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Abstract
This thesis seeks to open up a new area of debate and investigate the seemingly recent
phenomenon of corporate environmental performance considerations within bank
lending processes. By drawing initial evidence from professional banking literature
which addresses this issue, risk management is identified as the foundation for such
considerations. The critical question posed is how 'reality', and thus environmental
risk, is perceived and its associated management rationalised by bank lending officers.
Accounting research, which addresses bank lending processes, and interdisciplinary
debates on theories of risk perception are reflected upon. Drawing on theoretical
findings, initial evidence of corporate environmental performance considerations by
bank lending officers is re-examined. Based on an analysis of the social construction of
perception within a bank, it is argued that a plural rationality for environmental
management is constructed according to the social roles, relationships and
responsibilities of its members. 'How' and 'why' a bank lending officer interprets
reality become interrelated questions which are addressed.
The central proposal made is that banks can be characterised as hierarchical cultures
with views of physical nature founded upon myths of tolerance. Environmental risk
management within bank lending processes is thus rationalised as an effort to maintain
human impact with the environment at natural threshold limits. Hierarchical cultural
preferences explain a bank lending officer's support for environmental legislation
designed to sustain corporate activity at these limits. Empirical evidence to support this
proposal is based on a hermeneutic evaluation of environmental risk perception by bank
lending officers. Research participants are drawn from bank communities within
Switzerland, Ireland and the UK.
The thesis concludes by drawing upon evidence that corporate environmental
performance is considered within bank lending processes to highlight the need for
further research in this area. The central proposal establishes a provisional basis for
future research of this kind.
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Introduction
The term environment has been subject to varied use. A broad interpretation of the term
environment is 'all that surrounds us, man-made or seemingly natural'. When discussed
within the context of management, a popular inference made at present is that the
environment issue in question is one which arises from human interaction with the
natural environment: raising the question what is natural? However, each issue raised is
subject to a myriad of interpretations, and opens up debate founded upon different
perceptions of reality, sustainable development and accountability.
Contributors to environmental debate include individuals from a range of
organisations/institutions each offering a different view of environmental issues and
social roles and responsibilities. Over the last few decades, following pollution
incidents and 'signs' of global warming and resource depletion, interest in
environmental issues has increased. It is almost impossible currently to read a
newspaper, listen to the radio or watch television without witnessing debates regarding
environmental management. Questions have been raised regarding the scale of human
impact on the environment and the associated risks to society. Increasing uncertainty
has resulted from the variety of answers provided.
Government representatives have developed environmental legislation, as a response to
debate, in an attempt to manage human impact on the environment and potential social
risks. Corporate representatives, for their part in consumption and production, have
portrayed a proliferation of environmental policies and examples of management best
practice to counter claims that they damage the environment.
A new area of debate has centred on ethical investment and accounting practice as
mechanisms of environmental management. As a result, financial institutions have been
drawn into the environmental arena. The thesis l opens up this area of debate by
examining corporate environmental performance considerations within bank lending
processes.
Bank lending processes are defmed for the purpose of research as encompassing
applications for loans and loan monitoring procedures. 'How' and 'why' corporate
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environmental performance considerations form part of bank lending processes are
examined as a function of a lender's perception. The construction of perception is
explored as a basis from which to understand and interpret a lender's definition of
'environment' and their associated rationality for environmental management. The
issue of environmental risk perception evolves as a specific area of theoretical attention
from a literary review which addresses evidence of environmental consideration within
bank practice.
As this thesis addresses perception, it is necessary to provide a background from which
to evaluate the author's position. The author was schooled within the discipline of
accounting, through an undergraduate degree and working as a corporate financial
auditor in an accountancy practice. Given an interest in environmental issues, the
author's attention has become focused on the function of finance in environmental
management and the potential to adopt a monetary representation of environmental
value. The pursuit and direction of this thesis resulted from the author's personal desire
to explore the relationships between environmental management and finance. The
author found a specific research challenge on recognising that, despite increasing signs
of environmental issues within commercial bank lending practice, debate which
addressed this area was scarce.
Thesis format
Given the selection of bank lending processes as a focus for research, the natural
starting point of the thesis in Chapter one, is a review of prior research which addresses
this area. The purpose of the review is to analyse theoretical foundations developed
within the research area, in particular those which address environmental consideration.
The review identifies a wide range of research grounded predominantly in accounting
which address bank lending issues.
It is revealed that the primary research focus to date has been the nature and functional
value of information demanded and used by bank lending officers within lending
processes. Findings show that financial and non-financial information demanded and
used in lending processes are both complementary and supplementary sources of
information. In a number of studies, a bank lending officer's preference for, and use of,
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information was found to be influenced by a combination of lending officer
characteristics, bank policy and bank culture. However, as secondary considerations,
the degrees of influence of these variables on lending processes and their inter-
relationships have not been fully explored and remain questionable.
Further analysis of research findings is complicated by the lack of common research
questions and associated methodologies applied. In addition, comparisons drawn
between research findings are limited given the unique nature of lending decisions and
problems of research access. Thus, attempts by researchers to model 'the' lending
process and provide a theoretical foundation to explain findings have been limited.
Environmental considerations within bank lending processes, by both bank lending
officers and researchers, were found to have been scarce. This appears surprising when
reflecting upon the emergence of environmental accounting research, particularly over
the past decade. However, a key research study by Gray et al. (1993) identified a
proliferation of 'professional literature', encompassing publications and journal articles
by bank lenders and their representatives, highlighting an emergence of environmental
considerations within banks. It was noted that environmental accounting, in particular
lending considerations of financial institutions, has emerged as an area of increased
research interest and practice during the last decade. A tendency for theory to follow
practice in this area is recognised.
It is concluded from the review that there is a need to develop a theoretical framework
for the lending process from which to take research forward. As a basis for the specific
exploration of corporate environmental considerations within bank lending processes,
an extensive review of professional literature which addresses environmental lending
considerations by banks is carried out in Chapter two.
Undertaking a historical analysis of professional literature identifies the 1980's as the
first time when environmental lending considerations were raised by lenders. Potential
US lender liability for the environment under the US Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act 1980 is recognised as the initial basis for
debate. It is proposed that the observed lack of academic attention to the research area
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may be partially explained as the consideration of environmental issues by bank lenders
appears to be a relatively recent phenomenon.
The review reveals that as environmental legislation has developed at an international
level, concern regarding lender liability for the environment has become a subject of
sustained international debate. A number of bank advisers have proposed that evidence
of developing environmental policies and procedures within banks should be attributed
to liability management. To address this proposal a wider review of the situation is
undertaken.
An initial examination is made regarding the existence, availability and conditions of
environmental insurance that may be viewed as a means to offset such a risk.
Environmental insurance is found to be relatively scarce and conditions are perceived
as deterring purchase. As a result it appears unlikely that the risk of direct or indirect
environmental liability of lenders is offset with insurance.
Analysing in detail environmental considerations within lending processes the
remainder of Chapter two assesses further the questions of how, and why,
environmental issues are considered by bank lenders. Analysing the approach of
individual banks, initial evidence provides support for the proposal that environmental
considerations are part of a bank's risk management. However, an apparent
contradiction arises as an ethical position on the environment is noted among a number
of bank lenders. Consequently, bank lenders' rationalities for environmental
management remain questionable and in need of further examination.
The resulting direction of research is to address at a theoretical level a bank lending
officer's perception of, and associated management rationality for, environmental
management. This is undertaken through an initial exploration of possible theoretical
linkages between: environmental 'risk' perception and 'ethics'; and the role of bank
policy and functional lending policy. Particular emphasis is placed on defining how
lending officers' perceive risk and environmental risk given the recognised adoption of
the phrase 'credit risk management' in practice.
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Chapter three begins by considering risk definitions and their theoretical foundation
drawn from social science debate. The core ontological question addressed is how
environmental risk, and thus reality, is perceived by an individual. The result is the
narration of a search for, adoption, and justification of a social constructionist
perspective on risk perception. Thus, the epistemological stance adopted is to analyse
and seek to understand 'how' social reality is constructed by assessing specific social
processes supporting a proposed rationality. This stance in turn addresses the related
question of 'why' reality is perceived in such a way. Particular emphasis is placed on
cultural theories proposed by social anthropologists Mary Douglas (Douglas, 1966 to
present) and Michael Thompson, and scholars in political science Richard Ellis and the
late Aaron Wildavsky (Thompson et al., 1990).
It is recognised that the reduction of issues to 'mere' social constructions may be self
defeating. However, the author proposes that grandiose social theories provide more
than a sterile alternative to scientific reductionism; they provide a foundation for
analysis and debate regarding social practices. The end result may be to provide that the
development of these practices reflects a bias towards methods of scientific reduction.
The role of policy in communicating risk messages to and from individuals is viewed
as a representation of perception and management rationality.
In Chapter four, the bank is taken as the subject of analysis and the findings in Chapters
one and two are re-examined from a social constructionist perspective. Attention is
focused on social relationships and responsibilities inherent within a bank organisation,
and representations of environmental risk perception. Social relationships are viewed as
'hierarchical' arrangements supported by what is termed a 'complex web' of risk
communication. Bank and lending policy is a formal part of this communication web
representing bank members' plural rationality for environmental risk management. This
process of rationalisation is viewed as the fundamental 'ethic' of the social group
concerned. It is proposed that a bank's apparent environmental management activities
and rationalisation reflects a view of physical nature founded upon a myth of tolerance
(Holling, 1979). It is argued that, under such a classification, the recent phenomenon of
bank lenders examining corporate environmental performance is a reaction to
developing environmental legislation and a consequent adjustment to their perception
of natural environmental threshold limits.
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In Chapter five a methodology is proposed to facilitate an empirical examination of the
central proposal developed in Chapter four that, according to Thompson et al.'s
Cultural theory (1990), banks can be characterised as cultural hierarchies with views
of physical nature founded upon myths of tolerance. The methodology chosen reflects
the ontological and epistemological assumptions on which the central proposal is based.
Classification of the research as qualitative is therefore insufficient. The method of
analysis selected is a hermeneutic evaluation of social meaning and shared
understanding. Examining prior research findings and the results of pilot studies it is
recognised that a number of research access problems may arise in an effort by banks to
maintain client confidentiality and a competitive position. These issues were factored
into the research design.
Bank community case studies were selected as a basis for research. Communities were
delineated according to the national geographic boundaries and associated legislative
and regulatory regimes affecting banks. This basis of selection facilitated an analysis of
the potential influence of issues such as legislation, regulation and culture through
comparison of similar and dissimilar bank situations. Research was established with
bank participants from three communities: Switzerland; Ireland; and the UK with
banks classified according to their head office location. The cases encompassed ten
banks: three Swiss; two Irish; and five from the IX. One Swiss bank was the subject of
a cross community study additionally assessing the bank's subsidiary UK operations.
Initial bank contact was established with bank representative responsible for
formulating bank lending policy. Research within each bank was pursued using a
questionnaire to provide a semi-structure to interviews. Follow up research with each
bank varied according to researcher and participant views on access, confidentiality and
the nature of the bank's lending process.
In Chapter six research findings are outlined by evaluating trends displayed within and
between banks within individual communities, including findings from the cross
community study. Issues addressed include the social structure of banks, the
environmental management activities of bank members, and the rationalities
underpinning environmental management. Adopting a social constructionist
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perspective, it is stressed that the trends illustrated are the author's view of research
findings and may be subject to alternate interpretation.
In Chapter seven the application of the central proposal is discussed with respect to
these findings and additional contrast is drawn between banks across communities. This
proposal is evaluated in a number of cumulative stages which follow the theme set by
the theoretical development process undertaken in Chapter four.
Initial support for the central proposal is provided by evidence that banks are
hierarchical social structures within which bank members share common values. This is
achieved by drawing comparison between the nature of social roles, relationships and
responsibilities illustrated and adhered to within each bank. Attention is then devoted to
the development of, and adherence to, environmental policy by bank members, and the
communication web supporting the social construction of perception and management
rationality within a bank. The next stage is to compare and contrast environmental risk
perceptions illustrated by banks between, and across, communities to highlight the
unique nature of values held by members of each bank. Finally, comparison is drawn
between environmental management rationalities portrayed within each bank to reflect
a common view of tolerant nature.
Drawing on these findings it is concluded that bank members examined adhered to
hierarchical ways of life and tolerant myths of nature, supporting compliance with
environmental legislation and management of exceptions through bank activities. This
analysis explains how, and why, corporate environmental performance has been
considered within bank lending processes according to the social construction of
perception. The recent emergence of environmental policies and procedures within
banks is interpreted as a reaction to developing environmental legislation as opposed to
a change in an ethical position.
The thesis concludes by drawing upon evidence of corporate environmental
performance consideration within bank lending processes and establishes the central
proposal as a means of explaining this phenomenon as a provisional basis for further
research. It is argued that the provision of a social constructionist perspective from
which to interpret and understand the nature of lending processes and associated
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information requirements aid researchers or practitioners understanding of practice.
Due to its descriptive nature much of the research undertaken may be subject to claims
of positing an illegitimate tautology. Alternatively, it is proposed that the exploratory
nature of the research serves to establish a foundation from which to initiate debate.
8
Note
The term 'thesis' has been adopted to represent the full textual document presented as opposed to any
theoretical proposal contained within the document.
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Chapter 1
A theoretical insight into bank lending processes
Introduction
This Chapter reviews academic literature, predominantly in the field of accounting,
relating to bank lending processes'. The purpose of the review is to analyse theoretical
foundations developed within the research area and examine environmental
considerations.
Given the breadth of research which addresses bank lending processes, attention is first
devoted to identifying distinct areas of interest. This provides a context within which
the validity and contribution of research findings can be discussed. Areas of interest are
categorised according to different aspects of the lending processes examined, in
particular, the influence of: the bank; the bank lending officer2; the borrower situation;
and the banking environment.
Research findings fall into two primary categories financial and non-financial
considerations within lending processes. Findings show that financial and non-financial
information demanded and used in lending processes are both complementary and
supplementary sources of information. However, further analysis of research findings is
complicated by the lack of common research questions and associated methodologies.
In addition, research findings are limited given the unique nature of lending decisions
and problems of research access. Thus, attempts by researchers to model 'the' lending
process and provide a theoretical foundation to explain findings have been problematic.
Environmental considerations within bank lending processes, by both researchers and
lending officers participating in research, were found to have been relatively scarce to
date. However, key research identifies a proliferation of 'professional literature'
highlighting environmental considerations within banks. It is noted that environmental
accounting has emerged as an area of increased research interest and practice during the
last decade. In particular, research which addresses environmental issues within
financial institutions has highlighted the emergence of environmental considerations by
other lenders and a tendency for theory to follow practice in this area.
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Areas of research interest
Decision process and decision only research
Research which addresses bank lending processes has centred on what has been referred
to as 'decision process' research (Stephens, 1980). 'Decision process' research
examines the method of, and influences on, decision making supporting applications for
and of less prominence monitoring of loans. Research questions centre on how
decisions are processed and why particular processes are adopted. In particular,
accounting research has addressed the importance placed by bank lending officers on
the source, demand for, and utilisation of information and the rationalities for their
preferences.
Decision process research may be distinguished from 'decision only' research which
has centred on an analysis of the nature of information influencing the final lending
decision. In particular, bank lending officers have been recognised as potential users of
accounting information and questioned regarding the adequacy and format of financial
statements (Chandra, 1974). The results of decision only research have been used to
design decision process research. (Abdel-Khalik, 1973; Eyes and Tabb, 1978; Fertuck,
1982; Stanga and Tiller, 1983; Wilkinson, 1984; NEDC 3, 1986; Berry et al., 1987;
Duchessi et al., 1988; Dams et al., 1989; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991,4  1993;
Deakins and Hussain, 1991, 1994; Berry et al. 1993a)
Financial and non-financial information
A common distinction in research focus has been made between research which
addresses financial and non-financial information. While a number of studies have
considered both these categories of information, financial information has undoubtedly
received greater prominence (Berry et al., 1984; Berry et al., 1987; Innes, 1990; Berry,
Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993; Deakins and Hussain, 1991, 1994; Berry et al., 1993a).
A number of researchers, in particular those undertaking decision only studies, have
exclusively considered financial information (Abdel-Khalik, 1973; Stephens, 1980;
Cooper et al., 1981; Stanga and Tiller, 1983; Danos et al., 1989; Kemp and Overstreet,
1990; Holt and Morrow, 1992; Hutchinson and McKillop, 1992).
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Research has been undertaken to establish types of information demanded and used
within each category, and their relative importance. As part of such examinations, a
number of researchers have attempted to evaluate the functional value of information
with respect to the form of the lending process. A number of studies have considered
the value of financial information in isolation (Abdel-Khalik, 1973; Stephens, 1980;
Cooper et al., 1981; Danos et al., 1989). However, when considering the functional
value of non-financial information the relative value of financial information has
additionally been addressed (Berry et al., 1984; Berry et al., 1987; Innes, 1990; Berry,
Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993; Deakins and Hussain, 1991, 1994; Berry et al., 1993a).
Influences on lending processes/decisions
Research has addressed various combinations of influences on lending processes. Areas
of consideration have included the influence of the bank, the bank lending officer, the
borrower and the bank environment on lending processes and information for decision
making. These considerations reflect the founding rationalities upon which research
methodologies, and the degree to which general characteristics of lending processes, have
been modelled. Before critically reviewing research literature in this area, there is a need
to outline these influences to gain an insight into potential research limitations.
The bank
Whilst it is recognised that there are differences between banks, the structure of a bank
lending process is typified as an organisational hierarchy. Within such a structure,
authority for decision making is formally delegated to lending officers based on
authorised financial lending limits and referral conditions (Mansfield, 1979; Stephens,
1980; NEDC, 1986; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1993; Deakins and Hussain, 1994).
A number of research studies and professional commentaries have noted the operation
of lending committees. Lending committees were found to have been established to
approve loans either above the authorised lending limits of an individual lending officer
or for particularly large amounts (Mansfield, 1979; Stephens, 1980; Cooper et al, 1981;
Danos et al., 1989; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1993). However, the literature review
revealed an absence of research examining the committee decision process. In a number
of studies the existence of such a committee constrained research examination to loan
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applications below the level at which a committee was perceived to operate (Stephens,
1980; Cooper at al., 1981).
Research has examined the influence of bank policy and culture on the decision style
adopted by individual bank lending officers (Abdel-Khalik, 1973; Eyes and Tabb,
1978; NEDC, 1986; Nutt, 1989; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993; Deakins and
Hussain, 1991, 1994). Findings revealed that bank policy may vary in application
according to borrower size categories. Thus, loan size categorisation as determined by
bank lending officers has been examined by a number of researchers as a potential
influence on the lending process (Stephens, 1980; Cooper et al., 1981; Danos et al.,
1989; Holland, 1988) The size and/or location of a bank with respect to its primary
market has also been considered as a basis for borrower size definitions (Heard, 1980;
Stanga and Tiller, 1983; NEDC, 1986; Holland, 1988; Mansfield, 1979; Hutchinson
and McKillop, 1992).
The bank lending officer
The opinions of lending officers have been at the centre of research into bank lending
processes. A number of research studies have focused upon the influence individual
lending officers have had on lending processes considering a number of factors such as:
age; gender; academic qualification; career profile; professional training; and
experience. Subsequently, the effect of a lending officer's hierarchical position within
a selected bank and/or range of banks was considered along with the influence of
organisational constraints, incentives and bank culture on individual behaviour. (Abdel-
Khalik, 1973; Eyes and Tabb, 1978; Stephens, 1980; Cooper et al., 1981; Berry et al.,
1984; Wilkinson, 1984; NEDC, 1986; Berry et al., 1987; Nutt, 1989; limes, 1990;
Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993; Deakins and Hussain, 1991, 1994; Berry et al.,
1993a).
The borrower
The dominant form of research has been to question bank lending officers about the
influence of borrower characteristics on lending processes. Alternatively, research has
addressed borrower requirements and the associated view of the lending process. Of
particular interest have been the views of small business managers (Bannock and
Morgan, 1988). However, research examining the lending process from the point of
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view of lenders and borrowers within the same research studies were scarce. It has been
widely noted that research requests to examine real 'borrower' situations, have been
declined by banks bound by client confidentiality guarantees. These restrictions on
research access have precluded an examination of the views of associated parties within
a given lending situation. (Holland, 1988; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993;
Deakins and Hussain, 1991)
A particular area of research attention has been the influence of borrower size on bank
lending processes. Research has compared bank relationships with small companies to
those with large companies (Stephens, 1980; Cooper et al., 1981; Stanga and Tiller,
1983; Berry et al., 1987; Holland, 1988; Danos et al., 1989; Nutt, 1989; Innes, 1990).
Further examination of small business borrowing requirements has complemented this
research (Heard, 1980; Midland Bank, 1981; NEDC, 1986; Bannock and Morgan,
1988; Deakins and Hussain, 1991,1994; Fulmer et al., 1992; Hutchinson and McKillop,
1992; Berry et al., 1993a; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1993). Interest in small business
lending appears to have been evoked in response to a number of UK government
committee reports which address the role of banks within the monetary system 5 . (H. M.
Environment, 1971, 1979; Midland Bank, 1981 and Hutchinson and McKillop, 1992).
A primary problem comparing research results which address issues of borrower size
has been the variety of definitions provided for a company. A number of studies which
address small businesses have attempted to avoid ambiguity by leaving company size
undefined (NEDC, 1986). Company size has conventionally been defined by financial
indicators such as asset value, turnover, profit levels and number of employees.
Specific reference has been made to recognised size definitions such as those proposed
by the UK Company Acts (Berry et al., 1987; Berry et al., 1993a). However, other
considerations have been organisational structure, ownership structure, and
subscriptions to business forums perceived by researchers to be characteristic of a size
category (Bannock and Morgan, 1988; Holland, 1988).
The banking environment
Recognising the potential influence of the local economic and regulatory environment
on borrowers and lenders performance, research has focused upon research participants
within specific geographical locations. For example, considerable effort has been made
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to examine the use of accounting information by US bank lending officers (Abdel-
Khalik, 1973; Stephens, 1980; Cooper et al. 1981; Stanga and Tiller, 1983; Berry et al.,
1984; Bannock and Morgan, 1988; Duchessi et al., 1988; Danos et al., 1989; Nutt,
1989; Holt and Morrow, 1992; Kemp and Overstreet, 1990). This compares with
research which addresses lending practice within the UK which has been primarily
devoted to examining small business lending (Egginton, 1977; Wilkinson, 1984; Berry
et al., 1984; NEDC, 1986; Berry et al., 1987; Bannock and Morgan, 1988; Holland,
1988; Innes, 1990; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993; Deakins and Hussain, 1991,
1994; Hutchinson and McKillop, 1992; Berry et al., 1993a).
Research which addresses bank lending practice within other countries has been scarce
(Eyes and Tabb, 1978; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1993). However, notable research
includes that of Eyes and Tabb (1978) who examined lending practice in New Zealand
and research by Berry, Crum and Waring (1993) which includes an examination of the
lending activity of 4 'foreign' banks in contrast to 4 UK banks. To maintain requests
for anonymity they referenced findings to: American; Commonwealth; and European
banks examined.
Research examining bank lending practice according to geographic location has been
concentrated on banks domiciled within the country and/or area noted. However,
attempts have been made to examine the practice of banks of various domiciles
operating within the UK market, in particular comparing the practice of UK and US
banks (Berry et al., 1984; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1993). Few cross-community
studies have been undertaken, probably due to problems of feasibility or comparability
associated with conducting research under varying conditions. For example, variance of
accounting standards between locations restricts the comparability of research findings.
However, extensive research was undertaken by Bannock and Morgan (1988)
comparing and contrasting the lending experience of small business borrowers in the
UK and the US, taking into consideration local differences.
The range of research considerations and perspectives affecting lending processes
complicates the interpretation of research and its significance. Consequently the
formulation of theoretical foundations for lending processes have been problematic and
research conclusions are predominantly restricted to the context of specific research.
15
Research findings within both financial and non-financial categories illustrate this
problem.
Research findings
Loan applications
The importance and use of financial information
The dominant theme of research which addresses bank lending processes has
undoubtedly been the importance attached to the demand for, availability, and
subsequent use of financial information in decision making. Research findings have
been used to offer advice to providers and regulators of financial information as well as
companies seeking finance. Research which addresses bank lending officers as potential
users of accounting information has been particularly topical when changes in
accounting policy, regulation and practice have been proposed and/or adopted. This
may explain why non-financial information has frequently gone unrecognised or has
been recognised only as a secondary consideration or a by-product of research.
The most popular way of examining the importance of financial information within
lending decisions has been to ask bank lending officers to rate and/or rank the
importance of given data sets or proposed categories of information. Financial data has
primarily been drawn from the financial statements and provided in a detailed form
(Stephens, 1980; Cooper et al., 1981 6; Stanga and Tiller, 1983), according to imposed
categories (Eyes and Tabb, 1978; Berry et al., 1984; Berry et al., 1993a) or by name
only in comparison with other forms of financial and non-financial information
(Egginton, 1977; Berry et al., 1987 7; Danos et al., 1989; Beny, Crum and Waring,
1991, 1993; Berry et al., 1993a; Deakins and Hussain, 1994).
A number of researchers have built upon prior research findings (Stephens, 1980; Berry
et al., 1984). For example, Stephens (1980) used a data set considered by Chandra
(1974) in examining the differential weighting of financial information by users groups.
However, the findings of Stephens and Chandra lack direct comparability due to
differences between research questions and methodologies.
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Problems of research comparability exist on a greater scale due to the range of research
questions and methodologies applied in analysing lending processes. Research
methodologies have ranged from extensive postal questionnaire surveys (Egginton,
1977; Eyes and Tabb, 1978; Stanga and Tiller, 1983) to detailed interviews (Berry et
al., 19848; Danos et al., 1989; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993; Berry et al.,
1993a; Deakins and Hussain, 1994). Research has addressed bank lending officers
within and between banks of various geographic locations and considered borrower
information ranging from genuine applicants (Deakins and Hussain, 1994) to financial
statements drawn from 'real' but anonymous companies (Stephens, 1980; Stanga and
Tiller, 1983) and 'realistic' case examples (Danos et al., 1989; Berry, Crum and
Waring, 1991, 1993). Such problems highlight the importance of recognising research
findings within the context of examination.
Financial Statements 
Financial statements, in particular the profit and loss account and balance sheet, have
undoubtedly been one of the primary data sources demanded and used by bank lending
officers. A wide range of research carried out in the US, UK and New Zealand supports
this view noting little difference in demand or use of financial statements between and
within banks (Egginton, 1997; Stephens, 1980; Berry et al., 1984; Berry et al., 1987;
Innes, 1990; Kemp and Overstreet, 1990; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993;
Deakins and Hussain, 1994).
When evaluating research findings the date at which research was undertaken and the
geographical location of borrowers is of particular relevance given the influence of
accounting regulations. For example, on examining Egginton's research findings in
1974 it is noted that funds flow analysis was not a mandatory requirement of financial
statements in the UK9 . Evaluating the use of funds flow statements Egginton found,
that while of notable importance, they were a less popular source of information than
the profit and loss account and balance sheet (Egginton, 1977). Despite changes in UK
accounting standards, requiring the inclusion of funds flow statements within financial
statements, Berry et al. made similar findings in 1984. However, Berry et al. (1984)
provided an explanation for their findings, noting that a number of respondents rating
funds flow statements of reduced importance prepare a more revealing, version of the
statement.
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While financial statement information is publicly available within published annual
accounts, this information was found to be requested directly from companies as part of
their lending application. By approaching a borrower the bank lending officer was able
to request up to date un-audited financial statements.
Research has compared the importance of audited with un-audited financial statements.
Increased demand was found for information which had been validated by an audit,
although un-audited financial statements which up-dated existing audited accounts also
remained an important source of information (Egginton, 1977; Innes, 1980; Berry et al.
1984). The consideration of un-audited financial statements as a secondary source of
information is unsurprising given findings by Berry et al. (1988) that by the time
audited accounts had been released they were already on average three months out of
date.
A number of research findings additionally recognised the timeliness of information
provision as a primary concern of bank lending officers and in need of improvement
(Egginton, 1977; Eyes and Tabb, 1978; Berry et al., 1984). A study of bank lending
officers in New Zealand by Eyes and Tabb (1978) found that the filing of late accounts
was likely to effect a bank lending officer's opinion of the management ability
associated with a borrowing company.
Annual reports 
An extensive review of the use of other information contained within annual reports
was undertaken in the UK by Berry et al. (1984). Supporting previous findings, it was
noted that the auditor's report was examined to determine the reliability of data and
ensure there were no accounting problems requiring further investigation. Additional
emphasis was placed by all respondents on reading the notes to the accounts
thoroughly. One respondent provided a reasonable explanation for this, noting that the
information contained within the notes was the first to be read and determines the
direction of the subsequent analysis, indicating where to look for potential problems.
Additionally, the Chairman's report on company performance was read with a critical
eye. The research noted by exception that respondents appeared not to read the five to
ten year summary and statement of value added within the annual report. While there
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was no obvious reason for the lack of interest in value added statements, evidence was
provided that bank lending officers prepared their own financial summaries.
Management accounting information
Research has shown that, as a standard part of the lending process, financial
information used for management purposes by the borrower has been requested by the
lender. Bank lending officers were found to request past, present and future
management accounting information including aged debtor and creditor analysis,
budget figures, projected cash flows and valuation reports (Egginton, 1977; Eyes and
Tabb, 1978; Berry et al., 1984; Berry et al., 1987; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991,
1993; Deakins and Hussain, 1994). Researchers have attempted to rate or rank the
importance of specific items of managerial accounting information but varying
priorities were found.
Research in general has shown that the importance and use of management accounting
information closely follows the importance attributed to the financial statements. A
number of research studies found that bank lending officers evaluating a borrower's
future performance, placed most emphasis on management accounting information
(Berry et al., 1984; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991; Deakins and Hussain, 1994). In
view of the financial statements historical view of the company such a finding is not
surprising.
Considering the potential influence of borrower size on requirements for financial
information, Berry et al. (1987) revealed that bank lending officers dealing with large
companies use management accounting information less than those dealing with small
businesses. One of the main explanations for their findings was that bank lending
officers view large companies as more financially secure, reducing emphasis on
management information within the lending decision. Berry et al. (1987) further
proposed that greater delays existed in the publication of financial statements by small
businesses m, meaning that information was out of date and management accounting
information was considered as a substitute. Berry, Crum and Waring (1991) recognised
that problems of information availability existed irrespective of size and could be
attributed to problems of access due to poor lender/ borrower relations.
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Bank records 
Egginton (1977) addressed UK bank lending officers and noted that information
generated by the bank as a result of past lending experience was of prime importance. A
number of studies noted that existing bank records regarding a borrowing company
were one of the most commonly used sources of information available without recourse
to the borrower. These findings are not surprising given the reliance which bank
lending officers may place on such information in contrast to potential problems of
availability and reliability associated with other sources of information. Little
investigation has been undertaken to identify specific categories of bank information
drawn on beyond an impressionistic review of financial 'account' performance and, in
the case of security consideration, the register of charges. (Egginton, 1977; Berry et al.,
1984; Berry et al., 1987)
Third party information
There is some evidence that financial information regarding a borrowing company may
be requested from: financial institutions such as Dunn and Bradstreet i 1 (Danos et al.,
1989); companies house (Egginton, 1977); press or governments offices (Berry et al.,
1984; Berry et al., 1987; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1993). Berry et al. (1987) found
that such sources of information were used when evaluating loans to larger companies.
It is proposed that the importance and subsequent use of financial information is a
function of availability, timeliness and reliability according to specific circumstances
and a range of information sources. While some of these factors may be indicative of
borrowers of particular sizes, it is likely to be the nature of information which
influences its use. When limited to financial considerations only, it is proposed that
where information is available, timely and reliable, prominence will be placed on
financial statements. Secondary consideration will be given to management accounting
information, with emphasis placed on performance projections. This will be considered
parallel to information from reliable bank records.
The functional value of financial information
An important research study which addressed the functional value of financial
information on the structure of lending processes was undertaken by Stephens (1980)12.
The research centred on a Delphi study in which the preferences of US bank lending
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officers for financial information were considered with respect to various decision
parameters within lending processes. Stephens found decision processes to be
structured in three stages beginning with a determination of information adequacy with
reference to primary indicators 13 . Stephens recognised subsequent stages of analysis
involving the use of three financial cues 14 : loan size; loan type; and inflation rates, to
establish a decision context according to which sub-sets of information were selected
and analysed.
It was concluded from the study that financial information is drawn on by bank lending
officers to structure their decision processes. However, Stephens recognised that
lending decision processes are very complex. Stephens stressed that findings do not
mean that bank lending officers limit their information requirements to financial
statements or that all items of information within properly prepared financial statements
are used for every loan.
In support of Stephens conclusions it is noted that Abdel-Khalik (1973) found that US
bank lending officers requested detailed accounting data and analysed primary
indicators drawn from aggregate information. Similarly Danos et al. (1989), when
conducting interviews with US bank lending officers, found further evidence to suggest
that officers reached a high level of confidence early in the lending process based on
primary indicators and background data. Danos et al. (1989) also found that bank
lending officers' initial confidence in their judgements were materially altered as more
detailed forms of financial information were made available. In particular, information
relating to the perceived risk level of the borrower was found to be very influential.
Stephens (1980) additionally proposed that, within the limited scope of his research
findings, properly prepared financial statements were viewed as a minimal requirement
for initiating the lending process. In direct contrast to this conclusion, Eyes and Tabb
(1978), provided evidence that financial statements are not used within the loan
evaluation equation unless non-financial consideration such as a borrower's
management characteristics are acceptable. However, it should be recognised that while
considering a relatively similar time scale, these studies lack direct comparability.
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Later research adds further controversy to Stephens' findings regarding the effect of
loan size on the lending process. For example, research by Stanga and Tiller (1983),
based on a survey of US bank lending officers, showed that their financial information
needs to make a term loan do not differ substantially between large public companies
and small private companies. Similarly Berry et al. (1987), as a result of a number of
interviews with UK bank lending officers, proposed that the importance of audited
accounts and frequency of their use was similar for large and small businesses.
However, considering the use of a wider range of financial information, Berry et al.
(1987) added that a different emphasis was placed on information due to the complexity
of the business, the availability of up to date information, and the relative uncertainty of
the performance of small businesses.
The main point of criticism of Stephens' research is the application of a Delphi
methodology to the research area. It is proposed that by seeking a consensus of opinion
among bank lending officers, drawn from various banks and bank roles, the adoption of
a Delphi methodology fails to take into account the potential effect of bank policy and
the specific role and experience of a lending officer on the lending process. The
importance of considering the potential implication of such characteristics on individual
decision style and the lending process has been noted by a number of researchers
(NEDC, 1986; Nutt, 1989; Berry Crum and Waring, 1993).
Examining characteristics of lending officers, Eyes and Tabb (1978) found greater
emphasis was placed on financial information by officers with more banking and
accounting experience and those based in city offices. It was noted that city locations
may be indicative of proximity to borrowers in manufacturing industries given
additional findings that more emphasis was placed on the financial statements of
borrowers involved in manufacturing than agricultural sectors. Alternately, in light of
Stephens' findings, Eyes and Tabb may be criticised for failing to examine the size of
the loan under consideration. It may be argued however that their distinction between
bank lending officers working in city and rural branches may be representative of levels
of delegated lending authority and thus considerations of loan size. Research by Abdel-
Khalik (1973) provides evidence of the impact of bank customs and traditions on a
lending officer's decision making rationality.
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Given the context of research findings, evidence which addresses the functional value
of financial information on the structure of the lending decision is viewed as
inconclusive. These factors may be considered in addition to the potential influence of
availability, accuracy and timeliness of financial information noted previously. In
comparison, considerable evidence exists highlighting a functional role in financial
performance evaluation for what have been termed 'primary indicators'.
Primary indicators 
Research has revealed that primary indicators are impressionistic data used in basic
ratio formulation to analyse financial performance. Less evidence was provided of their
use in more complex methods of evaluation such as break-even and sensitivity analysis.
However, it was noted that methods of analysis may vary between and within banks,
and between officers of varying financial training (Eyes and Tabb, 1978; Berry et al.,
1984, Berry Crum and Waring, 1993). General trends identified within research
findings have centred on the frequent use of indicators which address: profitability and
earnings capacity; financial stability and net worth; liquidity and gearing; cash flow and
income retention; and security (Abdel-Khalik, 1973; Egginton, 1977; Eyes and Tabb,
1978; Mansfield, 1979; Berry et al. 1984; Berry et al., 1987; Kemp and Overstreet,
1990; Hutchinson and McKillop, 1992; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1993).
A number of research studies illustrated the primary importance attached to the
evaluation of profitability by bank lending officers, closely followed by financial
stability (Abdel-Khalik, 1973; Egginton, 1977; Eyes and Tabb, 1978; Mansfield, 1979;
Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993). These findings are not surprising given the
importance found to be placed on the profit and loss account and balance sheet by bank
lending officers. Research by Berry et al. (1984) provided a more extensive analysis of
the importance placed on primary indicators by asking bank lending officers to rank
identified indicators in order of importance. Their results were as follows (in rank
order): profitability; financial stability; liquidity; consistency of performance trends15;
cash requirement and income retention policy; and security. Considering these wider
research findings, surprise was expressed that given the recognised value of liquidity
analysis as a primary indicator such little importance was attached to funds flow
statements (Egginton, 1977; Berry et al., 1984). To explain this discrepancy Berry et al.
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(1984) provided evidence that bank lending officers prepare their own funds flow
statements.
Berry et al. (1987), extending the scope of their initial study, noted that when
evaluating small businesses bank lending officers provided a variation in ranking the
importance of primary indicators. Bank lending officers evaluating smaller business
placed greater emphasis on security ranking it fourth with less importance on
consistency of trends ranked sixth. Assessing the experience of borrowers in the US and
UK, Binks, Ennew and Reed, and Bannock and Morgan (1988) provided further
evidence to suggest that banks request more security and personal guarantees from
small businesses 16. Distinguishing between research undertaken in the US and UK, they
explicitly recognised that US banks placed less importance on security than UK banks
(Bannock and Morgan, 1988).
The role of security, and the reason for its emphasis in small business lending, has been
the subject of considerable research and continuing debate (Eyes and Tabb, 1978;
Midland Bank, 1981; NEDC, 1986; Bannock and Morgan, 1988; Berry et al., 1987;
Berry et al., 1993a; Hutchinson and McKillop, 1992; Deakins and Hussain, 1994). It
has been proposed that these findings may partially be due to the nature of lending to
companies of different sizes in varying situations or, the unrealistic expectations of the
borrower and/or lender. Berry et al. (1993) and Deakins and Hussain (1994) noted that
problems of information availability or reliability resulted in a trade off between
variables such as profitability, gearing and security, and an emphasis on general trends.
For example, Berry et al. (1993) found that a borrower in a financial loss making
situation may be an acceptable loan candidate if a growth potential was demonstrated
by their sales trends and a strong liquidity or security position was found to exist.
However, while it has been proposed that these problems may be more prevalent in
association with small business borrowers they have additionally been associated with
larger borrowers.
A suspicion has been expressed that excessive security requirements are being imposed
on small business due to lending officers' lack of experience in deal with a range of
lending circumstances. It has been proposed that lending decisions may have been
inappropriately judged on the basis of capital rather than income gearing. Such
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problems are perceived to be have been exacerbated by high staff turnover within
branch banks and a non-specialist approach to lending (Bannock and Morgan, 1988;
Deakins and Hussain, 1994).
Examining further lending to smaller businesses, borrowers were found to offer security
as evidence of commitment and view equity capital as leading to a loss of control
(NEDC, 1986). Reflecting on this, it has been noted that bank policy has precluded the
refusal of security when it was offered, promoting the taking of security to offset risk
(Midland Bank, 1981). Thus the role of, and the reason for the apparent emphasis on,
security in small business lending remains uncertain.
The functional role of primary indicators of financial performance in contributing to the
lending decision has been highlighted by research. Consideration of primary indicators
of profitability and financial stability adds support for previous findings that placed
importance on financial information from the financial statements. Additional emphasis
was found to be placed on the availability and reliability of financial information on
lending processes, in particular concerning small business borrowers. However, the
influence of primary indicators on the structure of the lending decision remains
questionable.
The importance and use of non-financial information
In the above review it was recognised that bank lending officers draw on financial
information and carry out quantitative assessment to support what are essentially
judgmental decisions. However, while most studies have centred on the importance and
use of financial information, they have recognised that non-financial information may
have a role in the lending decision (Abdel-Khalik, 1973; Egginton, 1977; Stephens,
1980; Cooper et al., 1981; Stanga and Tiller, 1983; Dams et al., 1989; Innes, 1990;
Kemp and Overstreet, 1990). In a number of these cases, the research focus and
methodology has been limited to the consideration of financial information. Where a
review of the importance and use of financial and non-financial information has been
undertaken, the dominant use of financial information has been questioned (Eyes and
Tabb, 1978; Mansfield, 1979; Heard, 1980; NEDC, 1986; Holland, 1988; Berry, Crum
and Waring, 1991, 1993; Berry et al., 1988, 1989, 1993a, 1993b; Deakins and Hussain,
1991, 1994). Research which addresses the role of the interview and visit to a
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borrower's premises was, by its nature, centred on the consideration of non-financial
information (Berry et al., 1988, 1993b). However, no research studies that considered
only non-financial information were found.
The prominence of financial considerations identified by research may be explained due
to problems of identifying and representing less tangible non-financial information. For
example, Egginton (1977: 177) noted "the experienced banker may form an opinion on
the abilities of a firm's management by a subconscious process which absorbs a variety
of pieces of information often over a lengthy period of dealing with the firm. The fact
that this process cannot be explained need not detract from the validity of the banker's
conclusions ...although there are always dangers of prejudice in inexplicable value
judgements".
Research concerning non-financial information has been primarily undertaken in the
UK and centred on small business lending (NEDC, 1986; Berry et al., 1993a; Deakins
and Hussain, 1991, 1994). Research in the US has noted the consideration of non-
financial information by bank /ending officers when debating research design.
However, the majority of research in the US has been designed to deliberately avoid
consideration of non-financial information basing case evaluation solely on financial
information17 (Abdel-Khalik, 1973; Stephens, 1980; Danos et al., 1989). Consequently
there has been little opportunity to provide evidence to suggest that non-financial
information is considered by US bank rending °facets beyond. teitience Xo such
methodological discussion.
A number of research methodologies have precluded the identification of non-financial
information in lending decisions. A quantitative methodology, while permitting an
examination of the importance placed on categories of non-financial information, does
not provide an opportunity to examine the methods of analysis of non-financial
information. Such analysis would require, as a minimum, a number of personal
interviews with bank lending officers. Given the problems of research access, in
particular restriction imposed due to client confidentiality noted previously, the lack of
research which addresses non-financial information is unsurprising (Berry et al., 1988;
Deakins and Hussain, 1991, 199418).
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Where research has been undertaken to examine the potential inter-relationships
between financial and non-financial information attention has been devoted to the
availability, accuracy and timeliness of information. The role of non-financial
information has been a focus of research which addressed lending to small business
(NEDC, 1986; Berry et al., 1989a, 1993a; Deakins and Hussain, 1991, 1994). It has
been proposed that where the availability or reliability of one type of information is
problematic more emphasis may be placed on the alternative. Conversely, where one
type of information provides a valuable contribution to results a review of the other
may depend on the nature of findings. Thus, circumstances where one type of
information is favoured over another have been examined (Eyes and Tabb, 1978;
NEDC, 1986; Berry et al., 1989a, 1993a; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993;
Deakins and Hussain, 1991, 1994).
Character of management
One of the most frequently identified and reviewed categories of non-financial
information was found to be the management ability of a borrowing company. In the
case of a small company this has involved an evaluation of the personal, managerial
and technical skills of one person 19
 or a small group of executives with respect to their
role and responsibility. Bank lending officers have recognised that in a small company
the role of such 'characters', in shaping the direction of the company were perceived as
critical success factors (Berry et al., 1993b). Research has shown that in the case of a
larger company such a character evaluation is prohibited by the scale of management
involved. Alternatively, the management ability of a larger company has been analysed
through a review of investment in human resources or the personnel records of key
members of management in connection with a specific purpose loan. (Abdel-Khalik,
1973; Heard, 1980; Fertuck, 1982; NEDC, 1986; Deakins and Hussain, 1991, 1994;
Fulmer, 1992; Berry et al., 1993b)
To analyse a borrower's management ability bank lending officers were found to
examine such personal characteristics as: integrity; competence; entrepreneurial flair;
financial awareness; and industrial knowledge (Heard, 1980; NEDC, 1986; Berry,
Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993). Examining a borrower's attitude and apparent
motivations was recognised as a means of determining a borrower's willingness, as
well as ability, to repay a loan (Abdel-Khalik, 1973). When considering future
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company performance, bank lending officers distinguished between a person's 'push'
or 'pull' characteristics. A 'push' characteristic recognises a borrower has nothing to
lose in a venture and a 'pull' characteristic recognises a drive to succeed (Berry et al.,
1988).
For companies of all size, management ability was determined in part by reviewing the
financial performance of the company. Evaluating the priority placed on non-financial
information, Eyes and Tabb (1978) found that bank lending officers in New Zealand
provided personal factors as their most important consideration when evaluating loans.
While the research failed to distinguish borrower size it has been proposed that such
prominence is more likely to be associated with small businesses given restriction of
scale. The problems of judging the management ability of a larger company have
resulted in greater emphasis being placed on financial information. However,
considering small business lending, Deakins and Hussain (1991 and 1994) found that
bank lending officers relied on financial information that could be generalised across
industry20 . In support of these findings Berry et al. (1993b) identified that additional
emphasis was placed on judging the character of management of a small company only
when financial information was unavailable, unreliable or out of date.
While prominence has been given to non-financial information for small businesses
lending the importance placed on financial information remains uncertain. Deakins and
Hussain (1994) distinguished the case of start up venture from these findings. In the
case of a start up venture, beyond information regarding the performance of a
borrower's past ventures, no financial performance record is available to judge the
commercial management ability of a borrower. Thus, they proposed that emphasis will
be placed on the character of a borrower.
In evaluating the accuracy of financial information in general and management
accounting information in particular, bank lending officers examined the experience
and relevant qualifications of a borrowing company's employees who have
responsibility for preparing such information. A number of studies found a focus by
bank lending officers on the role and credibility of external financial advisors21,
including auditors (Eyes and Tabb, 1978; Berry et al., 1984). Research found an
emphasis was placed on reviewing small company employee's as frequently their
28
accountants had been found to lack experience and appropriate qualifications. Berry,
Crum and Waring (1991) noted a particular absence of accounting qualifications among
management and employees within 'family businesses'. A review of key personnel was
recognised as part of evaluating a loan for which human resources were considered as
an important factor in project success (Heard, 1980; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991,
1993).
Nature of the business and the loan application
Research has identified other non-financial information considered by lending officers
when evaluating the nature of the borrower's business including: stage of development;
products and services; and stakeholdersn. Emphasis was placed on the present and
future performance of the borrower according to the purpose of the loan and credibility
of the application (NEDC, 1986; Deakins and Hussain, 1991, 1994; Berry, Crum and
Waring, 1993). In a number of research studies the ability of the bank to service the
loan was considered, with particular emphasis on the bank's lending policy.
Research undertaken by Holland (1988), reviewing small business and middle
corporate banking relations, proposed that a bank restructuring was taking place to
tailor bank products and services to borrower size and associated requirements.
However, a number of research studies have recognised that UK bank lending officers
lack knowledge of specialist industrial processes and business practices. These findings
may be explained by, or themselves explain, a bank lending officer's creference for
standardised financial information. (Deakins and Hussain, 1991; Berry, Crum and
Waring, 1993a)
The relative function of non-financial and financial information in lending processes
Interviewq
An evaluation of management and the nature of the business was found to be
undertaken during interviews held on bank premises, followed in some cases by project
presentations to the bank (Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993) The interview was
conducted on a one to one basis involving the lending officer and 'the' borrower. A
presentation by the borrower, however, often involved additional borrower personnel
such as an accountant, or other specialist support staff, depending on the purpose of the
presentation (Berry et al., 1988, 1989). Particular emphasis was placed on a borrower's
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ability to put together and defend the loan application, and add support for the quality
of financial information provided.
Site visits 
Site visits were frequently recognised as a part of the lending process, in particular
when dealing with small businesses. A dual function has been attributed to site visits in
relation to what have been termed 'call and care' and 'call and check' factors, and the
priority given to each function varied with the individual lending situation considered.
A 'call and care' function has the aim of increasing a lending officer's understanding of
the business and developing their relationship with the borrower. A 'call and check'
function has the aim of confirming the existence and quality of assets and impressions
of company performance gained through financial information. Thus, a site visit may be
used to verify financial and non-financial information or provide a new context within
which to review information. It has been suggested that the importance placed on site
visits was a response to the poor quality of financial information obtained from small
company borrowers (Deakins and Hussain, 1994; Berry et al., 1993a, 1993b, 1993c).
A site visit was found to provide a lending officer with an opportunity to observe social
relationships within the borrowing company, and the level of efficiency and
effectiveness with which the company appears to be operating. As the scale of
operations increase it was recognised that the lending officer gains a limited view of the
business from a visit, but impressions contain valuable information in the overview of
an ongoing project (Egginton, 1977; Heard, 1980; Berry et al., 1984; NEDC, 1986;
Danos et al., 1989; Berry et al., 1988, 1993b; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993;
Fulmer et al., 1992).
Other methods of data collection
Additional information was found to be gained through other forms of contact with the
company: letters; telephone calls; and meetings with members of staff. However, bank
lending officers noted that such information was unlikely to alter their decision to lend.
Other secondary sources of information used included a lending officer's previous
experience of a particular person and/or company and a borrower's personal financial
position and management reputation (NEDC, 1986; Danos et al., 1989; Berry et al.,
1993a; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993; Deakins and Hussain, 1991, 1994).
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A lending officer was also found to draw on external sources of information such as
specialist press to evaluate the relevant professional skills required from an applicant.
However, lending officers recognised that these were given little consideration and
were not viewed as a substitute for reliable primary information.
Bank guidelines 
Research has revealed that lending officers are provided with various 'mnemonic'
guidelines. A review of guidelines identified within a range of banks illustrated the
emphasis placed by bank policies on the evaluation of various borrower performance
characteristics.
Research evidence suggests that these guidelines are used by new, relatively
inexperienced, bank lending officers to guide their decision process. It is noted that
consideration of each factor is given equal weighting, including financial and non-
financial considerations. Research revealed that a number of experienced bank lending
officers use aide-memoirs while others questioned their value (NEDC, 1986; Berry et
al., 1988; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993; Deakins and Hussain, 1991).
Table 1. Bank mnemonic guidelines
THREE C'S
Character
Capital
Capability
CA.MPAIII
Character
Ability
Margin
Purpose
Amount
Repayment
Insurance
PARSER
Person
Amount
Repayment
Security
Expediency
Remuneration
PARST
Purpose
Amount
Repayment
Security
Terms
SAPACTRPS
Standing Ability
Purpose
Amount
Contribution
Term
Repayment
Profitability
Safety
Egginton, 1977;
NEDC, 1986.
NEDC, 1986;
Berry, Crum &
Waring, 1991, 1993;
Deakins & Hussain,
1991.
NEDC, 1986;
Deakins & Hussain,
1991.
NEDC, 1986. NEDC, 1986.
Evaluating the nature of alternative guidance documents and procedures has provided
little evidence as to the priority attached to either financial or non-financial information
and their role within the decision process remained questionable. However, research
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findings highlight the individualistic nature of bank policy and procedures as a potential
influence on lending processes.
Credit scoring/rating systems 
There was further evidence to suggest that bank lending officers apply judgmental
rates, or credit scores, according to bank guidelines. These rates and scores were found
to be applied to financial and non-financial information to support final lending
decisions (Wilkinson, 1984; Fulmer et al., 1992).
Cultural preferences 
One explanation for the lack of an obvious priority attached to information categories
between banks was provided by Nutt (1989). Undertaking research with senior bank
lending officers in the US, Nutt found that the most important determinant of
information preference was bank culture. He proposed that bank officers equated the
use of standard operating procedures as representative of a unique set of beliefs shared
by bank members. Research findings by Abdel-Khalik (1973) provided additional
evidence to support this proposal highlighting that bank customs and traditions
influenced information demanded by bank lending officers examined.
Lending contingencies 
A number of other studies have found that bank lending officers preferred to base their
decisions on ad-hoc rules of thumb. Such studies have equated the individualistic nature
of lending decisions with a need for bank lending officers to rely on their experience in
evaluating corporate performance (NEDC, 1986; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1993;
Deakins and Hussain, 1994).
Evaluating financial risk and return
Bank lending processes have generally been characterised within research findings as
founded upon an evaluation of financial risk versus financial return. Considerations of
'risk' highlights the uncertainty that money credited to a borrower will be returned in
whole or in part. Under principles of risk compensation it is proposed that lenders
establish a level of credit risk according to which they are willing to gamble their
financial stake for a potential higher financial return. In managing a portfolio of such risks
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it is proposed that a lender will seek an aggregate profit. Based on such principles the
function of the lending process is seen to be one of 'credit risk management'.
Considering the functional emphasis of lending processes on financial risk and return,
the conclusion drawn from the literature review is that financial information is
prioritised in the lending decision. However, under conditions of uncertainty the value
of non-financial information should not be underestimated. It is proposed that the
functional influence of information characteristics on lending processes is an area
requiring further research attention. In particular, the influence of bank policy and
procedural guidelines on the nature of lending processes.
Monitoring loans
Financial emphasis
Limited research attention has been devoted to observing the monitoring function of the
lender. Where comments have been made, emphasis was found to be placed on
interpretation of financial information to provide an indication of problems that may
require attention. From a review of account performance noted by Berry, Crum and
Waring (1991, 1993), monitoring was found to require a borrower to provide regular
management accounting information and timely interim and final financial statements.
Such requirements were based on the same information recognised as valuable by bank
lending officers in considering the application process.
Within monitoring processes particular attention was found to be placed on the
evaluation of a borrower's short term fmancial performance 23 . Financial information
used for monitoring was thus standardised to a similar extent to information within the
application process. In a number of research cases information requirements were found
to be formalised by their inclusion within loan covenants and/or lending agreements.
Non-financial monitoring considerations identified by research included requirements
on the borrower to inform the bank of any significant change in management or
business practice that may influence corporate performance. Thus, non-financial
considerations were reported by exception.
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Environmental considerations
'Natural' environmental issues were found to be considered in only two studies. In a
questionnaire survey of US bank lending officers Kemp and Overstreet (1990), found
that 'social and environmental' information ranked 45th in order of importance in a
data set of 48 items and other intangible factors also appeared to be of less importance
than tangible factors. They concluded that although such factors affected a firm's
performance they were perceived to be less important as they proved difficult to
interpret. This could explain the lack of research which addresses environmental issues.
Gray et al. (1993) reviewing what shall be termed 'professional literature24'
alternatively identified increasing consideration of environmental issues by banks.
Literary reference illustrated environmental issues were initially considered by lenders
in the US and then later within the UK in response to the development of environmental
legislation and potential lender liability25 for the environment. Given the research
findings by Gray et al. (1993), the failure of other recent accounting research studies to
examine and/or recognise environmental considerations by bank lending officers is
surprising. These findings are examined by reflecting on the development of
environmental accounting theory and practice.
The development of environmental accounting
Environmental considerations within accounting research became a fluctuating area of
debate among theorists in the 1970's and 1980's as part of a wider interest in social
accounting. During the 1990's a sustained interest in environmental accounting theory
and initiatives in environmental accounting practice, in particular environmental
reporting, has emerged26.
Recognising the recent development of environmental accounting practice as a potential
source of information for lenders, the apparent absence of environmental considerations
within bank lending decisions may be partially explained. A further contrast may be
drawn between research which addresses environmental considerations by bank lenders
and other institutional lenders to explain the lack of research in this area.
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Ethical environmental investments 
A proliferation of accounting research provides evidence of the development of
environmental investment funds 27 in the US and UK over the last two decades (Dunham,
1989; Kemp and Overstreet, 1990; Fisher, 1992; Gray et al., 1993). Research has
revealed a range of investment criteria and assessment methodologies applied between
funds and over time by single funds28 . This has created problems for researchers
analysing rationalities for investment29 and relative performance of funds within the
market30 . While the rationale for environmental consideration remains questionable, an
estimated El billion of environmental investments in the UK highlights the importance of
environmental considerations to investors (Dunham, 1989; Wood, 1991; Koechlin and
Muller, 1992; Lascelles, 1992; Perks et al., 1992; Corbett and Van Wassenhove, 1993;
Luther and Matatko, 1994; Burnett, 1995; Coulson and Dixon, 1995).
From a review of research which addresses environmental investment it appears that
theoretical questions addressed by research have followed evidence of practice in this
area. Thus, the lack of interest in environmental considerations by researchers and bank
lending officers participating in research is partially explained according to evidence of
the recent emergence of environmental considerations by banks and a tendency for theory
to follow practice in this area. It is proposed that a detailed analysis of professional
literature is needed to provide evidence of environmental considerations by bank
lenders as the basis from which to open up debate.
Summary
The review indicates that the primary focus of research which addresses bank lending
processes has been the influence of financial and non-financial considerations.
Environmental considerations within bank lending processes by both researchers and
lending officers participating in research, were found to have been relatively scarce to
date. However, this can be explained due to the apparent emergence of environmental
issues as a new area of bank consideration and a tendency for theory to follow practice
in this area.
Findings drawn from the review emphasise that research which addresses bank lending
processes is problematic due to access restrictions imposed by banks and the contingent
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nature of lending situations. The subsequent range of questions and methodologies
addressed by research has therefore limited the scope of theoretical conclusions.
Research has provided evidence that financial and non-financial information is
considered within lending processes. The priority attached by lending officers to
financial information is explained according to the emphasis of lending decisions on
financial risk return evaluation. Attempts to distinguish the functional value of
categories of financial and non-financial information has been complicated by the
apparent inter-dependence of such information and the range of variables influencing
information characteristics. The findings show that financial and non-financial
information demanded and used by bank lending officers are both complementary and
supplementary sources of information. The availability, timeliness and reliability of
information relating to the borrower were found to influence lending officers' demand
for, and use of, information to support lending processes.
In a number of studies, a bank lending officer's preference for, and use of, information
was found to be influenced by a combination of lending officer characteristics, bank
policy and bank culture. However, as secondary considerations, the degree of influence
of these variables on lending processes and their inter-relationship has not been fully
explored and remains questionable.
It is concluded from the review that there is a need to develop a theoretical framework
for lending processes from which to take research forward. By maintaining a research
focus upon bank lending officers, two streams of theoretical questioning are posed:
1. How is the lending process influenced by a bank lending officer's personal and
social characteristics? Research should include a consideration of a lending officer's
decision rationality, including an analysis of social and psychological determinants
such as bank policy, and an individual's role, responsibility and personal
characteristics.
2. How do variables within a lending situation influence a bank officer's lending
decision? Research should include a consideration of borrower, loan, and bank
environment characteristics, comparing how the demands of bank lending officers
are met and information is subsequently used within given situations.
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The inter-relationship between these two streams of questioning may then be
considered.
As a basis for the specific exploration of corporate environmental considerations within
bank lending processes, an extensive review of professional literature which addresses
environmental lending considerations by banks is carried out in Chapter two. The
streams of questioning noted previously and their inter-relationship will be considered
when evaluating this professional literature.
This will be followed in Chapters three and four by the development of a theoretical
foundation from which questions drawn from research and professional bank literature
may be further addressed. Once a theoretical proposal has been formulated which can
be used to explain the literary findings, an appropriate methodology will be selected
and adopted to empirically test the proposal. Chapter five will be devoted to the search
for a methodology to empirically investigate the linkages between the theoretical
proposal and bank practice. This will be followed by a critical review of findings
obtained. The remainder of the thesis will be devoted to drawing conclusions from the
findings of the initial literary reviews and evidence gathered from the empirical study.
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Notes
1 It is recognised that practitioners making reference to areas of personal specialisation, interest or
experience have provided a priori accounts of decision processes within their affiliated banks
(Mansfield, 1979; Heard, 1980; Midland Bank, 1981; Wilkinson, 1984; Carter, 1988). Alternately,
specialist business advisers, working closely with banks, have commented on various issues such as
commercial loan agreements and relationship management (Simmons, 1972; Dietz, 1988). On rare
occasions borrowers have sought to provide advice to lenders (Brown, 1985).
2 To maintain clarity within the text the term bank lending officer will be used to refer to bank
employees with responsibility for making lending decisions.
3 NEDC refers to the National Economic Development Council.
4 In order to distinguish between authors Berry. R. H.. Crum. R. E., and A. Waring and Berry, A. J..,
Faulkner. S., Hughes. M., and R. Jarvis, the forma group shall be referred to in 'full' in textual reference
notes and the later as 'Berry et al.'.
5 The Macmillan report raised initial research interest by identifying a 'gap' in the sources of fmance for
small businesses. It noted that small businesses were too small to obtain funds by the issue of quoted
securities, but had exhausted the resources of its proprietor. Attempts to close the Macmillan gap in post
war years were a particular focus of research and later government reports. For example, the introduction
of the term loan pioneered by the Midland Bank following the Radcliffe report call for banks to address
the methods of borrowing and the total finance made available. (Midland Bank, 1981 and Hutchinson
and McKillop, 1992) As fmancial markets developed the Bolton and Wilson reports (1971-1979) were
more critical of the terms and conditions of small company finance compared to larger companies
evoking new research interest (See H. M. Environment, 1971, 1979).
6 The publications Stephens (1980) and Cooper, San Miguel and Stephens (1981) consider a common
research study.
7 Berry et al. (1984 and 1987) refer to the same research study.
6 Additional difficulties were highlighted by Berry et al. (1984) who recognised the use of, at best,
partially comparable data sets and arbitrary means of gauging the importance attached to information by
bank lending officers.
9 Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No. 10 (SSAP 10), issued in July 1975, sought to establish
the practice of providing statements of source and application of funds as a part of audited financial
statements and to lay down a minimum standard of disclosure in such statement. SSAP 10 was later
superseded by Financial Reporting Standard No. 1 (FRS 1), issued in March 1992, which established a
standard for cash flow reporting.
10 NEDC (1986) additionally recognised that some small businesses were permitted to file only
abbreviated accounts or were exempt from disclosure.
11 Noted as an important source of information by research conducted in the US by Danos eta!. (1989).
12 See endnote 5. The reference Stephens (1980) and Cooper et al., (1981) provides results of the same
research study. Within the text the research is referenced to Stephens (1980).
13 Alternatively referred to as "lead indicators".
14 Stephens (1980) considered: loan sizes of $50-250k, $250-1000k and >$1000k; term, seasonal and
industry types loans; and inflation rates of 5%, 10% and 15%.
15 Reviewing consistency of performance trends was primarily found to be based on analysing
profitability.
16 Research by Binks, Ennew and Reed, and Bannock and Morgan (1988) also noted other areas of
borrower criticism such as high rates of interest and high borrowing charges.
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17 Emphasis has been placed on representing the loan applicant as a company rather than a person, thus,
removing the potential to consider the character of management.
18 Deakins and Hussain (1991, 1994) recognised that a problem faced by researchers in analysing
decision making was to observe as near as possible the actual conditions and processes of decision
making. The innovative methodology which they applied in acting the role of a real loan applicant may
be perceived to be as near as possible which one may get to the truth. However, despite attempting to
mirror the replies and enthusiasm of the real entrepreneurs the research remain surrogates and any
reading of their behavioural characteristics should be questioned. In addition, as with any behavioural
evaluation the sub-conscious assessment of the lending officer as to a persons character can not be
explicit. Further, when evaluating the delicate issue of behaviour a full explanation for a conscious
decision, especially where the researcher is acting a part may not be given. Although these criticisms are
not easily rectifiable it is necessary to note that they may influence the results.
19 Berry et al. (1993a) noted that lending officers frequently used the term 'lending to a person' when
evaluating the borrower of a small company.
20 These fmdings were confirmed by Smith (1994) who reused Deakins and Hussain 'real' case example
with Scottish bank lending officers during 1993 and found remarkably similar results. However, it
should be noted that direct comparability problems do exist due to a difference in the timing of the
research and a new researcher playing the role of the borrower. There may be differences in economic
conditions between the summer of 1991 when Deakins and Hussain undertook their study and 1993
when Smith undertook the second study, a factor perceived to be important to risk assessment by
Deakins and Hussain. Further, the validity of using the same business plan may be questioned given that
its entrepreneurial proposals may not be as innovative or appealing two years later.
21 Such consideration was additionally extended to the credibility of other external advisers such as legal
representatives (See Eyes and Tabb, 1978).
22 Stakeholder identified included customers, suppliers, competitors and regulators. Consideration were
made of: existing and potential market size; the nature of competition; distribution channels; and
advertising and marketing. Product strengths and weakness in light of demand, competition and potential
improvement in production methods and pricing strategies. Supplier adequacy, reliability, and quality.
23 The monitoring process has additionally been recognised as a way of developing lender borrower
relations. In particular, getting to know the management of the company and the specialist nature of the
business. An improvement in the lenders understanding of both of the company has been identified by
research as an area of importance to the borrowers but an area subsequently criticised (NEDC, 1986;
Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993).
24 Professional literature includes publications: by bank practitioners; by bank advisers often quoting
practitioner examples; and comments by bank trade organisations.
25 More recent work has been undertaken by Thompson, P. (1995 and 1996) to examine the impact of
environmental issues on bank lending decisions. The research focused upon the use of environmental
information within annual reports by bank lending officers within the UK. Research participants were
drawn from a list of signatories to the UNEP statement by Banks on the Environment and Sustainable
Development (see later) as at January 1995, including banks of UK and foreign domicile. Research
findings were based on a postal questionnaire survey complemented in some cases by a follow up
interview during 1995/6. Thompson found evidence that 'commercial considerations' were leading to a
number of bank to consider environmental issues with little evidence of adoption of ethical codes and
socially responsible behaviour ascribed to under the UNEP statement.
26 At the same time interest in environmental issues has not been limited to accounting but has become a
popular area of debate across the disciplines.
27Envfronmental considerations were first hi . blighted within the investment criteria of social/ethical funds
and later within green funds based solely on environmental criteria (Dunham, 1989; Fisher, 1992; Gray et
al., 1993). The consideration of social criteria has for a long time been an issue for churches and charities.
Socially responsible, or ethical investment, funds have been researched since they became available to the
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private investor when launched in the US in the early 1970's and later in the UK in 1984 with the
development of the Friends Provident Stewardship Trust (Gray et al., 1993). The 'Merlin Ecology Fund',
was the first green fund introduced in the UK in 1988 (Dunham, 1989; Fisher, 1992; Gray et al., 1993).
28 Most research effort has been expended to define the term green investment or green fund. The result has
been a general bifurcation of this definition One approach is 'green opportunity stocks' in which investors
seek a profit from companies operating environmental services. The second approach has been investment
in companies who have adopted a 'positive' attitude towards environmental issues and avoidance of
companies perceived to have a 'negative' impact on the environment.(Lascelles, 1992; Perks et al., 1992)
29 The rationale behind such environmental investments have been the subject of research debates centred
on whether or not the search for profit and ecological concerns can be compatible.
30 A recent study by Luther and Matatko (1994)addresses the question of an appropriate choice of
benchmark against which to measure the performance of ethical investments. Luther and Matatko found
that ethical investment in the UK is characterised by largely but not entirely, investment in smaller
companies. However, they concluded that the 'systematic' component of ethical investments returns appears
to be better described by a benchmark made up of both a market and a small company index which could
cause problems in assessing their results.
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Chapter 2
Practitioners' insights into environmental issues within banking
Introduction
In Chapter one it was highlighted that academic literature which addresses bank lending
processes has largely failed to recognise environmental considerations. However, with
reference to professional literature, one key study by Gray et al. (1993) identified the
recent emergence of environmental considerations by bank lenders to assess potential
lender liability issues. The apparent absence of environmental considerations by both
researchers and bank lending officers engaged in research was attributed, at least in
part, to the recent development of environmental accounting theory and practice, and a
tendency for theory to follow practice in this area. This Chapter provides an extensive
review of 'professional literature' which addresses bank lending processes, and reveals
that banks are increasingly considering environmental issues. Thus, a need for further
research to address corporate environmental performance considerations within bank
lending processes is highlighted.
An extensive review of professional literature confirms that environmental concerns by
bank lenders were first publicised in reaction to a new and increasing potential for
lenders to be held liable for environmental damage. Thus, the initial experience of US
lenders with respect to the development of strict liability principles for the environment
becomes the starting point for the Chapter. This is followed by a review of non-US
lenders' experience of liability for the environment. Initial evidence, particularly from
the US, shows that banks have incorporated environmental considerations into their
lending processes with a view to managing liability risk.
Insurance is an important part of environmental risk management, and an examination
of lenders' efforts to obtain insurance for both themselves and their borrowers is carried
out. One proposal considered is that if environmental liability can be mitigated by
insurance then the associated credit risk, and management of that risk, may be reduced.
Little evidence emerges that banks have undertaken insurance to mitigate their potential
environmental liability, and the availability and suitability of insurance are questioned.
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In the last section of this Chapter, environmental bank principles and motives for
environmental considerations are addressed in detail, starting with organisational policy
and progressing to specific lending issues. Evidence is provided that banks have
adopted ethical positions on the environment in addition to lending policies founded on
credit 'risk' management principles. Two questions emerge from these findings: what is
the relationship between a bank's ethicallenvironmental policy and environmental
credit risk management approach, and how do bank lending officers' define risk?
Lender liability for the environment
The US experience
As noted by Gray et al. (1993), literature which addresses environmental consideration
within banks has emerged in response to concern regarding potential lender liability for
the environment. Such concern was first noted in response to the US Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 1980, a
remedial legislation requiring the clean up of contaminated sites. In support of this
legislation a 'Superfund' was established to finance the response activities of the US
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). Under CERCLA commercial owners of
contaminated land could be held strictly liable for site clean upl . Thus, when a bank
calls in security for a loan it becomes the owner, or operator, of the property and absorbs
responsibility for liabilities attached to the property including site clean up.
Published interpretations of CERCLA legislation and associated legal cases have been
dominant in literature which has addressed US environmental lending issues. As
environmental legislation has developed at an international level, experience of strict
liability principles within the US has been extensively quoted by bank advisers and
representative bank organisations (Fettig, 1991; Obermarm, 1991; Skaddens et al.,
1991; Cook, 1992; Ries and Christel, 1992; Tay, 1992; ACBE, 1993; Anon., 1994b;
Anon., 1994c; ASTM, 1994; Barrett, 1994; Dybhahl, 1994; Eggert, 1994; Gleason,
1994; O'Brien, 1994; Robbins and Bissett, 1994; Rutherford, 1994; Steven, 1994;
Williams, 1994; Vaughan, 1994; Clark, 1995; Olaf de Senerpont Domis, 1995; USEPA,
1995a, 1995b)
42
A number of US legal decisions have led to speculation that lender liability for the
environment may be extended to lenders who participate in the management of the
borrowing company and are thus responsible for undertaking, or allowing, polluting
activities to continue. A landmark case in this area, extensively reported, was that of Fleet
Factors 19902. In the case a bank was deemed to have participated in the financial
management of the company to the extent of influencing the corporate treatment of
hazardous waste. On these principles the court held the bank financially liable for the
clean up costs attached to resulting contaminated land. However, following the Fleet
Factors ruling it was recognised that other courts failed to rule against a lender in a
CERCLA context based on the 'capacity to influence' theory adopted in the case (See
Appendix A). Many writers have therefore claimed that Fleet Factors was a worst case
scenario of lender liability for the environment and somewhat of an anomaly (Ries and
Christel, 1992; Bennett, 1993; Eggert, 1994; Robbins and Bissett, 1994; Rutherford,
1994; Vaughan, 1994).
The reaction of US banks to the development of legislation and the Fleet Factors case has
been of particular interest to representatives of the local bank community such as the
American Bankers Association (ABA). In a survey of US banks, following the Fleet
factors ruling, the ABA found that 62.5% of community banks had rejected loan
applications for fear of environmental liability and 48.8% had discontinued financing
'dirty' industrial sectors such as chemicals processors and petrol stations (Anon., 1994c;
Barrett, 1994). These findings were drawn on by the ABA in lobbying the US
government for clarification of legislation, and later by those who have addressed the
potential effect of similar legislation outside the US. Further evidence of these trends was
provided by Sarokin and Schulkin (1991) who reported that a survey by the Mortgage
Bankers Association of America revealed that more than 70% of all US commercial estate
transactions were undergoing environmental assessment.
In response to such fears among lenders, the USEPA attempted to clarify legislation by
adopting a ruling on 29 April 1992 according to which Superfund liability for a
contaminated property under CERCLA would not be arbitrarily attributed to a lender
merely by virtue of their normal service activities. However, the rule was soon challenged
in the case of Kelly and Chemical Manufacturers Association v EPA by the US Court of
Appeal for the District of Columbia (Anon., 1994f; Eggert, 1994; Robbins and Bissett,
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1994). The court held that the EPA lacked the authority to define and limit a party's
liability under law and found determinations of liability the exclusive province of the
federal courts. In the absence of new legislation to clarify the lender's position with
respect to environmental liability, the EPA rule has been extensively quoted to lenders
attempting to avoid liability (Anon., 1994b; Anon., 1994d; Eggert, 1994; Steven, 1994;
Vaughan, 1994; Olaf de Senerpont Domis, 1995).
Following the invalidation of EPA rule, a survey by the ABA of small US banks in 1993
found that lenders' fears remained, and 90% had changed their lending policies in an
attempt to avoid environmental lending liability. Furthermore, many feared that their
capital base would be wiped out by a single claim (Anon., 1994c). Similar findings were
made with regard to lenders of all size through an environmental survey of financial
institutions in the US by Dun and Bradstreet and Environmental Data Resources (EDR).
They concluded that "environmental risk management procedures are.. ..institutionalised
in the banking ..industries of the US" (EDR, 1994). US surveys, publications by bank
associations, and a number of bank reactions 3 indicate that US lenders see environmental
liability as a real threat (Lascelles, 1992; Cocheo, 1993; Gleason, 1994; Griggs, 1994).
In response to lender fears, the ABA has developed an environmental risk task force from
key bank members to: review legal development; discuss community action; and guide
best practice (ABA, 1995a). In addition, the Environmental Bankers' Association was
formed in January 1994 by 25 US banks to focus on the growing need for banks to
manage environmental risk (EBA, 1994b; Anon., 1994a). Both associations have been
driven by a perceived need for environmental risk management. Consequently they have
been responsible for the proliferation of guidance materials to support risk management
by bank members across the US (Ries and Christel, 1992; Cocheo, 1993; McQuiston,
1993; EBA, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1994d, 1994e; Greenfields Group, 1994; Griggs, 1994;
USEPA, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; ABA, 1995b).
Environmental Data Resources (EDR) is a US organisation specifically founded to
provide information to lenders regarding environmental legislation and company
performance (EDR, 1994, 1995). In addition, the American Society for Testing Materials
(ASTM), among others, has begun to develop environmental standards regarding risk
management, due diligence and auditing. The value of these standards have been widely
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recognised (Bennett and McCarter, 1993; EDR, 1994; ABA, 1995b). Other published
environmental initiatives have included the establishment of voluntary standards to
promote the clean up of Brownfield, and less frequent, Greenfield sites (O'Brien, 1994;
Anon, 1995; Shearman and Sterling, 1995).
A number of US legal bills have been drafted in an attempt to clarify lender liability for
the environment, but none were adopted (Vaughan, 1994; ABA, 1995b). However, during
the Super-fund reform bills in 1995 a number of provisions clarifying lender liability in
specific situations were agreed. These provisions, which took effect from 6 December
1995, were extensively promoted by the ABA. They include, for example, an exemption
from lender liability where pollution was associated with underground tanks involving
petrochemicals' storage. In 1995, the ABA additionally recognised the adoption of the
EPA rule of 1992 as a basis for official guidance by the regional offices of the EPA
(ABA, 1995b4).
Some literature has presented a broader view of the effects on lenders of a borrower's
environmental liability. A borrower's solvency can be jeopardised by increased liabilities
due to environmental issues, and the lender may face a loss of repayment. In such
circumstances, lenders' face the prospect of paying twice, directly and indirectly, for the
same liability of the borrower. Such debates have been addressed by those concerned with
the development of potential lender liability outside the US, where potential loss has been
viewed as relatively limited (Bryce, 1992; Napier and Clabon, 1992; Segal, 1992; ACBE,
1993; Bennett and McCarter, 1993; Long, 1993; Redman, 1993; Hellawell, 1994;
Rutherford, 1994; Smith, 1994; Vaughan, 1994; Williams, 1994; Clark, 1995). A number
of publications have additionally highlighted the benefits to the borrower of lenders'
reactions to environmental liabilities 5 (Anon., 1989; ACE, 1993).
Historically, lender liability for the environment within the US appears to have been less
frequent than anticipated during the development stage of CERCLA and the
establishment of strict liability principles. However, the lender's legal position concerning
environmental liability remains unclear. US lenders' experience of environmental liability
over of past two decades has been of interest at an international level as environmental
legislation has developed. Examining the experience of lenders and their representatives
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regarding environmental liability outside the US, further evidence is provided of concerns
by banks.
Experience outside the US
Lenders and their representatives from many countries outside the US have reflected on
the historical trends concerning lender liability in the US. Although environment
related legislation has a long history in many countries the scope of more recent
developments, and the potential introduction of strict liability principles, for the first
time pose significant challenges to lenders. It is on this basis that the experience of US
lenders and interpretation of the US legal situation has been debated.
United Kingdom
Environmental legislation, notably the UK Environmental Protection Act 1990 (EPA),
is based on a fault based system of liability. The introduction of the UK EPA 1990
highlighted the need to finance corporate environmental management improvements to
avoid penalties. The development of European legislation has shown signs of opting for
a strict liability regime6. Lenders' concerns regarding developments in strict legislation
have been publicised through a variety of responses to EU discussion papers and the
advent of the Fifth Environmental Action Programme (1993-2000) calling for an
integrated approach to environmental
In 1992 the common law case Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather caused
considerable debate when the Court of Appeal held that no-fault liability principles in
nuisance law applied to an industrial company causing long term groundwater pollution.
The case was finally overturned8 on the basis that strict liability should be imposed by
Parliament rather than by the courts (ENDS, 1992c, 1993c).
Lenders' fears also escalated in response to the potential introduction of a contaminated
land register under the EPA 1990. The land register was originally proposed to take
effect from 1 April 1993, however consultation led to a number of deferrals and plans
for the register were abandoned due to impracticalities in Spring 1994. The UK
Government's review of contaminated land and liability in the consultation paper
'Paying for our Past' evoked considerable response from the bank community. (ENDS,
1992b; Napier and Clabon, 1992; National Westminster Bank, 1992; 1993c; Thompson,
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1992; Anon., 1993a; ENDS, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c; Gapper, 1993; Long, 1993; Barrett,
1994; BBA, 1994; Hellawell, 1994; Rutherford, 1994; Wheatley, 1994; Stallworthy,
1995)
The first reported instance of a bank in the UK exercising caution in view of
environmental considerations, was the case of Elm Energy in 1992. When attempting to
raise thirty five million pounds for the development of an electricity generating plant?
Elm Energy found that its bankers questioned the environmental impact of the plant. The
finance negotiations took over one year and legal costs were accordingly high (Lascelles,
1992).
This was followed in February 1993 by a report by the Financial Sector Working Group
of the Advisory Committee on Business and Environment (ACBE) 1 ° which addressed
the need to clarify the position of lenders with regard to environmental liability. They
found that uncertainty had resulted in lenders refusing loans in a number of situations
(ACBE, 1993). The British Bankers' Association (BBA) also published a position
statement on behalf of their membership and an issue brief to all UK banks in
September 1993 (BBA, 1993a, 1993b). The statement called for EU and UK legislation
to contain appropriate exemption from liability for lenders who have acted in the
ordinary course of their business and have not directly contributed to environmental
damage caused by the customer. The ACBE and the BBA have continued to comment
on environmental lending considerations as new risks and environmental lending
practices have been recognised (ACBE, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a; BBA, 1994,
1995b).
By 1995, the BBA's Risk Management Committee had established a special
Environmental Issues Advisory Group that became actively involved in government
liaison during the development and introduction of the Environment Act 1995. The
Group's principal aim was to achieve lender exemption from environmental liability
(BBA, 1995a). However, interpretation of the legislative terms 'owner', 'knowingly
permitting' and 'appropriate perion' within the Environment Act 1995, remain
problematic and have become a focus of concern for bank advisers and representatives
(Boulton and Lascelles, 1995; Smith, 1995; Stallworthy, 1995; Warren, 1995). In
addition to the BBA position, the National Westminster Bank published a number of
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special discussion papers and commented on lender liability issues in their annual
environmental reviews (National Westminster Bank, 1992 to 1996; Thompson, 1992).
The first, and only, reported case of environmental lender liability was noted in 1995.
The case involved Midland Bank becoming liable for environmental clean up costs
attached to a site following its repossession. Midland had failed to carry out an
inspection which would have revealed the existence of an old tyre dump on the site.
The local waste regulatory authority prosecuted the owner for unlawful deposit of waste
and the bank mortgagee in possession as the occupier under the UK Environmental
Protection Act 1990 (Nicholson et al., 1995).
Europe
At a European level the Federal Bank Association of the European Communityl 1 has
continued to address environmental liability issues following their initial response to
the European Commission's 1993 discussion document on remedying environmental
damage. In 1994, the Federal Bank Association established an environmental working
group with bank representatives from member states. Whilst the existence of the
working group is acknowledged in literature relating to environmental liability, the
Association does not appear to have published any further comments on the issue
(Clark, 1995).
A notable distinction has been made between lender liability for the environment within
common law countries, such as the UK and Ireland, and countries with civil code law,
such as continental Europe. As already noted, under common law in a situation of
bankruptcy or foreclosure the lender frequently becomes mortgagee in possession and
potentially liable as owner of the site. However, in countries with a civil code law
ownership devolves to the courts, so the lenders are more worried about loss of
collateral than inheriting extensive liability (Clark, 1995).
Environmental concerns have also extended to Europe's central banks who have
expressed fears that potential liabilities will be a long term drain on the industry's
capital base. In addition, concern has been shown regarding the potential impact of
attempts to quantify environmental liabilities within the banks' capital. Under
international rules set by the Basle Committee of central bankers, capital can qualify as
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tier one (or core) capital only if a bank can quantify the contingent liabilities attached to
it (Barrett, 1994). The uncertainty as to the level of environmental clean up costs faced
by a bank makes contingent liabilities impossible to quantify. Thus, to avoid placing
lenders in difficulties, central banks have been reluctant to force clearing banks to
provide for environmental liabilities and reduce core capital. It has been proposed that
once environmental liabilities are defined and quantified they will have to be accounted
for (Anon., 1994b).
Fears and uncertainties over the interpretation of legislation have been expressed, yet
few cases of lender liability have been reported outside the US. Further, despite the
trends indicated by EU directives, to date regulation regarding strict environmental
liability has not been introduced outside the US. Rather, other countries have looked
towards strict liability regulation in the US as a test scenario.
Canada
Canada has paid particular attention to the US situation. Canadian legislation at both
federal and provincial levels lacks clear definitions of potential environmental liabilities
faced by lenders. It has been proposed that this is largely due to the complexity of the
Canadian legal system. While no court decisions have been made regarding direct
lender liability issues, there are court cases (see Appendix 1) which have suggested that
environmental liability could be imposed on a party taking possession of a business
which has caused environmental damage (Fettig, 1991; Prevost, 1991, 1992; Farlinger,
1992; Tay, 1992; Ferrer, 1993; Vaughan, 1994).
Australia
Under Australian law, lender liability appears particularly pronounced as environmental
clean up costs are assigned to the current owner-operator regardless of their
responsibility for pollution. Unsurprisingly, the Australian Bankers' Association has set
out a 'financial institutions exemption' clause, on a similar basis to the BBA position
statement, which they would like to see adopted (Knapman; 1991; Welch, 199312;
Vaughan, 1994).
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Netherlands
In the Netherlands the approach has been proactive. Uncertainty over potential
environmental liabilities has led to an environmental liability insurance scheme
involving a pool of 48 insurers and 6 re-insurance companies (Vaughan, 1994). This
system highlights the potential role of insurance in mitigating environmental risks to
the lender.
Internationally
The UNEP has produced reports which address lender liability issues at an international
level. Further, it has provided access to conference papers presented by bank
representatives as an example of bank views and environmental management activities
(Bank Handlowy W Warszawie S. A., 1994; European Investment Bank, 1994; Smith,
1994; Vaughan, 1994; Bank Handlowy W Warszawie S. A., 1995; BBA, 1995b; Credit
Suisse, 1995; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1995a; Green
Alliance, 1995; Swiss Bank Corporation, 1995; UNEP, 1995b, 1995c, 1995d; UNEP
and Salomon Brothers Inc., 1995; Union Bank of Switzerland, 1995; Hill et al., 1997).
From a review of professional literature it is evident that bank members and their
representatives are concerned about potential environmental lender liability, arising
directly and/or indirectly from lending activities. Some banks have incorporated
environmental considerations into a corporate borrower's performance evaluation and
in some cases have refused to lend. Environmental considerations may support the
lending functions traditional principle of financial risk versus financial return.
However, without analysing environmental considerations within general bank policy
and lending processes further, the attribution of environmental consideration purely to
liability and so called risk management responses may be premature.
Adequate insurance against environmental liability is likely to form a distinct part of a
bank's efforts to manage environmental risk. Thus, evidence that lenders have
purchased environmental insurance themselves, or requested their borrowers to
undertake specific cover, implies that risk management principles have been
incorporated into lending processes with respect to environmental consideration.
However, for such a proposal to be valid the availability, cost, and cover provided by
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environmental insurance must be examined to determine whether it meets the
requirements of both lenders and borrowers. The assumption would be that if lenders
recommend insurance they see it as both valid and valuable. A literature review is
necessary to examine environmental insurance considerations by banks.
Insurance considerations
In seeking to spread environmental risk, it has been recognised that a number of US
banks have turned to insurers for help. Banks have required high risk borrowers to
underwrite their loans by taking out specific insurance cover. Such requirements were
applied to borrowers on a case by case basis, although there was one reported
exception, Rhode Island Fleet Bank. In June 1992 the bank announced the introduction
of a policy under which all new and renewing commercial real estate borrowers with
loans in excess of one million dollars would be required to carry environmental liability
insurance (Cocheo, 1993). The effect of such a requirement has been debated by banks
who have stressed a need to offer competitive finance, and questioned the ability of the
bank to exert power over a borrower in such a market. In the US the range of
environmental insurance policies available to the lender to avoid environmental lender
liability has increased (Dybhahl, 1994). However, the take up of such insurance within
the US remains unconvincing (Skaddens et al., 1991; Ries and Christel, 1992; Street,
1992; Cocheo, 1993; ASTM, 1994, Italiano, 1994).
The extent to which specific environmental insurance is available to lenders outside the
US is doubtful. There is no evidence to suggest that banks outside the US have taken
out environmental insurance. Little evidence has been found to suggest that non-US
banks have required borrowers to undertake environmental insurance, and the
implication has been that there is a lack of availability of adequate insurance (Street,
1992; Cocheo, 1993; Payer and Weidmann, 1993; Robbins and Bissett, 1994).
An examination of the international insurance market illustrates that insurers have been
concerned about the implications of their environmental liability and by the prospect of
facing the costs of environmental protection alone° (Lapper, 1994). This concern has
been emphasised by their experience of claims in association with asbestos, natural
disasters and pollution clean ups. Claims of this nature have, for example, resulted in over
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five billion pounds being drained from the London insurance market (Anon., 1992; Anon,
1993c; Anon., 1994e; Atkins, 1995a, 1995b; Burt, 1995; Simonian, 1995; Atkins, 1996).
Consequently insurers have been re-appraising their approach to underwriting and the
services they offer. In particular, they have recognised that environmental insurance
requires a scientific background to underwriting coupled with a high level of risk
management based on a comprehensive environmental performance assessment" (Napier
and Clabon, 1992; Street, 1992). It is generally recognised that insurers have reacted to
pressures surrounding environmental liability by endorsing their public liability policies
to restrict pollution cover to 'sudden and accidental' incidents and avoid gradual pollution
claims (Rutherford, 1994). Liability cover for gradual contamination and leakage was
provided by 'Environmental Impairment Liability' (Bit) policies on a 'claims made'
basis (Street, 1992; Gray, 1993; Smith, 1994).
In the past general liability policies were frequently written on an 'occurrence' basis. As a
result attention has been focused on problems in apportioning liability where one policy
follows the other. It has been recognised that cover may still exist under a number of old
policies. In terms of insurers covering a lender's liability, it is possible for banks to have
been included in the cover supplied through old borrower policies (Napier and Clabon,
1992; ACBE, 1993; Cocheo, 1993).
Insurers currently offering Eli cover are mainly large international groups with world-
wide experience of dealing with environmental liability. The UK market for insurance of
this type may be subdued due to stringent requirements laid down by EIL policy
providers, as well as high costs attached to policies 15 (Anon., 1992; ACBE, 1993; Smith,
1994; Hyslop, 1996).
Retrospective liability poses further problems for insurers in assessing risk to be
managed. Prior to the judgement in the Cambridge Water Case, the Association of British
Insurers noted that existing partial pollution exclusion wording was likely to be
withdrawn in favour of absolute exclusions if principles of retrospective liability 16
 were
upheld (Environmental Liability Report, 1993b). Absolute pollution exclusion in general
liability policies already exists in the US, Italy and more recently Germany and France17
(Anon., 1992; Anon., 1993a, 1993b; Coulson and Dixon, 1995).
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Whilst product scarcity, high costs and strict conditions of cover may explain the apparent
lack of borrowers seeking insurance for themselves, lenders have been slow to use
insurance to mitigate their environmental liability. However, in March 1995 a more
proactive stance was adopted by the insurance industry through an initiative by the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The UNEP initiative launched a 'Statement of
Environmental Commitment by Insurers' 18 to illustrate commitment to environmental
management; to facilitate the development of methods of assessing environmental risks;
and to share experience of premium setting in the environmental sector. Signatories 19 to
the statement have explicitly stated an ambition to price insurance policies to reflect their
client's commitment to the environment (Fossli, 1995a, 1995b; UNEP, 1995d). Thus, the
role of insurance cover with respect to the environmental liability of both the borrower
and, more particularly, the lender is brought into sharp focus.
The previous literature reviews shows that banks, particularly in the US, are concerned
about potential environmental liability and the indications are that banks have reacted
by incorporating environmental considerations into their lending processes. However,
the extent and nature of their actions remain questionable. A number of US banks have
secured their own environmental insurance cover or requested borrowers to underwrite
potential environmental liabilities. Outside the US, no evidence was found to suggest
that banks have undertaken environmental insurance or that it was available. Little
evidence was found that banks outside the US required borrowers to undertake
environmental insurance; or that, where environmental insurance was available it
offered suitable cover. On this basis a detailed review has been undertaken to examine
further evidence of environmental risk management by banks.
Environmental management
Bank principles
The above review highlighted the management of potential environmental risk within
lending decisions. Bank practitioners and their advisers, at an international level, have
confirmed that environmental risk management in lending policy has increasingly been
adopted by the international bank community (Sarokin and Schulkin, 1991; Cocheo,
1993; Welch, 1993; Anon., 1994c; Barrett, 199420; Griggs, 1994; Robbins and Bissett,
1994; Smith, 1994; Williams, 1994; ACBE, 1995b; Clark, 1995).
53
The following section focuses on an analysis of literature which addresses
environmental principles within bank strategy and the lending function. Particular
reference is made to the deployment of formalised environmental policies. Evidence is
drawn from national and international bank associations and representative groups, and
comments by bank advisers and bank members.
In May 1992, a UNEP working party of bank members developed a 'Statement by
Banks on the Environment and Sustainable Development' (ENDS, 1992a; UNEP,
1992; Williams, 1994). The Statement was part of a recognised need for banks, along
with governments, businesses, and individuals, to acknowledge their social
environmental responsibility (see Appendix 2). The content of the Statement explicitly
recognised the need for 'ecological protection' and 'sustainable development' as
interrelated goals. The implication of the Statements wording is the promotion of
ecological development to sustain economic development, reflecting an anthropocentric
as opposed to an ecocentric philosophy. Through public subscription to the Statement,
banks have declared their intent to "endeavour to ensure that .... their..., policies and
business actions promote sustainable development" (UNEP, 1992).
The UNEP statement has been extremely popular, by 31 January 1995 66 banks from
around the world, with the exception of the US, had subscribed 21 to its principles (see
Appendix 2). The absence of subscription by US banks has been examined in light of
other research findings. A number of ABA and EDR surveys have revealed that a high
proportion of US banks have developed environmental policies in reaction to potential
lender liability for the environment (Anon., 1994c; EDR, 1994; Green Alliance, 1995;
Hill et al., 1997).
A global survey on environmental policies and practices of the financial services
industry was undertaken in 1994, with support from UNEP and Salomon Brothers
Incorporated, New York. Slightly less than 50% of the 90 respondents, including 27
from the US, revealed that they had a documented environmental policy22 (Lascelles,
1995a). Motivations for the development of environmental bank policies were
addressed within the survey by reflecting on functional principles and environmental
management activities. Ethical principles were not addressed directly by the survey and
there was nothing to imply that environmental management was founded upon ethical
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principles beyond reference to subscription to the UNEP statement. Of respondents
22% were signatories to the UNEP Statement and 35% claimed to be unaware of the
Statements existence. The primary motive for functional environmental consideration
indicated by the survey was one of risk management and the requirement of developing
environmental legislation.
Recognition has additionally been given to the development and deployment of
environmental policies by international agencies such as the World Bank, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank 23 (Bank
of America, 1995; European Investment Bank, 1994; European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). In these organisations
the adoption of an ethical stance on the environment supports the principles of social
responsibility upon which the organisations were developed. The environmental
principles of banks has been further demonstrated by initiatives taken by a small
number of banks to publish environmental policy statements.
Contrasting approaches have been illustrated in the UK by the National Westminster
Bank which developed an environmental policy based on principles of 'ecological
protection and sustainable development' in 1990 24 and the Co-operative Bank which
developed and published an 'ethical' mission statement25 containing environmental
principles in May 1992 (Cooperative Bank, 1992; National Westminster Bank, 1992). It
should be noted that National Westminster Bank was one of a small number of banks
involved in the initial design of the UNEP Statement. It is thus unsurprising to fmd that
a number of clauses within the National Westminster Bank policy have been reflected
in the UNEP Statement.
In summary, a number of banks at an international level, including those based in the
US, have subscribed to environmental principles in formulating bank policies. The
rationality supporting subscription to environmental bank principles appears to be a
mixture of ethics and risk management. However, the absence of US banks from
subscription to the UNEP Statement, and emphasis on environmental risk management,
suggests that environmental considerations within US banks are not founded on ethical
principles.
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These findings are a little surprising given that literature at an international level has
focused on lender liability, and social and ethical responsibility of banks has been
relatively scarce (Sarokin and Schulkin, 1991; Lascelles, 1993). However, as
recognised by Lascelles (1993), this may be due to the fact that environmental issues
have been translated into risk terms as a more familiar 'language' of banks. Such
reference therefore does not necessarily deny that there has been a more fundamental
change in values underlying identified trends in risk management.
This proposal may be extended to address the translation of environmental bank
principles into practice at a functional level. Evidence outlined in this section has
addressed environmental considerations with respect to bank 'principles and policies'.
Literature which addresses lender liability provides initial evidence that functional bank
lending policies and procedures have been developed to incorporate environmental
considerations. Theoretical issues raised by accounting research, and practical issues
within professional literature, focus on how bank principles and policy influence
functional bank policy and procedures.
Credit risk management
An analysis of environmental considerations in lending processes may show how
environmental bank principles and policies have been translated into practice. However,
it should be noted that the term 'risk management' refers to the credit assessment
process of financial risk versus financial return noted in Chapter one. Thus, 'risk'
indicators may be perceived as having a positive as well as a negative consequence.
Such terminology may create problems of interpreting bank motives for incorporating
environmental considerations, though as noted previously, subscription to the UNEP
Statement is an acknowledgement of social ethics. As part of the Statement explicitly
subscribed to by banks, they 'recognise that environmental risks should be part of the
normal checklist of risk assessment and management'. Furthermore, examining lending
issues specifically it is declared that 'as part of ...credit risk assessment, we recommend
when appropriate environmental impact assessment'. It appears that these ethical
principles underpin the strategic functional principles of risk management in lending
practice.
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A number of banks, while subscribing to the UNEP ethical principles, have reported
separately the need to adopt risk management principles26. (Bank Handlowy W
Warszawie S. A. 1994, 1995; Smith, 1994; Vaughan, 1994; Credit Suisse, 1995; Union
Bank of Switzerland, 1995). Similarly, while adopting ethical principles, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development has based it lending function on a risk
management approach27. This evidence suggests that the incorporation of
environmental considerations within credit assessments, and refusal of loans to
polluting companies, can both serve objectives of risk management and meet ethical
principles.
A further insight into motives for environmental consideration within lending processes
comes from the global survey 1994, supported by UNEP and Salomon Brothers, New
York. The survey explicitly addressed the influence of environmental liability exposure
and corresponding risk management strategies on credit procedures. The survey
revealed that respondents focus heavily on effective environmental risk management in
relation to debt extensions in the pre-contractual stage of the credit review process.
Over 80% of respondents indicated that environmental liability risk equal to, or greater
than, a specified financial value was considered in all debt financing decisions28
(Williams, 1994; Lascelles, 1995a; UNEP, 1995b; UNEP and Salomon Brothers Inc.,
1995).
Findings from the global survey further revealed that while environmental
considerations within lending processes were recognised, the existence of a
'documented' environmental policy was not a necessary pre-requisite to such
consideration. Some 94% of respondents indicated performance of environmentally
orientated credit risk management, and over 50% of respondents indicated such
performance on a regular basis, compared to less than 50% of respondents with a
documented environmental policy (LTNEP and Salomon Brothers Inc., 1995).
These findings raise further theoretical questions as to the definition and purpose of a
bank policy. It is proposed that a bank's principles and policy may be inherent within
bank practice without the production of a formally documented policy statement.
Provision of a documented policy may be one of a number of ways to communicate and
deploy standard procedures. There is evidence to show that the basis for environmental
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considerations within lending processes is one of environmental risk management. It is
proposed that this strategy may be based on a general environmental risk management
approach of the bank, particularly in the case of US banks, or the translation of ethical
principles into functional strategies.
The role of a bank wide environmental policy may, or may not, be important in the
translations of principles to a functional level. More detailed findings indicate the
existence and role of functional lending policies and procedures. Further, an
examination of the potential interface between general and function specific lending
policies and explanations for their development may prove fruitful. There may be an
indication of rationality in environmental considerations in bank procedures.
Individual bank approaches to the incorporation of environmental consideration within
lending practices are noted among banks within the US, UK, Switzerland, Germany,
Canada, Poland and Australia (CIBC, 1991; Bruns, 1992; Cocheo, 1993 29; Mayo, 1993;
Welch, 199336; Anon., 1994c31 ; Bank Handlowy W Warszawie S. A. 1994, 1995;
Barrett, 199432; Griggs, 199433 ; Klump-Bickert, 1994; Robbins and Bissett, 199434;
Smith, 199435; Williams, 1994; ACBE, 1995b 36; Clark, 1995 37; Credit Suisse, 1995;
Union Bank of Switzerland, 1995). With the exception of the Canadian Imperial Bank
of Canada (CIBC) the procedural approaches of individual banks have not been
discussed in detail or in their entirety. However, a number of common characteristics
are recognisable38 (Robbins and Bissett, 1994).
Comparing these characteristics with findings from accounting research discussed in
Chapter one provides an insight into the nature and level of integration of
environmental considerations within lending processes. Where the existence of
documented environmental lending policies were identified, their development and
deployment within a bank was found to facilitate procedural direction (Barrett, 1994).
No reference was made to the relationship between the documentation of general bank
policy and lending policy. However, documenting lending policies was found to be one
means of communicating and establishing founding principles for environmental
lending procedures and a method evidenced within only a few banks. On this basis it is
proposed that a lending policy is built on a bank's general principles and policies, and
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the interpretation of the term 'bank policy' will be subject to a variety of interpretation
depending on the individual bank situation and the role of its members.
Training programmes with explicit lending policy objectives, and documented
standards for the guidance of bank members are more easily recognised than
developing or even established internal practices. Communication of lending policy,
whether implicit or explicit within such mechanisms, was viewed as facilitating the
integration of environmental considerations within the cultural principles of the bank.
(Barrett, 1994; Robbins and Bissett, 1994; Union Bank of Switzerland, 1995). Bank
policy makers recognised that adherence to environmental policies by individual bank
lending officers was dependent upon the effectiveness of policy deployment, and
constraints and incentives influencing the behaviour of the individual.
Literature which addresses the existence of environmental lending policies makes little
reference to the rationality for environmental considerations. Thus, there is a clear need
for research which addresses environmental considerations within lending processes to
examine the nature and role of bank policy at a general and function specific level.
There was some evidence of environmental assessment which varied with the industrial
activity in which the borrower was involved and the associated risk perceptions 39. Bank
guidelines on industrial sectoral analysis was found to vary from cataloguing a
borrower according to a list of high risk industries, to a more complex risk exposure
matrix (Bank Handlowy W Warszawie S. A., 1994, 1995; Griggs, 1994; Smith, 1994).
These findings were in contrast to those previously noted within accounting based
research which recognised a lack of attention to industrial issues. Loan value was
considered by one bank4° who noted that in the case of loans to small companies,
categorised as approximately twenty thousand pounds, the cost of environmental
assessment was an important issue (Barrett, 1994).
Compared with findings from accounting research which addressed lending procedures,
the use of interviews41 (Gleason, 199442; Robbins and Bissett, 1994) and site visits
were recognised as a means of gathering environment related information (Gleason,
1994; Griggs, 1994; Robbins and Bissett, 1994; Smith, 1994; Bank Handlowy W
Warszawie S. A., 1995). However, special purpose environmental impact assessments
59
and audits were found to be undertaken where the perception of environmental risk was
high, security was being agreed and/or foreclosure procedures were being considered
(Robbins and Bissett, 1994; Smith, 1994). In some cases special environmental units
had been formed to support policy deployment and specialist environmental credit
assessments43 (Smith, 1994; Union Bank of Switzerland, 1995).
It was noted that, compared to financial management previously recognised, little
monitoring of environmental considerations was undertaken once funds were
committed (Robbins and Bissett, 1994; Smith, 1994; UNEP, 1995b). The application of
environmental principles to loan agreements, or facility clauses, was noted as an
attempt by banks to mitigate environmental risks". However, in the US where banks
try to avoid environmental liability, the application of such clauses were not common
raising questions as to the value of the clauses and bank motives for environmental
assessment (Gleason, 1994; Griggs, 1994; Robbins and Bissett, 199445; Smith, 1994).
In contrast to accounting research findings, there was only limited reference to the use
of financial accounting information. It was noted that independent property valuers use
subjective financial valuation to quantify environmental risk, whereas qualitative
information was used for environmental management and scientific information in
cases of property contamination. A number of banks noted problems with the financial
quantification of risks given the poor availability and lack of standardisation of
accounting information (Barrett, 1994; Robbins and Bissett, 1994; Smith, 1994;
Lascelles, 1995b; UNEP, 1995b). In Chapter one it was noted that availability and
reliability were key factors influencing the importance and use of financial information,
these findings support this view.
Analysing the integration of environmental considerations within standard lending
procedures, there is some indication that due to the nature of environmental
information, any environmental assessment carried out by the borrower is
predominantly a stand-alone process. Support for this proposal is provided by reference
to environmental checklists, questionnaires 46 or worksheets, provided by banks to guide
environmental assessment procedures47 . Accounting research revealed the existence of
such checklists as reference tools denoting all elements of credit assessment used by
inexperienced lending officers. However, it is proposed that with the recent
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introduction of environmental considerations within lending processes these tools may
additionally be relied on when applying new lending procedures with which lending
officers are unfamiliar. Emphasis has been placed on environmental guidance
documentation as tick-lists rather than judgmental tools" (Lascelles, 1993; Barrett,
1994; Griggs, 1994; Smith, 1994).
To represent corporate environmental performance considerations, banks commonly
refer to documented conclusions drawn from environmental assessments, including
scientific examinations, which are compared to results of other credit considerations.
One bank member referred to the development of an environmental scoring system"
and another recognised the incorporation of environmental consideration within a
standard credit scoring system (Barrett, 1994; Smith, 1994). It has been argued that the
nature of methodologies applied in conducting environmental impact assessments
appear to be leading to the introduction of new tools and techniques within lending
processes (Clark, 1995). However, further empirical evidence is required to justify such
a conclusion.
While bank policy makers have provided accounts of standard policy and procedures it
has been recognised that the experience and role of individual lending officers vary
considerably. Policy makers have placed emphasis on the communication of standard
lending principles and procedures as a means of providing a foundation for action,
whilst recognising that procedural application differs between lending situations and
lending officers.
Despite the recognition of commonalties between banks, individual bank techniques
and approaches were found to vary considerably. Similarly, findings from accounting
research highlighted common methodological themes within lending processes, but
noted that the contingent nature of individual bank and lending situations limited the
possibilities of extrapolation of commonalties.
In summary, bank motives for environmental consideration stem from two main
approaches: an ethical approach; and a risk management approach. Examinations of
subscriptions to the 'UNEP statement, regional bank association position statements,
and responses to survey categorisation support this view. There was an apparent
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division between the motives of US banks and other banks. Evidence suggests that US
banks have based their environmental considerations purely on risk management
motives. However, this apparent distinction is unsurprising given the prominence of the
debate regarding potential lender liability for the environment in the US. More detailed
analysis of individual bank approaches beyond these broad categorisations is needed
before further conclusions can be drawn.
Professional literature which addresses environmental credit risk management suggests
that banks are integrating environmental considerations within lending processes as a
function of risk management. The term 'credit risk management' reflects this. It is
proposed that, as noted in Chapter one, the lending function is based on an evaluation
of financial risk against financial return according to the subjective analysis of financial
and non-financial information. Environmental consideration simply adds a new variable
to this process. Considering the relationship between general bank principles and
functional bank lending principles there is initial evidence to suggest that in
deployment these principles are inter-related. Thus, questions have been raised as to the
relationship between a bank's ethical motives and functional risk management
principles.
Summary
Chapter one indicated that environmental considerations within bank lending processes
were scarce within academic research. In this Chapter an extensive review of
professional literature provides considerable evidence to suggest that environmental
issues are an emergent risk management consideration by banks. It is recognised that
this is partially in response to increased potential lender liability for the environment,
particularly in the US. However, ethical environmental bank policies and principles
were recognised outside the US.
Evidence that environmental policy and procedural development within banks is a
relatively recent occurrence, taking place over the last five years, explains the absence
of environmental considerations within academic research findings. This places
additional importance on the potential contribution of academic research in this area.
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To establish a theoretical foundation from which to explain how, and why, corporate
environmental performance considerations form part of bank lending processes, it is
proposed that an examination of a lender's perception of environmental risk is
necessary. In addition, an analysis of the apparent relationship between a bank's ethical
policy position and credit risk management policy and practice is required. Founded
upon evidence that bank policy and communication mechanisms contribute to the
development of a bank lending officer's rationality for environmental management, an
examination of the social theories of risk construction is proposed as the start point for
theoretical investigation. This examination is undertaken in Chapter three.
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Notes
Under principles of strict liability it is necessary to prove only a causal connection between a polluting act
and the resultant environmental damage, permitting defence only in certain circumstances.
2 Fleet Factors referral 1992.
3 For example, Harrisons and Crosfield, a UK company learnt of their financiers environmental worries
when negotiating a US $120m private placement with a group of US institutions in 1991. The company
owned 110 chemical sites in the US and the financiers requested an environmental assessment at each one
during financial negotiations. The fmanciers later agreed to visit only a sample of the sites and accept
documentation for the remainder. The cost of delay and legal fees attached to the negotiations were reported
to have added noticeably to the costs. (See Lascelles, 1992)
4 Additional reference was made to the promotion and discussion of environment related issues by the
ABA and its members during a telephone interview with John J. Byrne, Senior Federal Counsel
Government Relations, ABA in 1995.
5 For example, in 1987 Beazer, the international building and construction group acqiined the VS company
Koppers borrowing US $700m. As part of the take-over Beazer also acquired Kopper's US timber and
chemical divisions. The timber treatment division was sold with a costly clean up guarantee in 1988 while a
£296m provision appeared in the balance sheet due mainly to potential pollution liability for the chemical
division. No environmental assessment was required in raising acquisition finance. (See Contract Journal,
1989)
6 European Community legislation calling for strict and/or joint and several liability principles included:
EC Draft Directive on Civil Liability for Damage caused by Waste; EC Green Paper on Remedying
Environmental Damage; the Council of Europe's Draft Convention on Civil Liability; and the European
Commission's Green Paper on Liability for Environmental Damage.
7 The EC Directive on Civil Liability of the Damage caused by Waste caused particular concern requiring
waste disposers to demonstrate some form of financial security as a means of compensation for those
suffering as a result of environmental damage caused by waste disposal activities ( Street, 1992).
8 House of Lords, December 9fla 1993.
9 The plant was designed to bum using rubber tyres to produce fuel. The main issues under consideration
were waste disposal and land contamination.
10 The Advisory Committee on Business and Environment was established to promote dialogue between
the Government and business to support the introduction of environmental objectives of the EPA 1990.
In January 1991 ACBE formed a Financial Sector Working Group to address among other things, how
best to apportion civil liability for environmental damage. (See ACBE, 1993 to 1996b)
11 Federation Bancair de la Communautee Europeenne.
12 Case of Westpac Banking Corporation, Australia.
" The US General Accounting Office has suggested that the cost to the USEPA and private sector could be
US $300bn over the next 30 years.(See CBI, 1993) In the UK the clean up of derelict land has been
estimated at £20bn with a cost of making it fit for use at twice as much (See ACBE, 1993).
14 Where available, environmental insurance schemes may require a site survey to be carried out as part of a
corporate risk assessment policy, prior to insurance being granted. Further, given that a site survey only
identifies the condition of certain aspects of the site, at a given point in time, insurers may frequently request
the adoption of a corporate environmental management system to support insurance provided. This could
greatly increase the cost of environmental insurance. The Loss Prevention Council are currently undertaking
research on this issue. (See Wilkinson, 1994)
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15 One method of tackling this problem was illustrated by the Chemical Industry Association who have set
up their own insurance fund and sharing the associated costs (See CBI, 1993; Lascelles, 1993; Willcinson,
1994).
16 The principles of retrospective liability open up a debate considering how best to apportion liability for
environmental damage, both historic and current Unanswered questions remain as to the length of
limitation periods for claims and types of loss recoverable.
17 From 1 January 1994 the French insurance market has restricted pollution cover under general liability
insurance to a maximum of FFr 10m (US $1.7m). All risks above the limit will have to be insured
separately through the pollution insurance pool Assurpol, with a separate premium and a more restrictive
EIL wording. Assurpol has also replaced the previous claims made policy wording with a form of
'discovery trigger'. This action has followed a decision by the French courts that claims made policy
wording was invalid and that the only valid trigger of coverage was the causative act (Anon., 1993b) In
Germany environmental insurance became compulsory for 'dirty industries' in 1993.(Anon., 1992)
18The statement explicitly recognises under its general principles the need to identify, quantify and
respond to environmental risk and under environmental management the need to reinforce attention
given to environmental risks in core activities.
19 At 12 July, 1996 signatories to the Statement totalled 60 with 7 further insurers having expressed an
interested in signing (UNEP, 1996).
20 Barrett (1994) extensively quotes comments by UK lenders from National Westminster Bank,
Barclays Bank and the Co-operative Bank providing evidence of their environmental lending practices.
21 Subscription at 12 June 1996 totalled 88 banks. Research is currently being undertaken based on this
statement see previous reference to Thompson, 1995 and 1996. The Green Alliance have reviewed bank
actions following subscription to the statement (See Green Alliance, 1995; Hill et al., 1997).
22 Those with an environment policy revealed that on average these had been in place for 4 years
23 However, it has been acknowledged that environmental lending assessment procedures have been
adapted by fmancial intermediaries given local social and economic conditions and individual
organisational philosophies.
24 The follow up activities of the bank were published in first annual environmental report in 1993 and
subsequent editions. (See National Westminster Bank 1993-1996).
25 SBN a Danish regional savings bank produced the first 'ethical accounting statement' in 1993.
However, this make no mention of environmental issues. (See SBN, 1993)
26 Among others references, in particular UNEP discussion papers, opportunities as well as liabilities
have been recognised by environmental credit 'risk' management (See Lascelles, 1993; Gentry et al.,
1995; UNEP, 1995c).
27 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development training programme for financial
intermediaries is based on the use of a 'Environmental Risk Management Handbook' produced by the
Bank of America (See European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1995).
25 Over 75% for corresponding equity financing.
29 Fleet Bank, Rhode Island, US.
30 Westpac Banking Corporation, Australia.
3 ' National Westminster Bank, UK.
32 National Westminster Bank, Barclays Bank and the Co-operative Bank, UK.
33First Union Bank, US.
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34 Canadian Imperial Bank of Canada.
35 Royal Bank of Canada, borrower questionnaire appendix.
36 National Westminster Bank and S G Warburg, UK.
37 Swiss Bank Corporation.
38 A number of the lending process characteristics identified form part of the ABA Environmental Risk
Program. Based on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's guidelines on good environmental
lending practice the ABA program recommends the adoption of a documented environmental lending
policy and detailed supporting procedures to the local bank community.
39 A representative of National Westminster Bank, UK revealed environmental credit procedures
incorporating sectoral analysis (Barrett, 1994) ABA guidance recognised a need for industrial sector
assessment and it was noted that the European Investment Bank promote the use of industrial summary
sheets and recognition of acceptable categories of industrial activity to their fmancial intermediaries.
40 See Barclays Bank, UK (Barrett, 1994)
41 Consideration of existing bank records which address the borrower were noted in one case (See
Gleason, 1994).
42 Reference to guidance by Texas Bank Association.
43 The use of central credit committees for high risk loans was additionally noted in the case of a Polish
Bank.
44 55% of respondents to the UNEP survey stated that they include specific environmental covenants and
conditions within contractual agreements.
45 Note CIBC use a generic environmental clause for loan agreements.
46 It was noted that in a number of instances an assessment questionnaire was used to examine borrower
characteristics in detail. A tool noted to be used by Royal Bank of Canada and First Union Bank,
Australia and recommended by the ABA.
47 Barclays Bank use a 12 point environmental checklist while the Co-operative Bank has a general
assessment checklist including environmental considerations (Barrett, 1994).
48 The use of such checklist were noted within ABA guidelines.
49 It was recognised that corporate ratings were available from specialist financial institutions but banks
have questioned there applicability to lending decisions (Lascelles, 1993, 1995b, Barrett, 1994)
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Chapter 3
The social construction of environmental/ risk perception
Introduction
This Chapter provides a theoretical examination of the questions how, and why, risk
and subsequently environmental risk are perceived by individuals. From this basis the
questions of how, and why, environmental management rationalities develop may be
explored. The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a foundation from which to
understand, and further examine, corporate environmental performance considerations
within bank lending processes identified in Chapters one and two.
Through an examination of risk perception and definitions across a range of disciplines
and situations, a social constructionist perspective is proposed as a basis from which to
understand and interpret risk, and environmental risk, management. The core
ontological question addressed is how environmental risk, and thus reality, is perceived
by an individual.
The basic epistemological stance is to analyse and seek to understand how, and why,
social reality is constructed by assessing specific social processes supporting a
proposed rationality. By adopting a social constructionist perspective, the roles of
formal and informal communication mechanisms in constructing a plural rationality for
risk perception become central issues. In particular, the role of policy communication in
the social construction of perception is examined as the basis for considering research
questions raised in Chapter two.
By applying principles of social construction to environmental risk perception, a basis
is provided from which to examine an individual's view, or 'ethical position', on
environmental management. Taking the bank as the subject of analysis, and reflecting
on findings in Chapters one and two, the appropriateness of applying a social
constructionist perspective to environmental/risk perception within bank lending
processes is discussed in Chapter four.
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The social construction of risk perception
Defining risk
Given the present proliferation of literature which addresses various questions centred
on the nature of risk, it is recognised that one definition would not meet the
requirements of all disciplines. Disciplinary and interdisciplinary risk debates reflect
different views of the world according to which risk definition becomes an issue of
science and perception.
Risk definition has traditionally been recognised as a function of scientific assessment.
Historically the most dominant definitions of risk have been founded upon principles of
linearity within determinate modern systems. These principles have been upheld in
discussions within the social as well as natural sciences, where social scientific
knowledge has traditionally been modelled on positivistic, rational models. Following
such principles risk definition has centred on the 'probability', or likelihood, of a risk
outcome occurring and subject to quantitative linear evaluation.
During the 1980's and 1990's, as theories of chaos and complexity' have emerged, the
limits of scientific authority as a basis for risk assessment have been questioned.
Objective quantitative evaluation of risk has been rivalled by subjective assessment of
'possibilities' based on principles of non-linearity and uncertainty. Social theories of
risk have emerged which have questioned the role that human conceptions reproduced
in scientific discourses play in risk perception. Risk definition has been considered as a
function of an individual's view of the world and how knowledge is constructed. The
view that a separation can be maintained between objective and subjective or perceived
risk has come under attack to the extent that it is no longer a mainstream proposition2.
As a minimum it is upheld that the choice of a linear evaluation method is in itself a
judgmental process of risk perception. When defining risk, emphasis has therefore been
placed on recognising the context within which scientific information is valuable. It is
argued that defining risk should be viewed primarily as a function of individual
perception. The role of 'the social' in influencing individual perception is dependent
upon beliefs concerning knowledge construction.
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Social constructionist perspectives
Individual analysis
Early studies of risk perception centred on a psychological evaluation of knowledge
construction. These studies have been extensively replicated and extended within
engineering accounts to explain how individuals rely on cognitive heuristics and mental
rules of thumb for decision making3 . For example, Tversky and Kahnemans' work on
'availability heuristics' denoted an individuals judgement of probability by their ability
to recall or imagine a probable event (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). However,
accumulated empirical evidence from psychometric and social psychological
investigations support the view that a purely psychological, individual-based analysis
can account for only part of risk perception and risk behaviour (Fischoff et al., 1981;
Kahneman et al., 1981; Kahneman et al., 1982; Slovic et al., 1982; Perrow, 1984;
Slovic et al., 1985; Heimer, 1988; Pidgeon et al., 1992; Glendon, 1994; Adams, 1995).
In particular, research studies of individual perceptions of risk have come under
criticism from researchers in the fields of anthropology and sociology for their inability
to account for motivational and emotional explanations for risk taking behaviour
(Douglas, 1982; 1992; Fessenden-Raden et al., 1987; Fitchen et al., 1987; Thompson et
al., 1990; Beck, 1992; Royal Society, 1992).
Risks have been conceptualised as components of increasingly complex systems in
which accidents will occur and there has been a movement away from perceiving risk
as a product of isolated human error within controllable mechanistic systems 4. In
response, risk research has expanded beyond purely individual explanations for human
response to risk towards a plural rationality for risk management based on a social
construction of risk. It has been recognised that the perceiver of risk is rarely an isolated
individual but a social being who necessarily lives and works within a network of
informal and formal relationships with others. Such relationships are manifest in a wide
range of both small and large scale social and institutional arrangements within and
across societies (Rayner, 1979, 1986; Comfort, 1988; Braithwaite, 1989; Bellaby, 1990;
Reason, 1990; Ashby and Diacon, 1994; Chicken, 1994; Fleming et al., 1994; Guest,
1994; McGregor and Hopfl, 1994; Waring, 1994; Mitchell, 1995).
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An integrated approach to risk perception, management and blame has developed in
which the individual is considered as part of social, cultural, institutional and/or
political processes. Examining the social construction of risk, research focus remains on
the individual in that an individual's attitude is viewed as being shaped by the extent to
which he or she is incorporated into a bounded group and social relationships are
conducted according to rules rather than ad hoc negotiations and actions (Douglas and
Wildavsky, 1982; Johnson and Covello (eds.), 1987; Thompson et al., 1990; Beck,
1992; Krimsky and Golding (eds.), 1992; Royal Society, 1992; Hopfl, 1995; Grove-
White, 1996).
The 'modern' debate
Examining the social construction of risk, particular attention has been devoted to
providing grandiose theories of social construction (Douglas, 1982; Beck, 1992;
Wynne, 1989b; 1992; Lash, 1994). A number of theorists have taken modernist views
on risk as their starting point and environmentalism as the central issue on which to
illustrate their argument and evoke debate. Together these theories are attempting to
move beyond the earlier view of the social sciences, that the environment exists as a
"material substrate of the social defined by scientific enquiry"(Lash et al., 1996: 1).
This research rests upon a fundamental questioning of knowledge construction. It is the
interpretation of knowledge construction that is explored as a basis from which to
determine the appropriateness of adopting a social constructionist to analyse the
research area in question. The views of these social theorists are first addressed in the
abstract to clarify their perception of knowledge construction and later situated in the
environmental risk debate to test the application of these principles.
An important catalyst for such theorising has been German sociologist Ulrich Beck's
reflection on 'Risk Society' (Beck, 1992). Beck proposed that society had entered a
phase of 'reflexive modernity' in which real physical-biological dangers have been
extended beyond the limits of calculability contained within conventional modernist
systems of prediction and control. In reaction to this, Beck provides that a process of
individualisation has/is taking place with social agents becoming ever more free from
the normative expectations of social institutions. Subsequently epistemic authority
becomes removed from groups of scientists, politicians and industrialists, and
fragmented across a huge range of social groups interacting and establishing a new
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means of self-critique. Beck emphasises that his is not a critical theory of society but a
theory of critical society - critique is endemic to the risk society (Grove-White, 1996).
The most common challenges to Beck, question the privilege which he gives to
scientific knowledge and the strict division drawn between scientific and lay
knowledge. Post or anti-modernist writers such as Lash have challenged Beck's
position by privileging the hermeneutic truths of lay actors over the propositional truths
of scientists in the risk debate. Alternately Brian Wynne, drawing on his extensive
research which addresses the sociology of science5, has presented a sustained effort to
challenge both neo-modernist writers such as Beck and their post modern rivals
(Wynne, 1989a; 1989b; 1992; 1996; Wynne and Mayer, 1993). Wynne proposes a need
to go beyond the strict division between 'propositional' scientific and 'formulaic' lay
knowledge.
Wynne argues that we have never been modern, claiming that scientific knowledge
itself is pervaded with an indeterminate and formulaic set of communications and
practices. Accordingly, scientific knowledge produces unanticipated consequence and
knowledge itself is indeterminate and uncertain. Wynne proposes a moral realism in
which public reactions to technocratic projects resist the imposition of inadequate
models that create not physical but 'identity' risks and increase reflexivity (Wynne,
1989a; 1992; 1996; Lash et al., 1996).
A similar argument has been put forward by post structuralists who argue that natural
meaning forms from interpreting signs in nature and the world. Post structuralist argue
that language, cultural meaning and the 'order of things' are part of a world in which
social practices and nature are interwoven, interpreted and 'ever already given'.
Research for post structuralists is concentrated on exploring perception as a determinant
of what is rational and hence managed. As previously argued, post-structuralist thinking
on risk highlighted the view that the minimisation of risk through increasingly rational
behaviour is an unattainable goal under conditions of indeterminacy (Jackson and
Carter, 1984; Carter and Jackson, 1992; Lash et al., 1996).
A common principle shared by these social theorists, and highlighted by Wynne, is the
recognition that expert definitions incorporate implicit assumptions about the social and
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institutional processes of risk management. This places emphasis on interpreting the
different aspects of risk and rationality that are expressed to aid understanding, rather
than on interpreting any particular framework as more accurate than another.
Cultural modes of analysis
Following social constructionist principles a stream of theorists have modelled risk
interpretation according to recognised systems of meaning and ways of life shared by
members of a particular culture. These cultural theorists have illuminated a world of
pluralistic rationality, discerning order and pattern in risk taking behaviour and the
beliefs and biases that underpin it. Risk, according to this perspective, is culturally
constructed and the deterministic rationality of physics is replaced by conditional social
rationality. Cultural theorists, proposing that no complete theory of risk exists, have
applied cultural principles to analyse the difference premises from which decisions are
made (Holling, 1979; Rayner, 1979; Wildavsky, 1979; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982;
Mars, 1982; Douglas, 1985; 1992; Jasanoff, 1986; Rayner, 1986; 1987; Fitchen et al.,
1987; James and Thompson, 1989; Bellaby, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990; Dake, 1991;
1992; Mars, 1994; Adams, 1995; Hopfl, 1995; Milton, 1996).
Given the theoretical foundations of cultural theories it is unsurprising to find that a
myriad of definitions of culture has been proposed. However, within risk debates one
mode of cultural analysis has dominated discussions, namely Grid-group analysis
proposed by social anthropologist Mary Douglas (Rayner, 1979; Douglas and
Wildavsky, 1982; Rayner, 1986; 1987; James and Thompson, 1989; Wynne, 1989b;
1992; Bellaby, 1990; Thompson, 1990; Dake, 1991; Krimsky and Golding, 1992;
Royal Society, 1992; Adams, 1995; Lash et al., 1996).
An analysis of Douglas' work 1966-present illustrates her rationality for developing
and re-working the Grid-group theory6 during extensive field studies 7 (Douglas, 1966,
1970, 1975, 1978, 1982a, (eds.)1982b, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1996). The most
frequent interpretations of her theory are taken from her paper "Cultural Bias" (1978) It
is this form of Grid-group theory which is considered here as a mode of analysis
(Douglas, 1978, 1982a; Thompson and Wildavsky, 1986; Wildavsky, 1987).
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Grid-group analysis was founded on the theoretical principle that the variability of an
individual's involvement in social life can be adequately captured by two dimensions of
sociality: group and grid. Group refers to the extent to which an individual is
incorporated into bounded social units. The greater the incorporation, the more
individual choice is subject to group determination. Grid denotes the degree to which
an individual's life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions. The more
binding and extensive the scope of the prescriptions, the less of life that is open to
individual negotiation.
Figure 1. The Grid-group dimensions
("root definitions" described by Douglas, 1970)
GRID
+A
GROUP
Douglas contends that individual choice may be constricted either through commitment
or control that binds an individual to group decisions, or demands that an individual
follow the rules accompanying their position in life. According to Douglas, analysing
social construction under principles of constrained relativism permits social
relationships, and cultural bias to be modelled. Douglas denotes four types of
individual, categorised according to their social relationships: hierarchists;
individualistic, egalitarian or enclavist; and the isolated or eclectic.
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• hierarchist - individuals in this social context are subject to both the control of other
members in the group and the demands of socially imposed rules. They favour
strongly incorporated groups with complex structure and formality and
compartmentalisation;
• individualist - bound by neither group incorporation nor prescribed roles, inhabits
an individualistic, competitive social context with a weak structure and weak
incorporation;
• egalitarian/ enclave - an individual within strong group boundaries and with
minimal prescriptions, in favour of equality within the group, spontaneity and free
negotiation. Individuals exercise control by acting in the name of the group;
• isolate/ eclectic - will not be able to exert influence and will not expect to use force
to attain their ends. Isolated by choice or compulsion in complex structures. (See
Douglas, 1996)
Figure 2. The Grid-group typology
(adapted from Douglas, 1982)
GRID
+
+
GROUP
-
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Relativistic claims by social theorists are open to challenge by realists dissatisfied with
this formula. A realist may argue that because we all inhabit a single world and share a
single genome, the multiple natures that are needed to keep social theory viable are not
available to us. However, it is proposed that there is enough irreducible uncertainty in
the world to be able to bias convictions about knowledge construction.
In adopting the logic of functional explanation, cultural theorists rely on theories in
which the consequences of some behaviour or social arrangement are essential elements
of the causes of that behaviour. It is noted that if functional theory is found to be
defective in principle cultural theories will collapse. A major criticism of functional
explanations is the lack of precise definition of boundaries and conditions for the
survival adjustment or adaptation of the system under examination. Evaluating cultural
theories on such distinctions, increasing reference has also been made to 'Cultural
theory' or `Socio-cultural viability theory' proposed by social anthropologist Michael
Thompson8 and scholars in political science, Richard Ellis and the late Aaron
Wildavsky (1990).
Thompson et al. (1990) argued that criticisms and abuses of functional theory are the
result of attaching functions to society as a whole. They proposed that functional
explanations were vulnerable to the charge of positing an illegitimate teleology. An
illegitimate teleology exists when it is presumed that social processes and structures
come into existence and operate to meet goals, without being able to document the
causal sequences whereby goal attainment creates and regulates these structures and
processes involved in their attainment.
It may be posited that to move from the system maintaining consequence of a
behaviour to the cause of that behaviour seems to require a group mind. Through
Cultural theory, Thompson et al. (1990) demonstrate not only how a behavioural
pattern sustains a social system but also how that system maintaining consequence, in
turn, sustains the behaviour pattern, without anything resembling a group mind.
Thompson et al. argued that breaking down societies into their constituent ways of life
and tying functions to them, 'rehabilitates a functional explanation'. Thus, functional
explanation may be provided for risk perceptions according to alternative ways of life.
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Drawing on the Grid-group typology proposed by Mary Douglas, Thompson et al.
(1990) sought to extend her theory on culture and bring further clarity to cultural
definitions by distinguishing between three terms: cultural bias, social relations, and
ways of life. They defined five ways of life subscribing to the egalitarian, hierarchical
and individualistic typologies proposed by Douglas but expanded her isolate definition
distinguishing between a fatalist's and a hermit's way of life:
• fatalist - an individual who is excluded from group membership yet find themselves
subject to binding prescriptions was termed as exemplifying a fatalistic way of life;
• hermit - an individual who withdraws from coercive or manipulative social
involvement altogether. The hermit in transcending all other ways of life transcends
the two dimensions of the grid-group.
Figure 3. Five ways of life mapped onto the two dimensions of sociality
(adapted from Thompson et al., 1990:8 Figure 1.)
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Analysing each way of life, Thompson et al., 1990 further defined associated
preferences9 for: risk; blame; envy; economic growth; and scarcity as a basis for
understanding behaviour and sustainability.
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Table 2. Examples of cultural preferences (from Thompson et al., 1990: Chapter 3)
Risk
Hierarchists accept risks at high level as long as decisions are made by experts
Egalitarians accentuate risk, mistrusting any part of the system holding danger
Individuals view risk as opportunity
Fatalists do not knowingly take risks
Hermits adopt a myopic risk acceptance strategy for risk attached to them
Economic growth
Hierarchists promise that collective sacrifice will lead to group gain
Egalitarians have little interest in economic growth as abundance makes equality problematic
Individuals seek new combinations to create new wealth
Fatalists find growth by chance
Hermits enjoy growth without effort
Scarcity
Hierarchists seek to manage resource scarcity
Egalitarians believe in resource depletion
Individuals reject the idea of scarcity
Fatalists believe in non-renewable resources
Hermits scavenge from what nature provides
Blame
Hierarchists blame deviants and subject them to re-education or asylum
Egalitarians reject authority and blame the system
Individuals attribute personal failure to bad luck, personal incompetence or both
Fatalists blame fate
Hermits transcendence reference to other ways of life and thus blame
Envy
Hierarchists control envy through institutionalising inequality, arguing for specialisation
Egalitarians prefer a simple life, envy is correlated with social acceptability
Individuals flaunt what they have and use envy to spur ambition
Fatalists satisfied with sufficiency
Hermits satisfied with sufficiency
Apathy
Hierarchists see apathy as consent
Egalitarians justify rejection of authority by arguing there is no real participation
Individualists see apathy as consent
Fatalists believe apathy is due to the fact one cannot make a difference
Hermits transcendence of other ways of life justifies apathy
The viability of a way of life was 'viewed as a function of the mutually supportive
relationship between a particular cultural bias and a particular pattern of social
relationships. According to a 'compatibility condition' these biases and relationships
cannot be mixed and matched. A change in the way an individual perceives physical or
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human nature, for example, changes the range of behaviour an individual can justify
engaging in and, thus the type of social relationship an individual can justify living in.
Viability requires each way of life to be resistant to change, proposing that anomalies
are noted and rationalised until a persistent pattern of 'surprises' forces individuals to
seek an alternative ways of life with a more satisfying fit with their perception of the
world. The viability of the four engaged ways of life depends on the presence of the
other three, the hermits strategy of withdrawal depends on the presence of the other four
ways of life.
To demonstrate how change may occur within, and between, different ways of life
Thompson et al. (1990) proposed a theory of surprise. Their theory is based on the
premise that members subscribing to each way of life have a recognised view of reality.
Their experience at sometime and in some place accords with that view. An individual
may change their rationality if they become disillusioned with their way of life. This
may happen if an individual is faced with successive anomalies or surprises that they
cannot accept from their existing position. Ways of life are viewed as resistant to
change. Anomalies are explained and pigeonholed, ignored or just noted. However, as
evidence builds up against rationalised ways of life doubts build up which may be
followed by defection.
Thompson et al.'s most distinct extension of work by Mary Douglas may be their
interpretation of 'myths of nature' corresponding to each way of life (Thompson et al.,
1990). From their theoretical explanation for change they build a typology of surprises,
based on myths of nature as representations of reality. The typology of surprises depicts
events in the 'actual world' which they claim would displace an individuals 'stipulated'
view of the world and according way of life. This theoretical develop will be
considered in the next section which addresses environmental perception.
Despite the acclaim received by Douglas and Thompson et al., a basic problem
recognised in classifying existing social units and risk in terms of the cultural types
may be to over simplify more complex shades of social differences (Johnson, 1987;
Royal Society, 1992). Further, empirically testing broad characterisations provided by
cultural theorists may themselves be problematic due to the inherent complexities of the
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model. In light of such criticisms it is not surprising to find that discussions of cultural
construction of risk have been centred predominantly on devising formulation for the
social construction of perception with little empirical application (Thompson et al.,
1990).
Where empirical examination has been undertaken the common point of departure has
been to test a grid-group typology as proposed by Mary Douglas. Empirical evidence in
support of cultural typologies have been provided at an organisational level in terms of
qualitative in-depth case studies of social groups in medical (Rayner, 1986) and
industrial settings (Bellaby, 1990) and direct quantitative tests (Dake, 1991, 1992).
Commenting on these works John Adams (1995) notes that Cultural theory, as
proposed by Thompson et al. (1990), by its nature cannot be framed as a statistically
testable hypothesis. Adam's recognised that grid-group analysis and modelling may be
undertaken to examine definition consistency within a pre-defined cultural typology.
However, he recognises that this does not test the central contention that only five ways
of life exists within which individual views of the world are changing. This he views as
defensible by theoretical speculation alone. Adams proposes that it is the theoretical
principles of social construction and plural rationality raised by Cultural theory which
are important.
Providing theoretical support for Cultural theory, Adams (1995 10) builds on the work of
Thompson et al. (1990), proposing a practical theory of risk compensation based on the
'risk thermostat model'. Adam's, a geographer extensively researching risk, mainly in
terms of road safety, has focused on the theory of 'risk compensation'. This theory
"accords primacy in the explanation of accidents to the human propensity to take risks"
postulating that "we all come equipped with risk thermostats" (Adams, 1995: ix).
Adams noted that in the "real interactive world of risk management, where the purpose
of measurement or estimation is to provide information to guide behaviour, risk
(representations and related decisions) will be contingent on behavioural responses,
which will be contingent on perceived risk" (Adams, 1995:30). Modelling his theory
on perceptions of road safety, Adam's proposed that an individual is not seeking zero
risk but to balance risks, rewards, accidents, and perceived danger". He views this
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balancing behaviour as analogous to a thermostatically controlled system in which the
setting of the thermostat varies between individuals, groups and cultures. Adams draws
on Cultural theory to address the question of why he noted large variations in the
setting of individual thermostats. As in the case of Cultural theory, risk is viewed as an
interactive phenomenon, one persons balancing act has consequences for another.
Figure 4. The risk thermostat with cultural filters
(adapted from Adams, 1995: 43)
Cultural filter
Adam's places importance on understanding how and why the balancing act is done as
a basis for interpreting resultant risk management information produced and decisions
made. Reflecting for example on the work of Beck (1992), Adams proposes that despite
his individualisation theory within Beck's argument a number of cultural typologies
such as hierarchical governmental arrangement can be recognised. Adams concludes
"risk compensation and cultural theory provide a life-raft that saves one from drowning
in a sea of reflexive relativism" (Adams, 1995: x).
Cultural theorists, unhappy with the application of such theoretical conditioning, have
proposed that risk perception is a function of organisational structure. Proposals have
been made that plural rationalities for management within organisations result from the
structure of social relationships which motivate and set constraints and obligations on
an individual's behaviour and construct broad frameworks for shaping attitudes
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(Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, 1984; Perrow, 1984; Doherty, 1985;
Jasanoff, 1986; Braithwaite, 1989; Ashby and Diacon, 1994; Fleming, 1994; Guest,
1994). As a result a recurring debate among the social scientists has been whether
institutional/organisational structures cause culture or culture causes structure.
Thompson et al. (1990) address this debate with their provision that Cultural theory,
defining ways of life according to a functional mode of analysis, provides no reason to
choose between social institutions and cultural biases. According to a functionalist
theory causal priority is given to neither cultural bias nor structure of social
relationships. Social relationships and bias are viewed as reciprocal, interacting, and
mutually reinforcing.
Most social theorists agree that the influence of political power and negotiations should
be recognised as a primary factor supporting the social construction of perception
within and between societies, cultures, institutions and organisations. Within political
situations it has been the social construction and reinforcement of 'expert' opinion
which has provided a dominant rationality for risk perception and management within a
given group and a basis for which others may understand and critically examining such
opinion. A dense network of communication stretching across social representative
governments, organisations and groups facilitates political debate and acceptance of
plural rationalities for risk definitions and subsequent management. (Wildavsky, 1979,
1987, 1988; Irwin, 1985, 1996; Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; Jasanoff, 1986; Lee,
1986; Dietz and Rycroft, 1987; Fessenden-Raden et al., 1987; Wildavsky, 1987;
Krimsky and Plough, 1988; Nelkin, 1989; Otway and Wynne, 1989; Schwarz and
Thompson, 1990; Fischer, 1991; Wynne, 1992a, 1992b; Hannigan, 1995).
From a review of theoretical debates which address risk perception it is initially
concluded that considerable evidence has been provided to support a social
constructionist perspective. It is proposed that we come to know about the world
through various social relationships. The issue of viewing the social construction of risk
perception according to institutional structure and/or cultural arrangement is considered
to be a question which should be applied to a given research situation if the proposed
answer is to contribute to the risk debate.
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At the centre of a perceptual framework of risk determination is the risk communication
mechanism inherent within the group, organisation or culture that supports a plural
rationality for risk management. It is proposed that observations of group perception
and rationality hold direct policy implications both for formal risk communication and
risk management decisions (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; Jasanoff, 1986; Dietz and
Rycroft, 1987; Otway and Wynne, 1989). Concentrating on risk communication, in
particular policy deployment, therefore additionally allows for some degree of
integration between the fragmented categorisation of risk causation and subsequent risk
definition at a practical level (Kates, 1975; Whyte, 1980; Irwin, 1985; O'Riordan,
1986; Common, 1988; Brown, 1989; Palm, 1990; Burton et al., 1993; Blaikie et al.,
1994).
The interface between risk communication and risk perception
Research issues and concerns at the interface of risk perception and risk communication
have been three-fold: the different conceptual approaches that are taken to risk
communication to support the social construction of risk; the particular roles of policy12
development and communication in influencing risk perceptions; and normative
guidance on effective risk communication highlighting the role of trust.
Conceptual approaches to risk communication
In carrying out risk research at least four, partially overlapping, conceptual approaches
to risk communications have been developed: a top-down one way model; a two way
exchange model; a complex web and a political process. These approaches have been
recognised within and across different levels of risk communication primarily
according to divergent views on knowledge construction.
1. The simplest approach defines risk communication according to an 'engineering
communications' framework in terms of a top-down or one way transmission of a
message about a risk from a particular 'expert' communicator to a target 'non-expert'
audience. Typically such an approach focuses on characteristics of the source, channel,
message and receiver that might enhance the achievement of communication objectives
(Lee, 1986). The one-way model has been criticised particularly on the grounds of an
altruistic communicator which completely devalues the perspectives and knowledge of
the risk bearer (Otway and Wynne, 1989).
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2. A two way exchange or dialogue has been depicted which characterises risk as an
interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among individuals, groups
and institutions. It involves multiple messages that express concerns, opinions or
reaction to risk messages or to legal and institutional arrangements for risk
management. This highlights the interchange of communication in creating risk
perception. This exchange may be linked to questions concerning the principles of trust
fostered by long term dialogue.( Royal Society, 1992)
3. A complex 'tangled web' of communication has been associated with risk perception
and communication within institutional and cultural contexts in which intentional risk
messages and unintended signs and symbols are formulated, transmuted and embedded
(Krimsky and Plough, 1988). According to a cultural approach it is recognised that all
hazards have a history and that this influences an individual's interpretation of
messages at a particular point in time (Fessenden-Raden et al., 1987).
Under these principles action and inaction by a risk communicator can, depending on
context, send messages which may conflict with official communications. This implies
that predicting the outcome of any intended communication may often be far more
uncertain than is suggested by the simple one-way source-message-receiver model.
Further, significant dilemmas may arise from conflicting goals in risk communication;
for example, a message or messages about the same activity may need both to
'reassure' and 'warn'. A dilemma addressed by Otway and Wynne as the risk
'reassurance-arousal' paradox.
4. Finally risk communication has been viewed as an essential part of the wider
political processes "that operate or ought to operate within society" (Royal Society,
1992: 121). This approach highlights communication as central to decision making
regarding 'social' risk definition and subsequent risk management policy. Considerable
debate exists regarding the role of experts and the public, including public right to
know issues, in policy making (Jasanoff, 1986; Dietz and Rycroft, 1987; Fessenden-
Raden et al., 1987; Krimsky and Plough, 1988; Nelkin, 1989; Otway and Wynne, 1989;
Pearce et al., 1989).
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It is proposed that by adopting principles of social construction the recognition of a
range of risk perceptions represents a desirable rather than a problematic situation
through which decisions about risks can be explained and subject to effective critique
from a wide range of perspectives. An examination of the social interface between risk
communication and risk perception enables this analysis to be addressed at a practical
level.
Roles of policy development and communication in influencing risk perception
The most common focus of research attention has been the topic of risk communication
pursued to relate theory and findings from basic risk perception studies to the
formulation of policy and procedures 13
 for risk management. Risk communication, in
terms of policy development, has been viewed as encouraging a particular behaviour,
guarding against an immediate risk, or illustrating the varied perceptions and frames of
reference that different parties may bring to disputes. Hence, it is proposed that
fostering appropriate forms of communication between the defined parties of risk
perception and management may lead to acceptability of risk bias and contribute in
some way to mutual understanding and resolution of disputes. (Lee, 1986; Fessenden-
Raden et al., 1987; Krimsky and Plough, 1988)
Examining conceptual frameworks for the social construction of risk at a macro level,
attention has been centred on governmental policy making for a given society and
associated regulation. Discussions have centred on the need to establish acceptable, or
tolerable, and unacceptable risk level for issues of social safety. Psychological studies
examining the meaning of risk were the first to identify the need to distinguish between
acceptable and unacceptable risks to individuals (Starr, 1969; Fischoff et al., 1981). The
question of voluntary and involuntary risk exposure was also raised by these studies
and has been considered as an additional question for government policy makers.
Traditionally, it has been the role of risk experts or 'professionals' drawn from
dominant scientific traditions to determine the scale and severity of the potential risk
incident (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990 14; Dietz and Rycroft, 1987; Renn, 1992).
However, recent emphasis has been placed on risk 'perceptions' rather than the
'objective facts' of risk determination. For example, this is demonstrated by the use of
policy terms such as 'As Low As is Reasonably Practical' by the UK Health and Safety
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Executive as a basis for communicating the need to interpret a 'tolerable' social risk
with respect to a given situation (Fischoff, et al., 1981; Royal Society, 1992). This term
has been applied, particularly in the case of the nuclear debate, to highlight that a
judgement on what is tolerable is a political rather than a scientific question. As noted
previously, a debate has arisen regarding the contribution of expert and/or lay opinion
and propositional and/or formulaic knowledge. Political challenges to the mainstream
view of scientific authority have represented such a variety of risk perceptions through
an examination of the role of direct or indirect communication on political negotiations
(Wynne, 1989a, 1992, 1993, 1996).
A central debate in government policy making is the rationality for adopting an
economic language based on monetary representations of value. As noted by Adams, it
is important to remember that monetary and other statistical scales represent the
messenger and not the message. Social arrangements for monitoring risks through the
collection and analysis of monetary values and other statistics and their subsequent
communication reflect the biases of the collectors and analysts (Doherty, 1985;
Wildavsky, 1988; Morgan and Henrion, 1990; McGoun, 1993; Murray and Smith,
1995).
For example, disputes regarding the role of cost benefit analysis (CBA) to make
decisions about risk have centred on individual rationality. Some economists and
accountants have conceded that in undertaking CBA not everything relevant to decision
making can be translated directly into money. However, such factors are classed as
residuals whose value can be inferred from the values of those things that can be
monetarised through market preference. Money has therefore been identified as
representing a means of communicating a relative value and not an actual value of a
resource (Gray, 1990). A primary economic debate has been how to value a life for the
purpose of public policy making, insurance sales and compensation claims. Similarly,
establishing a potential `kill size' of a debated risk has been the subject of policy
negotiations (Pearce et al., 1989).
It has been proposed that methods of policy development and other communication
mechanisms may be typified by a particular culture or way of life (Jasanoff, 1986;
Nelkin, 1989; Kasperson, 1992). Policy development in a cultural context has been
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viewed as an explicit representation of beliefs within a cultural group and a means of
communicating this position to others. In forming cultural perceptions of risk, emphasis
has additionally been placed on more informal communication networks and proposals
that risk is subconsciously perceived.
Normative guidance on effective risk perception
In terms of risk communication and risk perception researchers have sought to provide
practical advice to risk managers, particularly at an organisational level. The value of
reflecting on mental model approaches in order to understand the skills needed to solve
specific problems or operate a specialised piece of equipment has been highlighted as a
basis for establishing appropriate risk communication mechanisms (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1981; Irwin, 1985; Jungermann et al., 1988; Braithwaite, 1989; Brown, 1989;
Ansell and Walton, (eds.), 1992; Carter and Jackson, 1992; Ashby and Diacon, 1994;
Toft, 1995; Irwin, 1996). Debate has been centred on the use of individual mental
models provided by experts and/ or lay subjects (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; Dietz
and Rycroft; 1987; Nelkin, 1989; Otway and Wynne, 1989; Wynne, 1992a, 1993;
Wynne and Mayer, 1993; Beck et al. 1994; Lash 1994; Lash et al., 1996).
An issue common to risk communication has been the importance placed on 'trust' in
achieving effective communication and influencing the social construction of risk.
Emphasis has been placed on the effect of risk communication on perception in terms
of the trust placed in the communicator. The establishment of trust has been considered
with respect to establishing and understanding the 'social rationality' of the risk
communicator and risk perceiver, reflecting on a debate centred on the influence of
political power and the relative value of expert and lay opinion. (Wynne, 1980; Lee,
1986)
An examination of the interface between risk communication and risk perception serves
two purposes. Firstly, it provides additional theoretical reasoning in support of a social
constructionist perspective on risk perception. Secondly, it illustrates the potential
practical application of such theorising.
During the discussion of risk perception in this Chapter so far, brief reference has been
made to theoretical positioning on environmental perception and communication by
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social theorists as a means of illustrating social constructionist perspectives. A detailed
discussion of environmental risk perception has been avoided to highlight the general
applicability of social constructionist principles, and to dedicate a separate space for the
due consideration to environmental risk.
The social construction of environmental risk perception
Defining environmental risk
Environmental risks have traditionally been defined according to the element,
individual or group perceived to be at risk, and the perceived cause of the risk under
consideration. Interpretation of environmental risk depends largely on the perceiver's
ontological and epistemological position on nature and the human interface with nature.
Historically within environmental risk debates anthropocentric positions have
dominated and eco-centric positions have remained marginalised.
Environmental risks have been perceived as induced by natural phenomena. For
example those triggered by climatic or geological variability have been termed 'acts of
god'. Alternately, environmental risks resulting intentionally or unintentionally from
human interaction with the physical environment have been termed 'acts of man'.
Environmental risk causation has further been categorised according to three partially
overlapping distinctions 'natural', 'technological' and 'social' risks. These distinctions
have been made according to whether the environmental risks being managed are
considered to emanate from the physical 'natural' environment, manufactured
'technology' or from within 'society'.
Historically, as the scale of human interaction with the physical environment has
increased, the margins between these categories have become increasingly blurred.
These categories have been further sub-divided according to specialist risk analysis
undertaken within each category and viewed in terms of the perceiver and situation
under consideration (Burton et al., 1978; Kates, 1978; Whyte and Burton, 1980;
O'Riordan, 1986; Whyte, 1986; Krimsky and Plough, 1988; Daly, 1989; Pearce et al.,
1989; Daly and Cobb, 1990; Palm 1990; Burton et al., 1993; Robinson and
Timmerman, 1993).
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It should be noted that the terms risk and hazard have often been used interchangeably
when applied to environmental issues. In distinction the term hazard is more often used
to refer to a specific 'risk situation' such as hazardous waste. Additionally, reference to
disaster has been made to depict the 'occurrence' or risk 'potential' when considering
large scale damage or severe risk 'consequence' (Whittow, 1980; Fisher, 1991; Albala-
Bertrand, 1993; Richardson, 1993; Smith, 1993; Fleming et al. 1994; Guest, 1994).
It is proposed that as the scale and severity of human impact on the natural environment
has increased, theoretical justifications for the separation of natural and human systems
have been displaced and margins between categorises of risk causation have become
increasingly blurred. Advocates of anthropocentric and eco-centric philosophies have
reduced environmental problems to issues of human relationships and socio-cultural
and political theorising (Pepper, 1996).
Communication and the co-construction of nature, culture and society
An examination of the environmental debate from a social constructionist position has
centred attention on knowledge construction in terms of ones view on 'reality'. As
previously recognised, reifying environmental risks as if they are shaped by 'real'
processes in nature alone and as if the range of possible societal responses, is thus
determined, is no longer an acceptable proposition. Alternately, the occasional
sociological tendency to criticise such scientific reification by advancing the view that
all such problems are social constructions, and hence not real, is viewed as equally self-
defeating. Such reductionist positions have been viewed as simply reinforcing a
traditional debate of nature versus culture.
Social theorists, whether highlighting a need to reflect on modernity or taking a post or
anti modern view, have recognised a common need to find new terms to reflect the co-
construction of nature and culture or society. Thus, an emphasis is placed on
communication as a reflection of socially constructed environmental risk perceptions
and associated environmental management rationalities.
Considering environmental risk as an issue of science and perception has resulted in
particular attention being devoted to technological development as a source of risk, and
the evaluation of associated scientific reasoning and proposed management solutions.
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In particular, research has addressed the development and deployment of formal
policies as a mechanism supporting the social construction and reinforcement of
perceptions of environmental risk and associated rationalities for environmental risk
management (Irwin, 1985, 1996; Dietz and Rycroft, 1987; Wynne, 1989a, 1989b, 1992;
Wynne and Mayer, 1993).
For example, reflecting on the 'risk society', Beck started from the premise that the
environmental crisis is primarily not a natural but a social crisis. Beck recognised a
degree of real physical-biological risk viewed as currently beyond modern systems of
prediction and control. He viewed the risk society as reflexive with individual critiques
modernising the modern to counteract the natural damage of earlier excesses. Beck
highlighted the role of environmental risk discourse and communication in terms of
technology, individualisation and the transformation and cultural renewal of the
political as central to this solution.
Wynne alternately argued that we have never been modern and addressed the need to
treat uncertainty and indeterminacy more seriously as potential sources of risk and
embrace them in broader debate about the implications of societal commitment to
production processes. He notes that "in the rapid escalation of environmental concern,
various established norms and perceptions have been cast loose" (Wynne, 1992b: 137)
and the political voice predominates in evaluating and processing information about
environmental risk.
A common reference within the scientific debate regarding environmental technology
and management has been the recognised shift in the goals of environmental policies
from end of pipe solutions towards upstream prevention of environmental damage. It is
commonly accepted that this shift was founded on the implicit acceptance of the
inherent limitations of the anticipatory knowledge on which end of pipe technological
solutions concerning environmental discharges have been based. Wynne's
interpretation of this shift has gone beyond that of many theorists who have proposed
that moving attention upstream exposes uncertainty. Assessing the foundations of
environmental/ risk perception Wynne has distinguished between uncertainty and
indeterminacy, recognising indeterminacy's, especially social ones. Wynne has advised,
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that to fully address risk perception and associated management, we should open up
'natural knowledge' construction and address such foundations.
In a similar vein cultural inquiry into the origins of beliefs about nature and
humankind's place in nature has focused attention on management beliefs and
perceived responsibility guiding risk taking behaviour. Research has been particularly
inspired by the work of Douglas 15 and Wildavsky (1982) who proposed that
environmental risk is perceived through culturally constructed filters inherent within
typological ways of life. Modelling the selection of technological and environmental
risks for public attention on the development of US environmental legislation, they
further proposed that public perceptions of risk and its acceptable levels are 'collective
constructs'. Douglas and Wildavsky viewed these constructs as the result of politically
debated perceptions reflecting different ways of life and inherent views of nature.
Acknowledging that "we cannot know the risks we face" Douglas and Wildavsky
proposed that "we must act as if we do", supporting political debate as a medium for
developing a plural rationality for management (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982: 1).
Thus, Douglas and Wildavsky, like Wynne, recognised that the final definition of a
public environmental risk is dependent upon which cultural/ political voice
predominates in the evaluation and processing of information about environmental risk
is sues16.
Central to the social construction of environmental risk perception is the
communication mechanism inherent within the social form recognised. Considering the
communication models proposed previously, it is recognised that as interrelationships
between nature, culture and society have been highlighted there has been a movement
towards complex webs of communication. However, despite this recognised shift,
political communication continues to reflect a predominance on expert opinion with the
view of the lay person marginalised.
Reviewing in greater detail social foundations for environmental perception, in
particular cultural myths, an insight can be gained regarding risk interpretation and
associated rationalities for environmental management.
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Environmental myths and rationalities for risk management
Ecologists studying managed ecosystems have provided evidence of risk management
tied to socially constructed perceptions of environmental risk. For example, Holling
(1979) discerned pattern consistencies in the different approaches adopted by
environmental management institutions in apparently similar situations. He noted that
when confronted by the need to make decisions with insufficient information in the face
of uncertainty they assumed that physical nature behaves in certain ways. He reduced
the various sets of assumptions he encountered about how physical nature behaves in
the face of uncertainty to four 'myths' of (1) benign nature, (2) ephemeral nature, (3)
perverse/tolerant nature, and (4) capricious/resilient nature. These divergent myths were
seen to imply "different policy postures ranging from ignoring threats to developing
fail-safe designs, designs that are safe in failure, and designs that benefit from changes"
(Holling 1979: 98)17.
Holling warns that the myths are only a partial representation of reality, the acceptance
of which leads to the accumulation of new knowledge, that eventually exposes their
incomplete nature. In acknowledging these 'myths' an attempt is made to consciously
trace the logical consequences of alternative approaches taken to deal with the
unexpected. Holling represented these shapes with an analogy of a ball and a landscape.
• Nature benign - represents global stability. A ball moves in a valley shaped like a
bowl. Assuming the bowl is infinitely large or events beyond the rim are
meaningless, no matter how far the ball moves it will eventually return to rest at the
bottom. To forgiving nature, trials and mistakes of any scale can be made and the
world will recover once the disturbance is removed.
• Nature ephemeral - is an opposing myth of instability. The landscape is a convex
hill rather than a bowl. At the top of the hill the ball is at an unstable equilibrium, if
it is displaced slightly it will roll away. Complete instability of this kind leads to
extinction. While systems persist the conditions of this myth seems to be impossible
but are the subject of philosophical and scientific debate.
• Nature perverse/tolerant - demonstrates a midway condition between the two
previous myths. The dominant feature of this myth is the apparent existence of
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more than one equilibrium state. If a ball travels over the boundary between basins
a radical change in behaviour occurs. Incremental trial may not seem to be causing
significant error yet could accumulate until one more trial leads to a new state of
stability.
• Nature resilient - The ball as nature holds the property that allows it to absorb and
utilise change. It reflects a benefit from failures. (adapted from Holling, 1979)
Building upon Holling's work, Schwarz and Thompson (1990) proposed the existence
of a fifth myth of capricious nature: Nature capricious - reflecting a random
unpredictable world where groups "do not really manage or learn: they just cope with
erratic events" (Thompson et al., 1990: 27) It was provided that as ecologists addressed
only management action and learning, they did not fully explore this myth. By
considering environmental management from the view of management rather than the
environment this myth was discovered. Thompson et al. (1990) claimed that nature:
capricious, perverse/tolerant; benign; and ephemeral were the four primary myths and
nature resilient was a "meta-myth" that subsumes the other four (Thompson et al.,
1990: 26).
Figure 5. The four primary 'myths' of nature
(Thompson et al., 1990: 27 Figure 2 adapted)
Nature Capricious	 Nature Perverse/ Tolerant
Nature Benign	 Nature Ephemeral
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Cultural theory, proposed by Thompson et al. (1990), expanded this view with the
proposition that the five dominant ways of life and inherent views of reality, previously
addressed, are illustrative of individuals myths of nature. Under their proposals of
constrained relativism, each myth is a partial representation of reality. In modelling
ways of life and myths of nature Thompson et al. seek to rationalise an individual's
environmental management behaviour:
• Nature benign - in the context of human activity, not something that needs to be
managed. The management style associated with this myth is therefore relaxed,
non-interventionist, laissez-faire: that of the individualist.
• Nature ephemeral - nature is fragile, in danger of being provoked by humans into
careless collapse. The objective of environmental management is the protection of
nature for human rights: the egalitarian.
• Nature perverse/tolerant - modified from the first two. Within limits, nature can be
relied on to behave predictably. Regulation is required to prevent major excesses,
while leaving the system to look after itself in minor matters. This is the ecologists
equivalent of a mixed economy model. The managers style is: interventionist and
hierarchical.
• Nature capricious - represents the view of laissez faire, in the sense that there is no
point in management: the fatalist.
• Nature resilient - has been referred to as a "sort of meta-myth" that subsumes the
other four: the hermit.
(Rolling, 1979; Thompson et al., 1990).
Four rationalities for environmental management illustrated by the: hierarchist; fatalist;
egalitarian and individualist are represented on the Grid-group on the following page.
The fifth position of the hermit with a resilient view of nature transcends the grid.
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Nature Capricious
FATALISTIC
Individualized
Nature Perverse/ Tolerant
HIERARCHICAL
Collectivized
Nature Ephemeral
0
Nature Benign
Figure 6. The four rationalities for environmental management
(adapted from Adams, 1995: 37 figure 3.3)
Prescribed
Inequality
INDIVIDUALISTIC
	 Prescribing	 EGALITARIAN
Equality
As noted previously, Thompson et al. (1990) provided a typology of surprises to
explain how the myths of nature can be sustained and how a change of myth occurs.
The typology illustrates surprise for an individual who stipulates that the world is one
way and acts in a world which resembles another way.
Table 3. A typology of surprises (depicted by Thompson et al., 1990: 71 Figure 4.)
Actual world —>
Stipulated world
4,
capricious ephemeral benign perverse/tolerant
capricious
(fatalist)
, expected
windfalls don't
happen
unexpected runs
of good luck
unexpected runs
of good and bad
luck
ephemeral
(egalitarian)
others prosper others prosper
benign
(individual)
perverse/tolerant
(hierarchist)
skill is not
rewarded
unpredictability
total collapse
total collapse
'	 .
competition
partial collapse
-*
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According to Thompson et al. (1990), members subscribing to each way of life have a
recognised view of reality. An individual may change their rationality if they become
disillusioned with their way of life, when faced with successive surprises that they
cannot accept from their existing position. Ways of life are viewed as resistant to
change as anomalies are explained and pigeonholed, ignored or just noted. However, as
evidence builds up against rationalised ways of life doubts build up which may be
followed by defection.
As noted by Thompson et al. (1990), and reflected by Pepper (1996), by tracing the
origins and social context of ideas it becomes easier to understand their practical
implications and significance. Adopting a historical and ideological perspective, Pepper
highlights that there is no one objective monolithic truth about society-nature
relationships but different truths for different groups of people with different social
positions and ideologies. He notes that by studying and reconstructing the perceived
environment the observer is able to explain particular options and actions on the part of
the group being studied 18 .
Drawing on this principle Adams (1995: preface) recognised the reflexivity of
environmental/risk perception as "the world and our perceptions of it are constantly
transformed by our effect on the world, and its effect on us". As individuals' perceive
nature through their cultural filters, the important influence on decision making is thus
environmental perception and the rationality for perception. Adams noted the
importance of recognising that a researcher's position and perceptions influence
research choices and perception of results. To understand the environmental debate, the
assumptions and perceptions or 'myths' concerning nature should be examined. To
address environmental risk Adams modified his proposal for a risk thermostat model to
symbolise the impact of human behaviour on nature and all the natural forces that
condition the movement of the risk thermostat.
Summary
Conceptualising risk as a social construct provides a basis from which perceptions of
environmental risks can be defined and examined, facilitating debate based on
corresponding rationalities for environmental management. An analysis of the interface
between environmental risk communication and perception provides a practical means
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of examining and illustrating mechanisms which support the social construction of
environmental risk.
Adopting a social constructionist perspective addresses the question of why individuals
in different ways of life behave as they do by seeking to analyse and understand an
individual's social role and relationships. The question of compulsion - why must
people who live in a given mode of social relationships behave in the way they do - is
answered according to the imperatives created by social groups that compel people to
behave in ways that maintain their way of life. Explaining behaviour therefore entails
understanding the socio-cultural dynamic that generates attitudes.
Testing the basis on which bank representatives perceive environmental risk can thus
provide a framework for the recognition of risk management principles. How, and why,
environmental issues are managed are examined as interrelated questions according to a
social constructionist perspective.
Chapter one highlighted that the social construction of perceptions within a bank has
not, to date, been fully investigated by research. Emphasis has either been placed on
how 'or' why questions, and the relative nature of these questions and explanations
have not been examined. Findings in Chapter two revealed that emphasis has been
placed on environmental policy development and communication within banks to
support a plural rationality for environmental risk management within the lending
process.
It is therefore proposed that the apparent failure of accounting research to date to
provide a framework for lending decisions is due to a lack of emphasis on the social
context of individuals. In Chapter four the findings drawn from Chapter one and two
are re-evaluated from a social constructionist perspective. A theoretical proposal of
how, and why, corporate environmental performance is considered within bank lending
processes is developed based on social constructionist principles.
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Notes
For recent reference on chaos and complexity theory applied in economics see: Arthur, B. W. (1994);
Mouck, T. (1994); Parker and Stacey (1994).
2 For an introductory overview of this debate see papers in Royal Society (1983, 1992) and Krimslcy and
Goulding (eds.)(1992).
3 The application and value of such a mental models approach shall be further examined when the
development of risk communication mechanisms are considered.
4 The issue of human error and blame within organisations has been the subject of considerable debate,
particularly with respect to crisis management. See, for example: Ashby and Diacon, 1994; Fleming et
al., 1994; Guest et al., 1994; and MacGregor and Hopfl, 1994.
5 Wynne's arguments are illustrated through various research examples. For example, sheep farmers and
of 'craft based knowledge' of Andean potatoe farmers, see Wynne Chapter. 2 in Lash, Szerszynski and
Wynne, "Risk, Environment and Modernity" (1996). The Windscale inquiry and wider nuclear debate
see Wynne (1989a).
6 It is worth noting that her early ideas on the Theory stem from an analysis of the concepts of pollution
and taboo in her book Purity and Danger (1966).
7 For an extensive review of Douglas's Theoretical development see Spickard (1984; 1989) and Douglas
(1989).
8 See earlier works as a reflection on the authors progressive theoretical positioning: Thompson (1979;
1980; 1982a and 1982b; 1988; 1989); Thompson and Wildavsky (1986); James & Thompson (1989)
and Wildavsky (1979; 1987; 1988).
9 See also Wildavslcy, 1987.
10 It is noted that Adams publication of "Risk" in 1995 grew out of an ESRC research project called risk
and rationality initially undertaken with Michael Thompson.
11 See Adams (1995) main text for discussion of such bias within information used to support road
safety policy development, in particular seat belt legislation.
12 The term 'policy' may be interpreted widely across different social groups and in different situations.
For the purpose of interpretation within the text a 'policy' should be taken to denote anything from a
formal documentation to an implicit code of practice accepted by a group.
13 Based on the same principles as policy interpretation, the term 'procedures' should be taken to denote
anything from a formal documentation to the implicit conduct of behaviour.
14 For example, see Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) proposal for a means of evaluating the statistical basis
of information as a function of the reliability of the information and the qualification of associated
experts.
15 Douglas (1966) provides an introduction to this stream of thought reflecting a symbolic interpretation
of the rules of purity and pollution. Douglas shows "that to examine what is considered as unclean in any
culture is to take a looking glass approach to the ordered pattern which that culture strives to establish"
(1996: preface).
16 For an extended debate regarding the role of politics in risk perception see also Dietz and Rycroft
(1987).
17 See also Timmerman, (1986) and for a practical example, Dake and Thompson (1993).
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18 A prevalent organisational analysis has been to examine perceptions of environmental risk associated
with a given project or activity and the influence on perceptions of accidents or disasters particularly
with respect to Tverslcy and Kahneman's (1973) proposals of the influence of availability heuristics.
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Chapter 4
Bank rationalities for environmental management
Introduction
This thesis examines corporate environmental performance considerations within bank
lending processes. Questions addressed are thus centred on how the environment is
considered by bank lending officers, and their rationalities for environmental
management considerations within given lending situations.
From an analysis of research and professional commentary focused on bank lending
processes in Chapters one and two, it has been revealed that the nature of bank lending
situations are inherently individual and complex, seemingly influenced by a range of
variables including: bank lending officers; the lending bank; borrowers/ borrowing
companies; and the banking environment. To date, no theoretical foundation has been
proposed to explain inter-relationships between these variables. Key questions remain
regarding how the lending process is influenced by a lending officer's personal and
social characteristics, and how variables within the lending situation influence a bank
lending officer's decision process.
Research centred on bank lending processes has largely failed to address environmental
considerations. However, a review of professional literature, in Chapter two, provides
evidence that banks have adopted environmental lending policies founded on credit
'risk' management principles, in addition to ethical positions on the environment.
Questions emerge from these findings regarding how a lending officer defines risk, and
what the relationship is between a bank's ethical policy and lending practice.
In Chapter three, a theoretical review of risk understanding highlighted risk definition
as an issue of individual perception and social construction. The role of policy as a
mechanism supporting the social construction of perception and management
rationalities was a central theme addressed. By adopting such a perspective, it has been
illustrated that questions of how and why environmental risk is perceived, and
associated management effort is rationalised, become interrelated. This may explain
99
why previous researchers in this area have faced problems of interpretation when
addressing these questions.
The fundamental construction of knowledge has been touched on by accounting
researchers addressing bank lending processes. For example, psychological evaluations
have been conducted of a bank lending officer's decision process and issues of social
context have been raised. However, such issues have not been central to research, and
their consideration has lacked the support of a strong theoretical framework for research
design.
It is proposed in this Chapter that by re-interpreting prior research findings according to
social constructionist principles the basis for corporate environmental performance
considerations can be explained theoretically, and a method for further empirical testing
appropriately designed. Integral to such an evaluation of social relativism is an
examination of communication mechanisms supporting the social construction of
perception.
A lender's perception of risk
A social construction
By applying social constructionist principles to the research area, 'how' and 'why' a
bank lending officer perceives risk become interrelated questions. Accordingly, social
influences on perception are considered in terms of social relationships and
communication mechanisms supporting bank lending processes and the construction of
risk perception.
A bank 'hierarchy'
Through an analysis of accounting research addressing bank lending processes, the
social structures of lending functions have been characterised as hierarchies within
which authority for decision making is delegated to individual lending officers
(Mansfield, 1979; Stephens, 1980; Cooper et al., 1981; NEDC, 1986; Danos et al.,
1989; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1993; Deakins and Hussain, 1994). It was proposed
that the resultant social relationships and rules inherent within such bank structures
construct broad frameworks for shaping a lending officer's perception of risk (Abdel-
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Khalik, 1973; Eyes and Tabb, 1978; Stephens et al., 1981; Berry et al., 1984;
Wilkinson, 1984; NEDC, 1986; Berry et al., 1987; Nutt, 1989; Innes, 1990; Berry,
Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993; Deakins and Hussain, 1991, 1994; Berry et al., 1993a).
As research findings have illustrated, the detailed social structure, roles and
relationships within individual bank lending functions are varied and each hierarchical
arrangement is unique.
Accounting research provides evidence of the influence of bank policy on lending
processes (Egginton, 1977; Midland Bank, 1981; Wilkinson, 1984; NEDC, 1986; Berry
et al., 1988; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993; Deakins and Hussain, 1991; Fulmer,
1992). However, no distinction was made between bank policy and lending policy.
Drawing on the conclusion that a bank lending function is characterised as a social
hierarchy, it is proposed that a tiered policy structure exists within the framework of the
wider organisation. Accordingly, hierarchical social rules and relationships within a
bank govern individual functional arrangement and inter-relationships, and lending
policy is a derivative/application of bank policy. Based on this proposal, a transient
social boundary is drawn around members of the bank, rather than members of the
lending function. It is proposed that within this bounded group social rules and
relationships support the construction of a plural rationality for management.
Cultural engineering
The construction of a plural rationality for management within a bank lending process
may be viewed from two perspectives. It may represent an 'engineered product' of
organisational activity (Perrow, 1984; Duchessi et al., 1988; Braithwaite, 1989; Ashby
and Diacon, 1994; Chicken, 1994; Fleming et al., 1994) or a 'cultural view' of life
(Douglas, 1986; Jasanoff, 1986; Rayner, 1986; B ellaby, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990;
Dake, 1991; Royal Society, 1992; Guest, 1994). In each case rationality is a product of
an individual's social role and relationships.
Within an engineered organisation, individuals adhere to codes of practice as a result of
motivations, constraints and obligations placed on them according to their role within
an organisational structure. According to a cultural view, individuals voluntarily select
and adhere to socially constructed beliefs and bias which support a particular 'way of
life'.
As previously noted, an individual lending officer's role and responsibility is depicted
according to their delegated authority to make decisions within defined limits. These
limits may be viewed as constraining a lending officer's behaviour and/or as a
representation of their role. A lending officer's adherence to delegated bank/lending
policies and procedures within their given role may be viewed as an obligation
voluntarily adopted, or may be the result of the imposition of organisational constraints.
Reference to bank policy provided by practitioners and researchers include
documentary statements of principles and procedures, and the focus of materials and
discussion within training programmes, presentations and meetings (Egginton, 1977;
Wilkinson, 1984; NEDC, 1986; Berry et al., 1988; Berry Crum and Waring, 1991,
1993; Fulmer et al., 1992; Lascelles, 1993; Barrett, 1994; Deakins and Hussain, 1994;
Griggs, 1994; Smith, 1994; Clark, 1995). No evidence has been found to indicate that
lending policy and procedures are formally enforced within a bank. A desire for
promotion, or the threat of dismissal, may be viewed as a motivational influence on
lending officers to meet their obligations, but no evidence has been provided of formal
bank inducements. In light of these findings, it is proposed that bank lending officers
voluntarily select and adhere to culturally constructed beliefs and bias which support
their chosen 'way of life'.
As recognised by Thompson et al. (1990: 4), "the study of culture, however defined,
has characteristically emphasised uniqueness. Cultures, in this conception, ....are a
collection of people that think a bit differently, employ somewhat different signs, or
whose customary practices and/or artefacts have something special about them". From
an analysis of findings in Chapters one and two, banks appear to illustrate such cultural
uniqueness.
As described in Chapter three, Thompson et al. (1990) went on to propose a 'Cultural
theory' reducing basic cultural convictions to a distinctive set of assumptions, bias and
beliefs about reality. These core assumptions formed the basis of the proposal that five
cultural typologies can be recognised, each representing a partial view of reality. The
social characteristic of banks, discussed above, accords with Thompson et al.'s
description of cultural hierarchies with strong group boundaries and binding
prescriptions.
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In viewing a bank as a cultural hierarchy, policy and procedural development is
recognised as an inherent characteristic of a 'way of life' with lending officers
supporting and following culturally 'engineered' rules and relationships. The delegation
of authority within a bank represents such cultural principles. As noted in Chapter
three, a reoccurring debate among social scientists is whether institutional structures
cause culture or culture causes structure. It is argued according to Cultural theory, as
proposed by Thompson et al. (1990), there is no reason to choose between structure and
cultural influences as relationships and bias are viewed as reciprocal, interacting and
mutually re-enforcing.
According to Cultural theory a number of cultures may exist within an organisation, or
a number of organisations may exist within a culture. It may be argued that each bank
function reflects the characteristics of a separate culture. However, given the recognised
relationship between bank and lending policy, it is proposed that it is more appropriate
to draw a cultural boundary around the wider bank. Formulated as a cultural rule, a
documented bank policy represents, communicates and re-enforces common
perceptions within a bank. As a result, bank officers may adopt a plural rationality for
management that they apply to individual functional situations.
Additional evidence is provided to support the conclusion that a bank can be viewed as
a cultural hierarchy by addressing the communication mechanism facilitating
knowledge construction. Reflecting on this mechanism, questions raised earlier
regarding the construction of risk perception within a bank are addressed.
A 'web' of communication
Within such a hierarchy, formal channels of communication follow lines of delegated
authority, and definitions of risk inherent within communications are at the ultimate
discretion of senior management and functional policy makers. A tiered structure of
policy communications relates bank policy to functional policy. Risk communication
within this structure may viewed as a one way, top down, message. However, when
considering the process and purpose of policy making and its deployment a more
complex mechanism of communication is recognised.
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Bank members, according to their delegated role communicate, negotiate and to a
degree react to information from outside the organisation. The economic provision of
services across the organisational boundary is an obvious example of this. Bank
members, such as policy makers and lending officers, operating at social boundaries
will receive risk signs from outside the organisation. For example, changes in
legislation, economic policy, stakeholder pressure or market trends. Recognising these
potential influences on lending procedures accounting researchers have drawn
participants from specific geographic locations with relatively comparable influences
(Eyes and Tabb, 1978; Berry et al., 1984; Bannock and Morgan, 1988; Berry Crum and
Waring, 1993).
Policy makers and lending officers will interpret these changes in terms of their
influence on the bank and negotiations with borrowers. Within their delegated role,
each lending officer may be considered as a specialist with unique functional
experience. On this basis, it is proposed that formal policy design will involve
consultation with lending officers. An open dialogue is particularly likely to be
favoured by policy makers where a risk situation is highly subjective and a pragmatic
approach is required (Irwin, 1985, 1996; Dietz and Rycroft, 1987; Wynne, 1989a,
1989b, 1992; Wynne and Mayer, 1993).
Reflecting on the social relationships and rules inherent within the organisation, policy
makers will issue messages selected according to their understanding of how lending
officers form their perceptions of risk. As recognised in Chapters one and two,
communication mechanisms adopted by policy makers include formal documented:
policies; training notes; mnemonics guidelines; reference manuals; and work sheets
such as checklists and questionnaires (Egginton, 1977; Wilkinson, 1984; NEDC, 1986;
Berry et al., 1988; Berry Crum and Waring, 1991, 1993; Fulmer et al., 1992; Lascelles,
1993; Barrett, 1994; Deakins and Hussain, 1994; Griggs, 1994; Smith, 1994; Clark,
1995). Evidence of more informal communication mediums co-ordinated by policy
makers include presentations, discussion groups, case referrals and newsletter
circulation (Berry, Crum and Waring, 1993; National Westminster Bank, 1993b, 1994b,
1995b; Barrett, 1994; Robins and Bissett, 1994; Smith, 1994; Swiss Bank Corporation,
1995).
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The above findings illustrate that communication between lending officers is not
restricted to lines of delegated authority. Formal and informal communication channels
have been recognised which transmit risk messages up, down, or across a bank and a
lending officer may be a sender, messenger or receiver of a documented or verbal
message. As noted previously, risk messages may also be received by bank members
from outside the organisation. In addition, actions may implicitly transmit intended or
unintended risk signals. The sender, message, messenger and the receiver will all have
an influence on the risk message and resulting perception of risk (Douglas, 1970, 1975,
1982b; Fessenden-Raden et al., 1987; Krimsky and Plough, 1988; Thompson et al.,
1990; Adams, 1995).
Identical copies of a document may be passed among a number of bank lending officers
and interpreted differently according to the context of presentation and the frame of
reference of the individuals involved. Alternatively, a verbal message may be re-
interpreted a number of times as it is repeated and debated between individuals during
training programmes, lending committee meetings and loan referrals between lending
officers. It is proposed that risk communication according to such processes may be
characterised as a complex web of formal and informal interpretation, consultation, and
referral (Fessenden-Raden et al., 1987; Krimsky and Plough, 1988; Royal Society,
1992).
A lending officer's transmission and interpretation of risk messages will reflect and re-
enforce cultural beliefs and bias within the lending process (Douglas, 1978, 1985, 1986,
1992; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Jasanoff, 1986; Rayner, 1986; B ellaby, 1990;
Thompson et al., 1990; Dake, 1991; Royal Society, 1992; Guest, 1994). The transient
boundary drawn around bank members is viewed as a cultural filter through which risk
messages flow and bank members transmit and interpret 'information' according to a
common rationality. These messages will reflect unique cultural perceptions of risk and
form the basis of a plural rationality for risk management.
Individuals negotiate a set of risk beliefs capable of supporting their chosen way of life.
Social relationships generate risk preferences and perceptions that in turn sustain those
relationships. Change occurs when successive events fail to meet an individual's risk
expectation to the point that an individual becomes disillusioned by a given cultural
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view and seeks an alternative. As shown in Chapter three, changes of perception and
rationality may be explained according to Thompson et al.'s (1990) 'typology of
surprises'.
The publication of a bank policy statement may act as a basis for negotiation with
parties outside the organisation (Smith, 1994; Vaughan, 1994). By placing emphasis on
the reflexive nature of a bank lending officer's risk perception the facilitation of
negotiations and partnerships within a wider social, political and economic situation
may be understood. According to Cultural theory, acceptance of five fundamental ways
of life provide a starting point from which negotiable positions may be supported,
interpreted and understood. Communication between ways of life is facilitated because
the ways of life are limited. Thompson et al. (1990: 269) stressed that "if we had never
heard the same argument twice it would be difficult to see how we could ever
understand anyone outside our frame of reference".
By putting preferences and ways of life in a means end reasoning chain, individuals and
observers can deduce preferences from a way of life. Additionally, preferences emerge
as unintended/unanticipated consequences of individuals attempting to organise their
lives in a certain way. In choosing how to relate to others, individuals commit
themselves to a number of choices. "Functional explanations show that ...how social
relationships are sustained and how preferences are generated are the same question"
(Thompson et al., 1990: 66).
This method does not deny the existence of cognitive reasoning but provides that for
each decision individuals do not necessarily reflect back to their basic beliefs and biasl.
Individuals have organised life in a way to deal with issues as they arise, depending on
the help of other members to support them. For critical matters, individuals will
however reflect back on their basic beliefs. By considering banks as cultural
hierarchies, each with a set of unique values, and then reflecting on the fundamental
biases they hold according to their common cultural way of life, an initial insight can be
gained into risk bias displayed by banks.
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Bank perception of risk
In the conduct of their activities bank members are required to comply with legislation
and bank regulation. As highlighted in Chapters one and two, in reaction to mandatory
regulation, bank members seek to manage their 'liability' risk (Eyes and Tabb, 1978;
Berry et al., 1984; Bannock and Morgan, 1988; Fettig, 1991; Obermann, 1991; Cook,
1992; Berry, Crum and Waring, 1993; Lascelles, 1993; Dybhahl, 1994; Hellawell,
1994; Smith, 1994; Vaughan, 1994; Clark, 1995). Further, when selecting a specific
management approach, a bank will influence and be subsequently influenced by
external factors such as economic conditions, and competitors' activities and
performance. These factors applied at a national, and to a lesser degree at an
international level, may influence a number of banks. For this reason accounting
research studies have examined samples selected from banks operating within defined
national boundaries (Eyes and Tabb, 1978; Berry et al., 1984; Bannock and Morgan,
1988, Berry, Crum and Waring, 1993).
Addressing risk management it is recognised that when faced with similar situations
members of different banks react differently. However, a number of patterns do emerge
when considering bank lending processes in general. For example, reference to
mnemonic guidelines and checklists by bank lending officers. As noted previously, the
unique reaction of bank members is attributed to their set of individual cultural values
determined according to a bank's unique social arrangement and risk messages.
Similarities identified between banks are attributed to the claim that banks can be
characterised as cultural hierarchies sharing a common way of life.
According to this proposal bank members will accept risk at high levels as long as
decisions are made by experts who are authorised to act for the group, and are relied on
to 'do the right thing' 2 (Douglas, 1986; Thompson et al., 1990). Individual lending
officers as experts within their given role apply cultural rationalities to managing
unique lending situations, which in turn sustains their role. According to hierarchical
ways of life, emphasis is placed on members to manage immediate dangers and those
with greatest expertise to be able to counter distant disasters. This may explain why
bank lenders place emphasis on short term decision making and refer particular issues
to 'specialist' lending officers or policy makers.
107
In Chapters one and two evidence was provided that lending processes are centred on
the function of credit risk management, broadly defined as the management of fmancial
risk versus financial return. Loan transaction represents the product of an alliance
between different ways of life which may, or may not, accord to the same cultural
typology. From the point of view of members of a hierarchical bank culture, credit risk
may be viewed as an externality which they try to internalise by establishing acceptable
levels of risk.
By addressing risk as a product of an alliance between two ways of life, it is important
to highlight the presence of a web of risk exchange taking place within the elaborate
system created by interdependent ways of life. A member of each way of life handles
risks in a distinctive way according to risk perception and associated management
rationality provided by their cultural bias. Risks that are missed by one way of life can
be picked up by others. Cultural theory thus recognises, what economists call,
uncompensated risks and benefits as unavoidable transfers of risk within a cyclical
exchange system.
While banks have been characterised according to hierarchical cultural typologies
sharing fundamental bias, each culture has a unique set of values. This uniqueness will
have a subtle influence on lenders' perceptions of risk and resulting rationality for
management. By examining the specific topic of environmental risk perception among
lending officers from a range of banks, cultural individuality becomes more obvious.
However, it is recognised that by adhering to a hierarchical cultural typology banks
share a set of fundamental cultural beliefs and bias and thus, a common foundation for
environmental risk perception and management rationality.
A lender's perception of environmental risk
In Chapters one and two it was revealed that corporate environmental performance
considerations within bank lending processes were an issue of environmental 'ethics'
and risk management. In Chapter three it was recognised that the interpretation of
environmental/risk management depends largely on the perceiver's ontological and
epistemological position on physical nature and the human interface with physical
nature. By viewing a lender position on nature as their fundamental 'ethic'/belief, risk
perception and management rationality becomes a product of this ethic.
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Adopting a social constructionist perspective, as outlined previously, provides a means
of addressing the interrelated questions of 'how' and 'why' the environment, and
environmental risk, is perceived by an individual or group. Reviewing the social
construction of perception among bank lending officers, it has been proposed that
individual perception is culturally constructed within a bank. 'How' and 'why' the
environment is a risk issue for bank lending officers, becomes an issue of cultural
construction. A bank lending officer's perception of environmental risk is viewed as
constructed and re-enforced according to a complex web of communication inherent
within a bank. A bank lending officer's rationality for corporate environmental
performance consideration is viewed as a product of this perception. By examining
bank communications, rationalities for corporate environmental performance
considerations by bank lending officers can be analysed. From this basis a cultural
framework can be applied to explain the environmental position of a bank.
Bank communications
As noted in Chapter two, environmental considerations by bank members were first
recognised in the public arena in response to the introduction of environmental
legislation in the US based on strict liability principles (Fettig, 1991; Sarokin and
Schulkin, 1991; Skadden et al., 1991; Bryce, 1992; Ries and Christel, 1992; Segal,
1992; ACBE, 1993; BBA, 1993a; Gray et al., 1993; ABA, 1995b). Based on this
legislation, a number of bank lenders were held liable for environmental damage as a
consequence of their lending activities (see Appendix 1). The circumstances
surrounding court cases, and the reaction of lenders to these developments, have
become a common point of reference for debate among banks regarding lender liability
issues. From an analysis of the current position of lender liability in the US, it appears
that banks are unlikely to be held liable for environmental damage when acting in their
capacity as a lender, although banks remain sceptical (McQuiston, 1993; Redman,
1993; Anon, 1994a; Anon, 1994d; Steven and Dolin, 1994; Vaughan, 1994; Clark,
1995).
As environmental legislation has developed at an international level, lenders and their
advisors have reflected on the experience of their US counterparts in addressing and
communicating their own position. Strict liability principles have not yet been
introduced outside of the US, but the development of environmental legislation by the
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European Union has shown evidence of a movement towards the introduction of strict
liability principles (Smith, 1994).
In terms of the implications of current legislation outside the US, there has been an
absence of test cases addressing the application of legal principles of environmental
law, in particular with respect to the position of the lender (Nicholson et al., 1995).
Whether or not a lender could be held liable under statute for environmental damage
incurred as the result of borrowing activities remains the subject of diverse
interpretation by bank members and their legal advisers (ENDS, 1992b; Napier and
Clabon, 1992; Thompson, 1992; National Westminster Bank, 1992, 1993c; ENDS,
1993a; Gapper, 1993; Long and Rhoades, 1993; Barrett, 1994; Gleason, 1994;
Hellawell, 1994; Rutherford, 1994; Smith, 1994; Lascelles, 1995; Smith, 1995;
Stallworthy, 1995).
In common law there have been an array of cases of nuisance pursued according to
principles of 'harm' caused by pollution. The primary issues in these cases were the
loreseeability' of harm and the potential introduction of retrospective environmental
liability. These issues were highlighted in the UK case of Cambridge Water Co. v
Eastern Counties Leather plc (1994). The questioning of legal principles in this case,
under appeal illustrated the high degree of subjectivity which remains regarding
environmental issues within the law (ENDS, 1992c, 1993c). As a result a lender's
liability, directly or indirectly, for environmental damage or damage in connection with
a borrower remains questionable and new legislation continues to develop.
A collective bank position
Evidence has been provided of bank associations establishing environmental working
parties to facilitate discussion among bank members regarding their interpretation of
environmental legislation and their position on the environment. These associations
operate at national and European levels according to legal and regulatory boundaries.
Within the US a special Environmental Bankers Association has been established. At
an international level environmental initiatives, such as the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), have formed bank working parties on the
environment to facilitate wider debate on environmental issues (ACBE, 1993; BBA,
1993a; Anon., 1994a; EBA, 1994b; Smith, 1994; Vaughan, 1994; ABA, 1995a).
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These working parties have increasingly engaged in political debates centred on the
development of environmental legislation and common terminology. The view shared
by banks appears to be, that while they support the development of environmental
legislation, they are against the adoption of a strict liability regime. Banks have argued
this position on the basis that lenders should not be forced to "police" the
environmental management activities of corporate borrowers (National Westminster
Bank, 1992, 1993c; BBA, 1993a, 1994; Smith, 1994).
Position statements on the environment have also been published by working parties. A
common theme of these statements is bank support for 'sustainable' environmental and
economic development. For example, banks have subscribed to the UNEP "Statement
by Banks on the Environment and Sustainable Development" (see Appendix 2).
Through public promotion of their collective ethical environmental position, banks
have sought to communicate a foundation for their environmental management
approach as a basis for negotiation with regulators and commercial partners (UNEP,
1992; ACBE, 1993; BBA, 1993b; EBA, 1994a; ABA, 1995b, Green Alliance, 1995;
Hill et al., 1997).
Individual bank positions 
From a review of bank literature, a variety of evidence has been provided that
environmental considerations are being incorporated within bank lending processes.
Addressing individual bank positions a wide range of surveys, particularly those
incorporating US respondents, have noted that environmental considerations are part of
bank efforts to manage their risk of lender liability. In addition, as noted in Chapter
two, individual banks have published statements of ethical principles as an illustration
of their environmental considerations. For example, National Westminster Bank's
promotion of an environmental policy statement in 1990 and the Cooperative Bank's
publication of their ethical mission statement in 1992 (Cooperative Bank, 1992;
National Westminster Bank, 1992, 1993a, 1994a, 1995a, 1996).
The development and implementation of new environmental policies and assessment
procedures by banks, reflects changes in environmental management within banking
and in particularly lending processes (CIBC, 1991; Bruns, 1992; Cocheo, 1993; Mayo,
1993; Welch, 1993; Anon., 1994c; Barrett, 1994; Griggs, 1994; Klump-Bickert, 1994;
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Smith, 1994). Banks have noted that internal communication mechanisms supporting
such change have been focused on raising awareness of changes in environmental
legislation and developing a bank rationality for environmental risk management where
perceived necessary (Bank Handlowy W Warszawie S. A., 1994, 1995; Smith, 1994;
Vaughan, 1994; Williams, 1994; Credit Suisse, 1995; Lascelles, 1995a; UNEP, 1995b;
UNEP and Salomon Brothers Inc., 1995; Union Bank of Switzerland, 1995).
By examining corporate environmental performance considerations within bank lending
processes in detail a number of common communication mechanisms become
recognisable. Evidence has been provided that banks have a range of communication
mechanisms supporting environmental bank/lending policies including: special
environmental guidance materials; environmental training programmes and procedural
checklists (Lascelles, 1993; Bank Handlowy W Warszawie S. A., 1994, 1995; Barrett,
1994; Griggs, 1994; Smith, 1994; Clark, 1995). These mechanisms are similar to those
recognised in Chapter one when considering commonalties in lending processes. As
previously noted, the detailed mechanisms adopted by each bank are unique. However,
in the case of environmental guidelines little evidence has been provided of the
environmental risk 'messages' communicated by such mechanisms.
Experience of financial loss in connection with environmental lending issues has been
noted, primarily among US banks, as a product of legal and market issues (see
Appendix 1). It is proposed that when a bank suffers financial loss in association with
environmental lending issues, the 'incident' will lead to a change in bank members
perception of environmental risk. If the incident is communicated to members of the
wider bank community, then the incident may influence the perceptions of other
cultural groups.
By adopting a social constructionist perspective an insight can be gained into the
relationship between bank ethics and rationalities for environmental risk management
activities. The collective view of banks may be attributed to a common bias held by
them as cultural hierarchies. The unique risk perception and associated approach to
environmental management observed may be considered as a product of unique cultural
values inherent within each bank. By examining the ethical position of cultural
hierarchies in terms of their fundamental view of nature, and associated way of life, the
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collective bias of banks' can be explained. Further, the relationship between common
cultural bias and unique risk perceptions can be defined (Douglas, 1978; Douglas and
Wildavsky, 1982; James and Thompson, 1989; Thompson et al., 1990).
Managing tolerant nature
Cultural theory, as proposed by Thompson et al. (1990), provides a basis for explaining
the rationality for environmental management displayed by a culture according to their
accepted 'way of life'. As previously noted, applying Cultural theory to bank
characteristics suggests that a bank's culture is hierarchical. Hierarchical preferences
provide support for carefully planned frameworks of resource development, allocation,
and management.
According to Cultural theory, hierarchical ways of life favour a 'myth' or ethic of
tolerance or perverse nature. A myth of tolerance is founded on the principle that
physical nature is bountiful within strictly accountable 'tolerable' limits beyond which
risk and scarcity needs to be managed (Holling, 1979; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982;
Schwarz and Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990; Adams, 1995; Pepper, 1996).
The way of life demonstrated by bank members supports the development of social
rules and regulation internally and in their negotiations with other cultures. Hierarchical
managing institutions therefore favour the development, and enforcement, of
environmental regulation set at acceptable tolerable limits (Thompson et al., 1990;
Adams, 1995).
The form of legislation applied across cultural groups, including the tolerable limits at
which environmental legislation is established, are viewed as a social construct to be
determined by society's experts collectively. Community views reflected previously
provide an example of such a preference and the provision of an expert bank opinion.
Members of individual bank cultures will hold a bias as to the level of tolerable limits
which they will represent in negotiations.
According to such a position, members of a cultural hierarchy support legislation
determined by this process even if it does not conform to their own perception of risk.
In the case of environmental regulation, where members of a bank culture view the
tolerable limits of nature above those established within the wider social system, they
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will accept legal limits as the basis for management. Alternately, if members of a bank
culture view the tolerable limits of physical nature below those represented by
legislation, they may seek to enforce their own stricter form of regulation among
cultural members and in negotiations with others. This partially explains the variance in
corporate environmental performance considerations within bank lending processes
observed in Chapter two.
Hierarchists will view support for legislation as the role of a socially elected, competent
authority. Within such a social system hierarchists illustrate a preference for
accountability, or 'blame', centred on deviants who reject socially established rules and
regulation (Thompson et al., 1990). Under such principles bank members' rejection of
strict liability and the attribution of shared blame, is explained according to such
preferences. Bank members view their elected role within society as to provide finance
rather than to regulate.
A bank adhering to these principles will support the development of environmental
legislation and seek to ensure, where appropriate, environmental legislation is complied
with in its activities and the related activities of its borrowers. Developing an
environmental risk management approach may thus be viewed as a reflection of such a
cultural position. The determination of tolerable limits on which to establish
environmental legislation is viewed as a product of political negotiation at a societal
level (Jasanoff, 1986; Dietz and Rycroft, 1987; Fessenden-Raden et al., 1987; Krimsky
and Plough, 1988; Nelkin, 1989; Otway and Wynne, 1989; Wynne, 1989a; Beck, 1992;
Wynne, 1992a; Beck et al., 1994). By adopting a tolerant myth of nature, a bank's
environmental management activities will be two-fold ensuring compliance and
management of exceptions.
Despite the portrayal of such a common position on the environment, evidence has been
provided that environmental considerations among individual banks vary considerably.
While banks share common biases and management rationalities which accord to a
shared way of life, individual bank cultures hold unique views. Accordingly individual
banks will have a unique perception of risk and associated rationality for specific
environmental management activities which will be reflected within their lending
processes.
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Changing perceptions of environmental risk
In order to retain support for the application of Cultural theory to a bank situation, it is
important to show that a bank's defined myth of nature and corresponding way of life
remain constant, or if one changes the other changes accordingly (Thompson et al.,
1990). Testing adherence to this 'change principle' is particularly important given the
changes in the legal environment within which the bank is operating and bank policy.
Environmental legislation has existed for many years in varying degrees. However,
over the last two decades there has been a significant increase in the range and
requirements of environmental legislation at an international level. Over this period,
evidence has been provided that banks have shown concern for their position regarding
lender liability for the environment. This has led to claims that environmental
considerations within bank lending decisions are a reaction to potential lender liability
for the environment (Saroldn and Schulkin, 1991; Lascelles, 1992; Cocheo, 1993; Gray
et al., 1993; Anon., 1994c; Barrett, 1994; EDR, 1994; Gleason, 1994; Griggs, 1994;
Lascelles, 1995a; UNEP and Salomon Brothers Inc., 1995). While the applicability of
this proposal is not denied, the rationality for environmental consideration by bank
lending officers needs to be examined at a more fundamental level.
By applying Cultural theory, as proposed by Thompson et al. (1990), to bank
characteristics, a hierarchical way of life and a tolerant myth of nature has been
attributed to a bank's current cultural form. According to this cultural typology bank
members support the development of environmental legislation and associated
management of human interaction with the environment within tolerable limits.
Hierarchists' view the development of environmental legislation as a reaction to a
recognised decrease in nature's tolerable limits relative to human activity. Members of
a hierarchical culture will view a potential breach of regulation as a point of risk
management, however, the degree of risk management required will vary with levels of
regulation. Accordingly, risk management activities will increase as environmental
regulation increases. The resulting change in a bank's management activity which has
been recognised at a policy and/or practical level gives the impression that banks are for
the first time considering environmental issues.
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It is proposed that historically the environment has been a consideration of bank
members which has only been recognised as environmental legislation has developed
and the level of compliance management required has increased. Under such conditions
a bank's rationality for environmental risk management has not changed. A risk is
perceived in a given situation according to new criteria and this is communicated but
the same cultural typology applies.
In summary, on the assumption that knowledge is a social construction, the central
proposal made is that banks can be characterised as hierarchical cultures with views
of physical nature founded upon myths of tolerance. Accordingly, members of each
culture share unique values, and environmental risk perception and environmental
management rationality within each bank is unique. By adhering to a common cultural
typology banks share a set of fundamental cultural beliefs and bias and thus, a common
foundation for environmental risk perception and environmental management
rationality.
Corporate environmental performance considerations
Based on the above proposal, at a fundamental level corporate environmental
performance consideration by bank lenders will involve an assessment of compliance
with environmental legislation, corresponding environmental management practices of
borrowers, and contingency planning. Environmental risk management will be based on
perceived risks to the bank in the conduct of their activities, including risks perceived to
be indirectly incurred as a result of negotiations with a borrower.
Applying the conclusion drawn in Chapter one, it is envisaged that corporate
environmental performance consideration will involve an analysis of environment
related accounting information, in particular reported financial liabilities and
consideration of the management ability of a borrowing company. Little evidence has
been provided of this in practice (Barrett, 1994; Robins and Bissett, 1994; Smith, 1994;
Lascelles, 1995b; Thompson, 1995, 1996; UN-EP, 1995b). This may be due to the
relatively low level of environmental accounting information available. Addressing the
nature of lending processes, lending officers' apparent use of standard environmental
checklists and questionnaires as a basis of questioning is explained as a reflection of
their shared perception of risk and associated management rationality. In addition site
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visits, where practical, have been recognised as a method of gaining an insight into a
borrower's management ability (Gleason, 1994; Griggs, 1994; Robbins and Bissett,
1994; Smith, 1994; Bank Handlowy W Warszawie S. A., 1995).
It was recognised in Chapter two, that lending officers have called on environmental
scientists to provide environmental impact assessments when evaluating corporate
environmental performance considerations (Lascelles, 1993; Barrett, 1994; Smith,
1994; Vaughan, 1994; Clark, 1995). It is proposed that while bank lending principles
remain centred on financial risk management, evaluation of environmental risk
introduces a new variable for consideration within lending processes.
Summary
The approach undertaken in this Chapter has been to propose a basis from which the
questions of how, and why, corporate environmental performance considerations within
bank lending processes can be addressed. By adopting a social constructionist
perspective, based on a functional mode of explanation, the questions of 'how' and
'why' become interrelated.
By re-interpreting prior research findings according to social constructionist principles,
it is proposed that banks can be characterised as cultural hierarchies supporting myths
of tolerant nature. Accordingly, members of each bank culture share a unique
combination of environmental values, risk perceptions and management rationalities
supported by a web of social communication inherent within each bank. Banks
adhering to a cultural typology share a set of fundamental beliefs and bias which
provide a common foundation for environmental risk perception and associated
management rationality.
By applying the central proposal evidence of corporate environmental performance
considerations by bank lending officers is explained according to hierarchical cultural
values and myths of tolerant physical nature. In Chapter five a methodology is
designed from which this proposal can be empirically tested.
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Notes
'Cultural biases can be equated to what decision theorists call heuristics.
2 They concentrate on managing immediate dangers and expect their experts to be able to counter distant
disasters.
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Chapter 5
Research methodology
Introduction
This Chapter examines the researcher's rationality for adopting a qualitative research
methodology, based on three bank community case studies and a cross community
study, to examine the central proposal outlined in Chapter four. The Chapter is
designed as a narrative of the researcher's decision process, from an initial
consideration of methodological foundations based on theoretical assumptions and
proposals drawn from a social constructionist perspective, through to the design,
testing, and adoption of a research method. Particular reference is made to theoretical
and practical limitations, and how these limitations have been accounted for in the
research design.
Methodological foundations
Methodological choice involves the selection among methods which embody a variety
of assumptions about the nature and construction of knowledge. The first step in
deciding an appropriate and adequate research methodology should therefore be to
make explicit the ontological and epistemological assumptions upon which the proposal
is founded. The second step being to apply the assumptions to the phenomena to be
investigated (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Archer, 1988;
Burgess, 1988; Berry et al. 1989b; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1990; Babtiroglu and Ravn,
1992; Hamel et al., 1993; Cassell and Symon, 1994; Gray, 1994a; Humphrey and
Scapens, 1994). The importance of recognising such a relationship between theory and
method is a position reflected by the basis of the central proposal on a social
constructionist perspective.
The core ontological foundation of the proposal addresses how 'reality', and thus risk,
is perceived. This makes the environment a social construct. The basic epistemological
stance is to analyse and seek to understand 'how' and 'why' social reality and risk
definition is constructed by addressing specific social processes supporting a
rationality.
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Applying these principles to the area of research it is proposed that environmental
considerations within bank lending processes are dependent on a lender's perception of
environmental risk and their associated management rationality. Evidence seemingly
shows that individual bank members determine the need for environmental risk
management according to culturally constructed beliefs and bias developed as a product
of hierarchical social relations and an individual's role within a bank. Within such a
hierarchical arrangement it is proposed that the social construction of perception is
reflected through a complex web of environmental risk communication. By examining
this mechanism, the social process of risk construction and plural rationalities for
environmental risk management within banks can be outlined and the central proposal
tested.
It has been proposed that an individual's perception of the environment and social role
will influence their management rationality. A bank lending officer considering
environmental issues may perceive that they have no role to play in environmental
management as a lender. In this instance, the examination of a bank lending officer's
rationality not to act would require an in-depth psychological analysis of the individual
concerned. A bank lending officer may, alternatively, perceive a need to undertake
environmental management activities within a given role l . Accordingly, a bank lending
officer's management rationality is likely to be explicitly represented within bank
communications and therefore more accessible to examination. In order to explore the
applicability of the central proposal, research attention will focus on banks explicitly
claiming to conduct environmental management activities as part of their lending
function.
Research design
A qualitative study
To open up the perceptual and social process requires by its very nature a detailed
qualitative approach2
 with the researcher working closely with members of relevant
social groups (Pettigrew, 1973; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan and Smircich, 1980;
Bryman, 1988; Burgess, 1988; Berry et al. 1989b; Wolcott, 1990; Gummesson, 1991;
Silverman, 1993; Cassell and Symon, 1994; Humphrey and Scapens, 1994; Miles and
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994; ICAEW, 1996). In terms of examining social
construction, an individual's rationality for action is considered according to their
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social role and relationships. Research attention is directed to communication
mechanisms and messages which support and reflect an individual's management
rationality within a given context. To examine the social construction of knowledge the
researcher should therefore engage in what is commonly referred to as an hermeneutic
evaluation, interpreting social perception and process through symbolic analysis 3 of
human action/ routines, and language/labels (Hakim, 1987; Burgess, 1988; Covaleski
and Dirsmith, 1990; Johnson, 1990; Power, 1991; Babtiroglu and Ravn, 1992).
Research methods applicable to examining social construction differ primarily in the
degree to which the researcher observes and participates in a given way of life. Two
principal methods may be distinguished, namely an ethnography and a study of
symbolic interaction. Ethnographic methods4 focus on a researcher subsuming
themselves as much as possible into a given way of life, normally over a considerable
period of time, and recounting their experience (Burgess, 1988; Power, 1991; Hamel et
al., 1993; Humphrey and Scapens, 1994; Steyaert and Bouwen, 1994). Alternately,
symbolic interactionism5 involves a researcher undertaking intensive interviews and/or
a limited degree of participant observation with members of a given way of life and
more readily facilitates analysis through comparative studies (Burgess, 1988; Bryman,
1989; Cassell and Symon, 1994; Steyaert and Bouwen, 1994; Waddington, 1994).
In choosing which method is most appropriate to examine the central proposal outlined,
a consideration will be made of theoretical and practical limitations associated with the
research area.
Theoretical and practical limitations
Under principles of social construction and reflexivity it is highlighted that the world
and our perception of it are transformed through social interaction. In applying
principles of social construction theoretical limitations are acknowledged. In the first
instance, these limitations are based on the premise that interpretation cannot be
separated from an individual's own beliefs and biased view of the world. A complete
understanding of a given way of life can never be achieved by an outsider 'observing' a
way of life. A researcher living with members of a given way of life will never gain full
membership. However, an individual may discern pattern and order represented within
a way of life and rationalise others views. Secondly, under principles of reflexivity, it is
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recognised that the research exercise will have an influence both on the researcher and
those knowingly observed, and findings will be provisional to the time and
circumstances examined. These theoretical limitations should be recognised when
undertaking either an ethnographic or symbolic interactionist approach.
The practical limitations imposed as a consequence of the chosen subject area are more
restrictive on the research methodology and techniques adopted (Bryman, 1989;
Gummesson, 1991). Research studies undertaken with banks have revealed that
research access is problematic. Banks are committed to maintaining client
confidentiality thus, the examination of 'real' lending cases and associated rationalities
for actions are precluded for all research approaches. Participant observation or the
examination of documentation of a real lending case is unlikely to be available to a
researcher adopting an ethnographic or symbolic interactionist approach.
Research studies have also revealed that on occasions banks have restricted access to
bank information, particularly policies and procedures, which they perceive may be
useful to their competitors. In a number of research studies, access has been provided
on the condition that the bank's anonymity will be maintained in all research
references.
In selecting a research design the potential limitations posed by the nature of subject
area also need to be considered. In Chapter two it was recognised that environmental
management activities by bank lending officers appear to be a relatively new
phenomena. It is proposed that such circumstances could have both a favourable and an
unfavourable effect on research access. Where banks are in the early stages of policy
deployment and communication, access may be restricted to those individuals to whom
policy changes have been formally communicated. Alternately, given the apparent
uncertainty regarding the implications of environmental legislation, banks may
welcome research involvement and insights drawn from findings.
Given that research studies addressing bank lending processes have largely failed to
include environmental considerations, a pilot study was pursued from which to evaluate
limitations posed by the research subject.
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A pilot study to examine limitations
The pilot study was carried out6 in Canada, with a major Canadian bank. This
opportunity arose through an introduction by an academic contact with local knowledge
of the bank's interest in environmental issues. Initial research access was not
problematic given a friendly introduction and an extensive interview was conducted
with a lending officer at a rural branch of the bank. On request, access was provided to
relevant bank policy and procedural documentation on the condition that the anonymity
of the bank would be maintained in all research references, and no documentation
would be reproduced. As anticipated access to client related information was denied.
The participant's comments and documentary reference revealed an established
operational framework for environmental consideration within the bank's day to day
lending processes. However, due to the participant's role only a limited insight into the
process of development of formal bank policy and procedures was provided. As a result
research was pursued with policy makers and other lending officers in the bank. The
application to extend the research was denied on the basis that the bank conducts in-
house research and further dedication of bank resources, in terms of staff time, to
support outside research could not be justified.
The results of the pilot study provide additional evidence that practical research
limitations exist in the area of proposed study. These centre on access restrictions which
may be imposed by banks on the basis of confidentiality and commitment of resources.
Questions remained regarding the potential impact of the stage of environmental policy
deployment on research access. To undertake additional pilot research to address this
question is fruitless given the proposal that bank positions are unique. Consideration
will be given to the issue of formal policy representation in the next section when
selecting appropriate methodological techniques.
In light of practical restrictions the pursuit of an ethnographic study with a bank appears
futile. Alternatively, research based on a symbolic interactionist approach is feasible
but will require detailed planning. The research choice now focuses on the research
design to be adopted to address the central proposal.
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Bank community cases
The central proposal is founded on the principle that a transient boundary can be drawn
around a bank's membership. Within this bounded group cultural rules and
relationships facilitate the construction of a unique plural perception of environmental
risk and associated rationality for risk management. By drawing boundaries around
national and international bank 'communities' who face similar circumstances, and
taking them as study cases, the proposal that banks reflect individual perceptions of
environmental risk may be tested7 (Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Smithin, 1981;
Scapens, 1990; Wolcott, 1990; Hamel et al., 1993; Gray, 1994a; Hartley, 1994;
Humphrey and Scapens, 1994; Yin, 1994). If bank perceptions of environmental risk
within a given community are the same, the proposal that perception is socially
construction within a bank organisation may be disputed. By examining a number of
bank communities, additional weight could be given to this proposal.
The central proposal is that banks can be characterised as cultural hierarchies sharing a
fundamental set of cultural biases and a view of nature based on a myth of tolerance.
By examining a number of banks the existence of such commonalties may be
examined. Additionally, by framing bank examination within community cases, it will
be possible to test the principle that a culture is not a construct of a particular society
but a chosen way of life. If the same cultural biases were found in dissimilar contexts,
or conversely if dissimilar biases existed in similar social contexts then support for
cultural theory would be weakened.
It is recognised that the selection of national case studies may lead to mis-interpretation
and loss of information by research partners during linguistic translations. This was
acknowledged and accounted for in later research design.
A cross community case
As noted above, an inherent principle within Cultural theory by Thompson et al. (1990)
adapted by the central proposal is that a culture is not a construct of a particular society
but a chosen way of life. By examining a bank groups membership based on their
operations located within two communities the influence of local factors can be
examined and this principle can be further tested.
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Informants
Given potential access restrictions initial bank contacts were classed as 'key
informants', although further informants were to be pursued within the organisation
(Bryman, 1989; Cassell and Symon, 1994). In order to maximise research opportunities
it was therefore decided that research informants initially pursued should be those
individuals with an overview of the lending process. In particular, those with a
knowledge of: social roles and responsibilities; formal communications mechanisms
and correspondence; and the development and deployment of formal policy and
procedures. As noted in Chapter four, delegated bank policy makers 8 are most likely to
be in such a position and were selected as appropriate key informants. It was proposed
that 'policy makers' may hold a variety of titles within different banks and thus key
informants should be those proposed as appropriate by bank members.
On the assumption that a tiered policy structure exists within a bank, individuals
responsible for lending policy have an insight into the wider process of bank policy
development. Policy makers are also the bank members most likely to be representing
the bank on community association working parties. As such they are the most
appropriate informants to provide an insight into the interface within the bank and
between the bank and the wider bank community.
The case for selecting policy makers as key informants was strengthened by recognition
within bank literature that career profiles of lending officers revealed a tendency for
lending officers to remain within the bank and seek promotion through the
organisational hierarchy. Thus, as proposed by Berry et al. (1993), policy makers may
provide an informed view of the role of lending officers given their personal experience
of the role. This insight is of particular importance if the views of other lending officers
are inaccessible.
Recognising the need to examine the historical development of bank 'policy' to
determine the cause of apparent changes which have occurred in environmental
management practice, additional importance is placed on policy makers' views. As
noted in Chapter four, the basis for policy change will have important implications for
the application of Cultural theory. If it can be demonstrated that a change in an apparent
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myth of nature has occurred without a corresponding change to a way of life, the central
proposal will be undermined.
In terms of individual adherence to cultural 'views', it is important to recognise that
Cultural theory allows for what it calls the multiple self and cultural traitors. Cultural
theory asserts that cultural bias depends on social context, and vice versa. On this basis
contradictory beliefs may co-exist within different realms of an individual's life,
providing what is termed the 'multiple self' within multiple social contexts9. It
provides, however, that most individuals inhabit one way of life more than others.
In addition to compartmentalisation of biases through a positive belief that different
biases in different spheres of life are beneficial, an individual may fail to perceive
contradictions between competing biases. Thus, to provide an occasional position not in
accord with one's way of life does not provide a 'cultural traitor'. This recognition is
particularly important when considering rationality. Were an individual to move
beyond the occasional disagreement into a pattern of disagreements, a cultural alliance
would become questionable. It is on this basis of preference that 'change' is
incorporated into Cultural theory (Thompson et al., 1990). The challenge for research
lies in specifying the conditions under which one bias is more likely than the other, and
recognising the dominant rationality of a way of life.
Particular emphasis will therefore be placed on determining the meaning of the risk
metaphors and associated indexical expressions used by members of a given social
group. The value of considering such metaphors and expressions lies in their suggestion
of the impact of social relationships on perceptions. In cases where access may be
restricted, emphasis will be placed on examination of communication mechanisms and
textual representations of cultural bias and risk perception (Pettigrew, 1973; Hakim,
1987; Burgess, 1988; Bryman, 1989; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1990; Johnson, 1990;
Gummesson, 1991; Power, 1991; Puxty, 1993; Forster, 1994; Waddington, 1994).
Interviews and documentary reviews
A semi-structured interview with a bank policy maker was considered to be the most
appropriate starting point for the research investigation. This framework ensured that
key research questions were addressed according to unique bank situations. Interviews
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were to be tape recorded and transcriptions analysed to provide reference to key
terminology. A similar process was favoured for follow up research with other bank
members. However, given access limitations follow up telephone interviews with bank
members and/or additional documentary reference was also an acceptable basis for
analysis. Follow up procedures were determined on the basis of initial findings, and
subject to accessibility. Requests were to be made for access to documentation
representing social roles and relationship, and formal bank policy and procedures
referred to by informants (Bryman, 1989; Cassell and Symon, 1994; Forster, 1994;
Gray, 1994b, 1994c; King, 1994).
Basis of questioning
A questionnaire was designed to provide a semi-structure to a series of interviews with
bank participants. The main elements of the questionnaire were chosen as a product of
the theoretical framework to examine the linkages between risk perception and risk
communication. To provide a structure from which formal communication mechanisms
could be identified and expanded on, questions followed a top down process of
environmental policy deployment 10 .
To make the questionnaire appealing to the informant the questions were divided into
sections to provide breathing space, thinking time and to relieve the monotony of
writing a response. Such a structure further facilitated the avoidance of parts of the
questionnaire if they were perceived as not applicable n . It was hoped that this would
improve the response and provide an opportunity for any additional comments to be
made by the recipient in a more structured form.
The questionnaire was posted, or faxed, to the participant prior to the interview. This
provided them with the opportunity to consider questions and responses in advance,
possibly reflecting on previously unrecognised perceptions. Further, this allowed time
for the preparation of supplementary and/or supporting information which may require
access consent. It is recognised that this approach provided the participant with an
opportunity to prepare 'ideal' answers, possibly having discussed their response with
their colleagues. However, given the focus of the examination and apparent stage of
policy/systems development, it was felt that prior knowledge of questions were
justified.
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The format of the questionnaire was as follows:
Correspondence details 
Information was requested regarding the role and responsibility of the participant policy
maker and any additional information which they felt was relevant to their response. In
addition to correspondence details, this information provides an important background
to the informant characteristics with a potential influence on their environmental risk
perception.
A. General background information
This first main area of questioning was designed to establish requirements on a bank to
consider environmental issues within bank lending decisions, and recognise potential
influences on environmental policy development. Particular questions were addressed
to determine if the bank was a member of a group of companies and, where applicable,
the implication of group membership on environmental consideration. Other factors for
consideration included the policy maker's views on the influence of bank regulation,
legal requirements, industry guidance and pressure groups on the bank. Reference to
these factors provided a control against which to ensure that community boundaries had
been correctly drawn when defining case study groups.
B. Environmental considerations within 'banking activities' 
The second area of questioning was designed to examine the participants understanding
of a bank's general 'policy 12 ' on the environment. Policy issues were addressed in
terms of: definitions of 'environment'; scope of application; and background to policy
development, including motivations and peer group support. Particular attention was
devoted to determining communication mechanisms through which policy messages
were represented. Subscription to public policy statements on the environment were
also examined. Addressing the implication of bank policy, questions were designed to
determine bank members' roles and responsibilities in terms of environmental
management.
C. Environmental considerations within the corporate lending process 
To assess the lending process, questions initially examined policy definitions and
details as noted above. Consideration was given to the perception of formal and
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informal environmental/lending policy and procedures, their inherent objectives, scope,
and method of construction. The second stage of questioning in this section addressed
risk communication mechanisms within the bank and messages regarding corporate
environmental performance consideration. Subsequently, methods of environmental
credit risk assessment and management were addressed. The section ended with an
examination of the bank's experience of environment related financial lending loss and
the impact of such loss on environmental considerations within lending decisions.
D. Bank identification
This last section requested background information for use in categorising results for
bank feedback in order to maintain bank anonymity, and provided an additional
perspective for evaluation.
A system of cross referencing was operated during evaluation to explore any implicit
risk messages and communication mechanisms which may have been revealed during
the interview.
It was pre-agreed with the participant, that the purpose of the questionnaire was to
provide an introduction to the interview and that the discussion would be flexible
enough to diverge from the perceived framework, where necessary, to facilitate an
analysis of individual bank perspectives. Additional questions were prepared as a
supplement to the questionnaire during the interview. These were based on a series of
prompts in the questionnaire.
Areas of supplementary questioning addressed:
• the policy maker's perception of environmental risk - given that the primary focus
of the research was to analyse how and why they determined environmental risk.
The influence of the participants career history on their perception of environmental
risk was considered.
• internal support and/or advice provided to the policy maker from other bank
participants in the establishment of bank policy/practice. This support was
considered as a potential influence on the policy maker's risk perception and
resultant risk messages.
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• details regarding the use of external advisers at any stage in the formal
establishment of environmental risk perception and/or management activity. The
use of such 'expert' advice was considered as a potential influence on the
participant's risk perception.
• the perceived roles of bank lending officers were established with regard to their
'expert' or 'lay' perception of environment/risk. Again this provided a background
from which to evaluate the purpose and effect of risk messages. It is noted that a
lending officer may be identified as 'an expert' in credit assessment but a 'lay
person' in the evaluation of environmental risks. However, to some extent a lending
officer will always be a 'lay person' with regard to specialist activities of the
borrower.
Bank feedback
In each bank a summary report of research findings was presented to key informants
and their comments were requested. This reporting process was undertaken to ensure
that bank policy and procedures had not been mis-interpreted.
Selection of research participants
From the outset a decision was made not to undertake empirical research in the US. A
review of literature in Chapter two revealed that US lenders are in the unique position
of government according to a strict liability regime. Evidence was additionally
provided which illustrated a variety of legal interpretations on a state by state basis. It is
proposed that to justly address environmental consideration within lending processes in
the US, case studies would need to be determined according to state boundaries. It is
felt that the extent of research required to facilitate such a study was not feasible within,
or appropriate to, the scope of the thesis if other community cases were to be
considered.
Research participation was to be pursued with bank communities, illustrating a
commitment to the environment either through their representative bank associations or
subscription to public environment policy statements such as the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) 'Statement by Banks on the Environment and
Sustainable Development' (see Appendix 2).
130
As a basis for the cross community case study, once bank members of one community
had agreed to participate in the main research programme they would be approached to
extend the scope of research participation to their overseas operations. The choice of
banks approached would be based on those with operations within two of the final
communities examined, to facilitate a comparison with other banks operating in the
base communities (Bryman, 1989; Gummesson, 1991; Cassell and Symon, 1994).
Research negotiations
Given planned emphasis on a number of national bank community cases, a research
proposal was prepared which promoted participation within an international research
programme. It incorporated a statement ensuring the maintenance of confidentiality and
anonymity of the bank and participants at all times. It was hoped that this provision
would encourage an open dialogue during research activities and facilitate access to
internal bank documentation 13 where necessary. As an inducement to potential
participants a report of research findings was offered. This provision was taken into
account when the questionnaire and interview research was planned to ensure an
appropriate feedback format was achieved.
A pilot study of research techniques
To examine the appropriateness of the research methodology proposed a second pilot
study was undertaken. The study was based on the UK bank community and involved a
telephone survey of community banks to establish their level of environmental
management activity and a detailed examination of one bank. The UK bank community
was selected given the recognised publication of the community position on the
environment through the British Bankers' Association and knowledge of local language
and conditions.
Telephone survey
A telephone survey14 of the main UK commercial lending banks was undertaken which
included: Barclays Bank; Lloyds Bank; Midland Bank; National Westminster Bank;
Trustee Savings Bank; Royal Bank of Scotland; Bank of Scotland and the Co-operative
Bank. Initial telephone contact was made either through a bank's switchboard or details
provided in literary bank references. Contact was requested with an environment unit,
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person responsible for environmental issues/policy or failing that a marketing/public
relations function or personnel officer.
In two cases telephone interviews resulted in the identification of 'key informants' who
agreed to take part in the research programme. The first bank contact revealed that the
bank was in the middle of undertaking an internal review of environmental
considerations within their lending function and thus requested a delay in participation
until the review was complete ls. This confirmed fears that the stage of environmental
policy development may prove problematic to research access. The second bank contact
agreed access immediately and an interview was arranged. The research was undertaken
as a pilot study, documented later.
Members of the remaining banks all provided evidence of their bank's environmental
management activities either by quoting their own environmental responsibilities or by
providing appropriate public relations literature. However, in a number of cases
telephone enquiries proved problematic and written requests to support enquiries were
often necessary before contacts could be identified and/or information obtained. In light
of difficulties encountered while 'cold calling' UK banks, an alternative approach was
chosen as the basis for establishing further contacts, particularly in other communities.
A request was made to representatives of the UNEP for the provision of contact details
for individual bank subscriptions to the UNEP statement 16 . Research contacts within
the UK, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, and Ireland were recommended. Contacts
provided by UNEP were banks considered to be actively undertaking environmental
management and had been involved in a number of international conferences and thus
perceived to be willing to discuss bank issues. UNEP representatives proposed that
banks were sufficiently conducting environmental management activities to warrant
such a community research study as outlined. This deliberate bias was adopted in order
to facilitate research among communities in which problems of access and
policy/procedural development had been recognised.
Considering the results of the telephone survey, it was decided that the pursuit of a
community case approach was feasible. A research proposal was issued to all contacts
recommended as the first stage in establishing community cases.
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A pilot study to test the research design
The pilot study" was undertaken to examine the feasibility and appropriateness of
research techniques selected. In advance of the interview the bank participant stressed
the need for confidentiality but agreed to provide research access as the bank's
anonymity was guaranteed.
The study involved an extensive interview with a bank's legal representative
responsible for the integration of environmental management procedures within the
lending function. Selecting a policy maker as a key bank informant proved to be the
most appropriate choice. The participant acknowledged that the bank was in the process
of developing a new system of environmental credit assessment. The policy maker in
overseeing this process was the one person who was able to provide an outline of: the
social relations and roles within the bank; the process of development involved; and
draft documentation for consideration. The participant also represented the bank as a
part time member of a national bank community environmental working party. As such
they were able to provide an overview of formal bank relationships and communication
with the wider bank community, in addition to a view on the role of the working party.
The participant was reluctant to have the interview tape recorded and it was decided
that notes would be taken during the discussion. The interview lasted six hours and with
hindsight it was recognised that the tape recording of such a period of discussion was
not feasible. Further, considerable reference was made to on screen presentations,
printouts of which were not made available and it was necessary to take detailed notes.
A copy of draft bank documents supporting procedural development were provided.
However, despite the provision of a confidentiality statement, access to the bank's
guidelines on environmental lending issues was restricted to bank premises at a time set
aside during the interview. The provision of access to such reference materials on bank
premises added considerable support for the choice of a personal interview with key
informants as a means of information collection.
Questions drawn from the draft questionnaire were used during the interview to prompt
discussion 18. The questionnaire format was found to be a useful guide supporting the
systematic examination of interrelated issues and evaluation of discussion notes. The
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appropriateness of questions were evaluated through a critical review of responses and
slight modifications were made to the questionnaire. In particular, the participant noted
that questions raised regarding a documented policy statement on the environment were
inapplicable as the bank had no such documentation.
The flexibility offered by the choice of questionnaire only as a provisional guide to
questioning facilitated a detailed discussion regarding the participant and bank's
definition of 'policy'. As a result considerable emphasis was placed on training
materials and procedural documentation as a basis for determining 'bank rationality' for
environmental management.
As a follow up to information gained during this interview, a formal introduction was
provided to a branch lending officer of the bank who had been involved in developing
the environmental lending procedures. A telephone interview was initially undertaken
with this officer. However, the officer referred a considerable number of issues back to
the legal representative of the bank on the basis that they were "policy" issues under
review at the time of questioning. A request for further research discussions with other
members of the bank was declined by the policy maker, on the basis the policy maker
did not want any undue prominence to be given to environmental issues given that the
main environmental communication programme had not been undertaken.
While the stage of procedural development in this case restricted the scope of research
to key bank informants, earlier arguments for addressing the bank policy maker as the
primary contact were supported 19 . As a result the research methodology was pursued as
outlined.
Basis of examination
Community cases and bank participants
The research programme was based on three case studies centred on the bank
communities of Switzerland, Ireland and the UK20, as defined by their geographical
location. Bank involvement in the research programme encompassed three Swiss
banks21 , two Irish banks and five UK banks. In each community examined research was
conducted with local bank regulators, trade associations and legislators to identify
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potential influences on bank activities which should be considered when evaluating
findings. Background information on each bank is provide in Appendix 3a
A Canadian case study was not pursued as two of the major Canadian banks
approached refused to take part in the research programme and the remainder failed to
reply despite several attempts at following up proposals. Similarly, German banks
approached provided copies of a number of useful internal publications and research
references but declined full involvement in the research programme. The main
justification provided by banks for their inability to take part was "maintenance of
confidentiality". This occurred despite the offer of written guarantees. Time
commitments foreseen to be required for research also precluded bank involvement in a
number of instances.
Cross community case participation
Once bank participation in the community cases had been established an approach was
made to Swiss banks requesting the involvement of representatives from their UK
operations in the research programme. Research agreement was initially provided by
only two of the three Swiss banks. The third bank refused to provide details of a UK
contact and requested that no independent approach be made to their UK operations.
The justification for this refusal was that UK operations were in the process of
developing their credit assessment procedures.
When research was pursued with the Swiss banks' UK operations, problems were
encountered in establishing an interview with a member of one bank and research was
abandoned in this instance. The cross community study was finally undertaken with
only one Swiss bank. It was recognised that the study was further limited as the nature
of the bank's operations in the UK were restricted to merchant banking activities.
However, research was pursued to examine group influences on bank members'
rationality for environmental considerations within lending processes.
Research time frame
The research programme was undertaken between August 1995 and March 1996. Case
research was negotiated so that banks within each community were examined during a
comparable time period and time specific factors could be accounted for.
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The timing of research studies were particularly opportune as changes in environmental
legislation were taking place within the bank communities examined, and
environmental issues were topical discussion points among banks. For example,
research studies were undertaken in the UK shortly after the Environment Act 1995 had
gained parliamentary approval in July 1995 and legal guidance notes were awaited. In
Ireland the inclusion of the agricultural sector under Environmental Protection Agency
Act 1992 industry listing was expected, and in Switzerland the final stages of
assessment were being conducted for a contaminated land register. The uncertainty of a
lender's position regarding environmental liability and bank members resulting desire
to contribute to the environmental debate favoured research access22.
Bank research
A summary of research methods and evidence obtained from each bank is provided for
analysis in Appendix 3b.
Key informants
In all banks initial 'key informants' were policy makers ultimately responsible for
environmental lending policy design and implementation. Despite this common
responsibility, policy makers held various roles within their individual banks, from
heads of lending functions to risk managers, and members of specialist environmental
units. In most cases policy makers also represented their bank at community level
discussions.
Bank interviews
Initially a telephone interview was undertaken with key informants during which time
the research23 background and the bank's position were discussed and an interview
timetable was agreed. A number of banks agreed to provide documentation for review
prior to the interview as a basis for discussion.
Interviews lasted on average between two and three hours. A number of interviews
were conducted in an informal setting away from bank premises. Where interviews
were held on bank premises an observational review was conducted for evidence of the
bank's environmental policy and/or housekeeping procedures. Interviews on bank
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premises additionally provided immediate access to bank documentation and other on-
line reference material.
Documentary reviews
In a number of banks internal policies, procedural guidance and working papers were
provided for review. Copies of documents were not always made available for private
study and/or removal, and in a number of banks textual analysis had to be undertaken
on the premises. In all cases where interviews were held away from bank premises copy
documentation was requested and provided by post following the interview.
Follow up interviews
In most cases follow up interviews were carried out in person, with individuals and/or
groups, or by telephone. Follow up telephone interviews with policy makers were
standard practice. Other interviews were requested on the basis of bank findings. Bank
participants involved in follow up interviews included legal representatives, members
of environmental working parties, in-house environmental specialists, training officers
and lending officers. In a number of cases these participants were involved in policy
design and development. A summary of bank members interviewed within each bank is
outlined in Appendix 3c.
Research approaches to branch lending officers were frequently denied. The
explanation for this was lending officers had recently been introduced to environmental
issues and, given legal uncertainty regarding lender liability for the environment,
questioning may distort the process of integration and perceptions. In a number of cases
interviews with lending officers were not requested as environmental responsibility had
not been delegated to lending officers.
Where follow up interviews were not appropriate, or not available, extensive
documentary reviews were undertaken to ensure adequate research evidence was
provided in all banks examined.
Translation issues
Key Swiss informants expressed a preference for all correspondence to be in English, in
particular the questionnaire24. Any uncertainty recognised by research participants25
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regarding translation issues were resolved during interviews. This approach was
favoured as it was felt that it minimised the risk of mis-understanding. On a number of
occasions bank documentation existing in an English form were made available for
review. Where documents accessible for review did not exist in an English form, bank
participants provided translations of key terminology and made copy documentation
available for full translation.
Language barriers created a research problem during follow up exercises. During the
research visits one Swiss bank was undertaking training and presentations but these
were delivered in German. The attendance of the researcher at the events was discussed
but it was decided between research partners that the language barrier was un-
manageable. Alternately, the training and presentation issues were discussed during
interview with the member of staff responsible for training design and delivery.
Access to branch lending officers was provided by only one Swiss bank on the basis
that correspondence would be addressed in the local language of German, French or
Italian, as applicable to the bank lending officer. The bank advised the researcher to
initiate contact using a purpose made questionnaire26 translated to and from German
with the help of a University interpreter and bank advisers. This was pursued as the
only available means of contact while recognising translation risks. The questionnaire
was designed on the basis that questionnaire follow up would be available by means of
a telephone interview.
A German questionnaire was issued to eight lending officers selected given their
various roles throughout the lending hierarchy. A complete questionnaire was returned
directly to the researcher by four lending officers. Follow up research was attempted
with participants but was abandoned as lending officers proved unavailable for
questioning. This restricted the scope of the findings which could be drawn from the
questionnaire results.
Bank feedback
A summary report of research findings was presented to key informants of each bank
and their comments were requested. Confirmation of findings were achieved with all
but two banks.
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Analysis of findings
The choice of research methodology and broad scope of the examination provides a
multitude of starting points from which findings can be analysed such as commonalties
and/or differences between: banks within each community; banks in different
communities; and all banks. Further, the adoption of a theoretical approach based on
social perception highlights the findings and conclusions represented as the researcher's
interpretation of events, observations and discussions. Publication restrictions imposed
by banks precluded: the identification of banks participating in the research; the
anonymous reproduction of bank documentation; and in some cases specific details of
bank policy and procedures.
With this in mind the findings of the research programme have been documented in two
sections within which each bank is identified alphabetically. The first section, in
Chapter six, illustrates the research findings of the three community case studies and
the cross community bank study. Findings are illustrated by drawing comparison and
contrast between banks within individual communities. By comparing and contrasting
the UK and Swiss operations of a Swiss bank the influence of locational characteristics
on the bank's policies and practices are examined. The second section, in Chapter
seven, critically reviews the application of the central proposal made to findings
outlined in Chapter six, drawing additional comparison between bank findings across
communities.
Summary
This Chapter has outlined the methodology undertaken to empirically examine the
central proposal that banks can be characterised as hierarchical cultures with views of
physical nature founded upon myths of tolerance. The methodology is based on the
ontological foundation inherent within the proposal that reality, and environmental risk,
is socially constructed. The basic epistemological stance reflected by the methodology
is to address the social construction of environmental risk within a bank, through an
examination of social processes supporting the development of cultural perception and
associated management rationality.
The chosen methodology takes into account practical research limitations, highlighted
in Chapter one, imposed by bank research participants. These limitations include:
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preclusion of access to borrower information; restricted access to bank members and
internal bank documentation; the maintenance of bank anonymity; and preclusion on
the reproduction of bank documents within research publications.
The methodology selected was to undertake three bank community case studies within:
Switzerland; Ireland; and the UK, and a cross community bank study based on a
comparison of a Swiss bank's subsidiary operations within Switzerland and the UK.
The findings drawn from the research are outlined in Chapter six. Reflecting upon the
adoption of a social constructionist perspective, it is recognised that the research
findings are a representation of the researcher's view of given situations.
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Notes
It has been proposed that individuals rationalise their responsibility for environmental management
according to their social role and corresponding myth of nature.
2 It has been proposed that discussions regarding research methods in the social sciences have frequently
oversimplified the choice of methodology by focusing on the dichotomy between qualitative and
quantitative (positivistic) methods almost in abstract. It is stressed that the choice of a qualitative
'approach', is derived from the nature of the social phenomena to be explored.
3 According to symbolic analysts meanings do not reside in objects but emerge from social processes.
Emphasis is therefore placed on the active, interpretative and constructive capacities or competence
possessed by social actors resulting in reference to symbolic analysis under 'social action theory'. Within
the thesis the term 'members' rather than 'actors' is favoured given affiliations with cultural theories.
4 In anthropology, an emphasis on the importance of the ethnographic method was initially associated
with the functionalist school encouraging the analysis of the internal structure and function of social
groups.
5 Symbolic interactionism emphasises the emergence of meaning from social process and the
interpretative and constructive capacity of actors or 'members' of a social group as opposed to social
structure and functionalism.
6 Undertaken July 1994.
7 From Chapter one the argument is noted that banks facing common regulatory demands, economic
conditions and social pressures will have/illustrate similar perceptions of environmental risk.
8 The proposal that banks are hierarchical social structures implicitly recognises the existence and
maintenance of power relationships within banks. Those in a position of power will have a dominant
influence on formal risk communication channels and messages. Selecting policy makers as key
informants recognises and facilitates an exploration of this dominance.
9 It is partly because of such an overlap in social contexts that individuals are able to co-operate with
inhabitants of other ways of life.
10 It should be noted that no formal attempt was made to differentiate between lending processes dealing
with large and small corporations. However, the interviewer was aware of the possibility of size
influencing lending policy and thus the nature of risk communicated.
11 For example, parts of section 'B' or 'C' may be omitted and a copy of the banks annual report may be
attached as a basis of a response to section 'D'.
12 The definition of policy was left open to interpretation by the informant.
13 It was recognised that the bank would maintain clients confidentiality agreements at all times.
However, the questionnaire, in places, required the recipient to comment on their experience/ knowledge
of particular case examples. It was perceived in advance that this area of questioning may be a
problematic, as respondents may provide a dishonest response if questioned on an error in practical
judgement.
14 The survey was undertaken December, 1994. It was recognised that the Co-operative Bank and
National Westminster Bank had publicised their ethical/ environmental policies which providing a
background to the research approach.
15 Outside involvement in the review was not considered appropriate.
16 See Appendix 2
17 Undertaken June 1995.
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18 Further, the first questionnaire was undertaken as a draft, with critical comments requested from the
recipient and adjustments made where necessary.
19 A more extensive review of the results of the pilot study will be given in Chapter six and the appendix.
Reference given at this point is an overview of factor influential on the choice of methodology as
opposed to theoretical justification.
20 Banks were examined within their home country, as determined by their head office location.
However, consideration was given to the influence of wider group activities where applicable.
21 The UK operations of one Swiss bank were also examined.
22 The international scope of the research programme was perceived to be a factor which persuaded
many banks to participate as they were interesting in learning about the experience and reaction of their
peers regarding environmental liability under a broad range of circumstance, constantly striving to attain
best practice.
23 Extensive questions were asked concerning the perspective of the researcher. It was noted that the
accountancy training and experience of the researcher was perceived by bank members to be an
acceptable basis from which to investigate the proposed research area.
24 A translation was offered to Swiss bankers.
25 The standard of written and spoken English demonstrated by the participants was very high.
26 This questionnaire provided the only explicit reference made to bank culture by the researcher. All
other references to culture were either raised by the participant and discussed or evaluated according to
other research evidence.
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Chapter 6
Research findings from three bank communities
Introduction
This Chapter provides an overview of research findings drawn from three bank
community case studies: Switzerland; Ireland and the UK and a cross community bank
study based on a comparison of a Swiss bank's subsidiary operations within
Switzerland and the UK. The research was undertaken in the period August 1995 to
March 1996. Findings are drawn from: three Swiss banks; two Irish banks; and five UK
banks, classified according to location of their principal Head Office.
Community cases are presented in terms of community views represented through local
trade associations and then by comparing, and contrasting, findings drawn from
individual banks within each community. These findings are supplemented by those
from the cross community bank study which addressed the impact of location on the
deployment of Group policy and practice. Background details for each community are
outlined in terms of: bank regulation; environmental legislation; industry/market
profile; bank community profile; and bank trade associations, and the influence of these
location factors are discussed.
Research findings drawn from each Bank are classified according to a letter of the
alphabet to maintain bank anonymity, while still providing a basis for reference.
Restrictions imposed by banks participating in the research preclude their identification,
reproduction of bank documentation, and specific policy and procedural details.
The adoption of a theoretical approach based on social perception highlights the
principles that the evaluation provided represents the researcher's interpretation of
events, observations and discussions.
In Chapter seven, the application of the central proposal is discussed with respect to
these findings and an additional contrast is drawn within banks and between banks
across communities.
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Swiss bank community
Background
Bank regulation
Bank activities are regulated by the Federal Bank Commission. When research was
carried out no regulation existed which required banks to consider environmental
issues.
Legislation
Switzerland is governed by a Confederation who establish federal law to be
administered at a 'canton', regional and municipal level. There was no explicit legal
requirement on banks to consider environmental issues as part of their lending process
but as corporate entities' banks were legally required to manage 'housekeeping' issues
such as waste disposal. The corporate activities of borrowers were controlled by
individual environmental laws. In August 1995 when primary bank research was
carried out, a contaminated land register was in the final stages of development. The
register outlines requirements for legislating future clean up activities with potential
implications for corporate land owners.
Under Switzerland's civil code of law in a case of bankruptcy, or foreclosure,
ownership of property devolves to the courts. In such circumstances banks are more
likely to lose their security than inherit extensive environmental liability from
borrowers.
Industrial profile
Historically, Switzerland's economy has been dominated by service industries.
However, the country provides a base for the subsidiary operations of a number of
international groups, in particular, members of the chemical industry. These operations
are predominantly located in the canton regions of Basel and Geneva close to
Switzerland's borders with Germany and France.
Bank community profile
The research was based on a study of Switzerland's three major banks which dominate
the domestic financial services market. The banks examined were part of a large
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international group with their primary executive board and supporting policy units
based in Switzerland.
Bank trade associations
Liaison between banks within the community was primarily facilitated by the Swiss
Bank Association, locally termed the OBU. The OBU has an Environmental Working
Group, which includes representatives from the banks examined. The Group was
established in response to environmental initiatives undertaken by the major Swiss
banks. The work of the Group has centred on an identification of the environmental
issues faced by local banks, including issues of lender liability. No formal guidelines
are provided by the OBU on procedural issues for banks.
Community views
The banks examined acknowledged a very close relationship with one another. For
example, the policy maker for each bank involved in the research programme
acknowledged meeting on a monthly basis to discuss their financial performance and
topical issues. In contrast to this direct liaison, their involvement with smaller Swiss
banks is facilitated by the OBU.
Representatives from the large commercial banks claimed to have a considerable
influence on the activities of the OBU. The banks examined noted that they have
encouraged the OBU to address environmental issues and have frequently hosted
special issue seminars and conducted research on the OBU's behalf. For example, the
policy maker from Bank A referred to the first Swiss banking Conference on the
Environment 1995 hosted by the OBU with representatives from over 60 Swiss and
foreign banks.
The OBU activities specifically referred to by research participants involved liaison
with other bank associations within Europe. The OBU has worked with bank
associations within neighbouring countries such as Germany to harmonise bank
approaches to environmental issues'. For example, Bank B recognised that the OBU
were sponsoring European research addressing the development of corporate
environmental performance indicators for use by banks and other industries.
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Given Switzerland's geographical proximity to Germany, France and Italy the potential
for the environmental impact of corporate activities within one country to transgress
national boundaries is high. With this in mind the close relationships demonstrated
among these neighbouring bank communities is unsurprising. Particular reference was
made by the Swiss banks to their relationship with German banks. It is noted that the
locations of Switzerland's "heavier industries" are on its border with Germany.
The desire of the Swiss banks to promote their environmental position internationally
was further reflected by their involvement in United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) and the International Chamber of Commerce Environment Group initiatives.
These activities represent the involvement of the banks with communities beyond their
direct neighbours and an interest in sharing environmental best practice, where relevant,
on a broad international scale.
Community Overview
Banks A to C
Group structure
Within Groups examined trading activities varied geographically. Corporate lending
activities in Switzerland differed from other Group lending activities on the basis that
the banks only offered loans to small and mediums sized enterprises (SMEs) in their
domestic market. Bank policy makers associated the Groups' dominant roles within the
local economy with high degrees of social responsibility2
 and high public profiles.
Within each Swiss bank examined, responsibilities for lending decisions were delegated
to lending officers within specialist central lending units, cantonal centres and local
branch networks as a function of the lending situation. In each bank a process of
restructuring was taking place to increase the decision making power of lending
officers. The nature of lending activities within individual cantons was found to vary
significantly depending on the nature of industry within the region.
Environmental considerations
Each bank examined had an "Environmental Management Services" unit based in
Switzerland whose members were environmental scientists responsible for co-
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ordinating environmental management activities internationally and providing day to
day support services to Swiss bank operations. Executive members of each unit
reported directly to the board of directors. Outside of Switzerland, each Group had a
network of national representatives responsible for local environmental management.
Policy maker interviewed referred to discussions between national representatives to
harmonise Group environmental management approaches. The networks were co-
ordinated by head office policy makers who referred to examples of consultation. The
frequency and method of communication adopted by each Group network varied
considerably between banks.
In Bank C the Group's environmental considerations were formally recorded in an
environmental mission statement. The mission was launched in 1991 to communicate
environmental management responsibilities to Group members as a basis for procedural
development. The statement was publicly promoted as a sign of Group environmental
commitment. The publication of the mission initiated the development of functional
environmental policy regulations and management practices.
In Bank A environmental considerations are recorded in a comprehensive
"environmental concept" directive. The concept was launched in 1993 as a strategy
document outlining environmental responsibilities across the Group. Extensive
procedural guidelines were issued to members of the Group's Swiss bank operations in
tandem with the concept document.
At the time the research was undertaken, a cross functional committee of policy makers
within Bank B were in the final stages of developing a Group environmental policy
statement. The statement objective was to summarise the environmental management
procedures undertaken in the Group. The purpose of the policy statement was to
provide a medium to communicate the Groups environmental position to the public.
From a review of formal Group policies it is recognised that the publication of
environmental policy/mission statements should not be viewed out of context as an
indicator of environmental management practice.
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Motives for environmental management
Social  responsibility
Policy makers noted that environmental issues had first been considered by bank
members in terms of energy management in the 1970/80s in response to the oil crisis.
Members from Bank A referred to the development of an energy policy statement in
1978 as a basis for communicating the need for energy management to bank members.
Bank B recognised the production of a similar energy policy statement in 1980 when
energy management procedures were implemented.
Bank representatives recognised that given the scale of bank operations they were
among the largest consumers of energy in Switzerland. The implication of this was
twofold. Firstly, resource scarcity threatened their economic sustainability 3 . Secondly,
the banks recognised a heightened degree of social responsibility to efficiently manage
their resource use.
The Sandoz incident
Representatives from each bank examined highlighted "environmental awareness and
action as the result of incidents such as 'Sandoz' which focused bank considerations,
and public attention, on the need to manage corporate environmental risks". The
Sandoz disaster4 occurred in 1986 when water used to put out a fire in the
Schweizerhalle Warehouse of the Sandoz chemical company caused massive pollution
of the river Rhine. The disaster highlighted the potential extent of industrial impact on
the natural environment, the public of both Switzerland and its neighbours, and the cost
to the associated company and its stakeholders. As a result of the accident Swiss banks
recognised a heightened responsibility for environmental management as a corporate
entity and a lender.
By 1991 the banks had responded to these risks by initiating the development and
incorporation of environmental management procedures into all of their in-house
activities. Reference to bank documentation and comments by members provided
extensive evidence of environmental "housekeeping" measures undertaken and
corresponding achievements during the period 1991 to 1995. In each bank
environmental housekeeping procedures such as energy efficiency and recycling
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initiatives were visible during research visits. Environmental management
considerations within lending processes were found to vary significantly.
Lending considerations
Specialists from each bank recognised that their bank's lending policies were not
formally documented in a position statement but were represented by "policy guidance
documentation" that they were responsible for providing. In all Swiss banks examined
credit risk specialists with the banks' Environmental Management Services Units
(EMU) provided reference to their environmental credit risk assessment activities. In
Bank A specialists reflected upon environmental impact assessments undertaken in
accordance with requests by lending officers. In Bank B specialists were responsible for
all loan facilities to small and very large businesses and, as in Bank A, environmental
impact assessments requested by lending officers. In Bank A and B, specialists
provided consultation on, and referral of, environmental credit risk assessment by
lending officers.
At the time research was conducted, the environmental credit risk specialist in Bank C
had sole responsibility for environmental credit risk assessment within lending
decisions. However, the specialist was in the process of developing formal procedural
guidance regulations to support the delegation of environmental credit assessment to
lending officers in Autumn 1995. The specialist noted that environmental issues
recognised by lending officers in response to the banks environmental mission
objectives were referred to the bank's EMU.
In Bank A the delegation of responsibilities for environmental credit risk assessment to
lending officers followed an extensive campaign of environmental awareness raising
through in-house publications and presentations. Responsibilities were formally issued
through the provision of environmental lending policy documents and an environmental
training programme. In Bank A lending officers questioned noted their consideration of
corporate environmental performance considerations within lending decisions in terms
of standard bank guidelines.
In Bank B far greater emphasis was placed on environmental training. Responsibilities
for environmental credit assessment were delegated to lending officers following their
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involvement in an environmental training programme and receipt of environmental
guidance documentation outlining procedural responsibilities. In Bank B research
access to bank lending officers was not achieved and this was recognised as a limitation
on research findings. However, it is noted that the environmental credit risk specialist in
Bank B provided considerable evidence of environmental credit risk assessment for
which they were responsible. In addition, access was provided to standard
environmental guidance documentation and training materials. In Bank C lending
officers were not approached as they had no formal responsibility for environmental
credit risk assessment.
All policy makers proposed that responsibility for in-house environmental management
had provided lending officers with a general awareness of environmental issues which
could be built on to introduce responsibilities for environmental credit assessment. All
corporate loans were to be the subject of environmental credit assessment in each Swiss
bank. In each bank a separate process of assessment had been designed for small and
medium sized enterprises, corporates and very large projects. While environment credit
assessment procedures and definitions of environmental credit risk within policy
communication varied considerably between banks, a number of commonalties were
recognisable. For example, the primary determinant of environmental credit risk was
the nature of a borrower's industrial activities and management ability. However, in
Bank A and Bank B environmental credit risk assessment extended to all environmental
mediums land, water and air. In Bank C environmental credit risk assessment was to be
introduced in stages beginning with contaminated land and later progressing to air and
water contamination.
Influence of European standards
Representatives from all the Swiss banks examined recognised that their environmental
management practice were influenced considerably by a variety of Swiss and European
environmental legislation. However, the degree and nature of influence of legislation
varied from bank to bank. For example, environmental considerations within the
lending processes of Bank A and Bank B were founded upon recommended European
standards of environmental management.
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In Bank A environmental credit assessment procedures were conducted with reference
to industrial sector requirements based on the strictest environmental legislation
demonstrated by a European member state. Whilst recognising developments in
European legislation, representatives from Bank C referred specifically to the
development of a contaminated land register for Switzerland as the primary influence
on corporate credit assessment procedures.
Bank representatives attributed their considerations of European environmental
standards to Switzerland's geographical proximity to its neighbours. Further, attribution
was made to the impact of the Sandoz incident which, while relatively localised,
crossed national boundaries. Representatives from Bank A and Bank B noted an
inability to fully predict the potential impact and associated cost of such an
environmental incident. It was noted that all Swiss banks examined required corporate
borrowers to have adequate environmental insurance which they recognised as being
readily available in Switzerland.
Experience of loss 
Representatives from Bank A and Bank B recognised that during the early 1990's they
had experienced financial loss in relation to lending in excess of five million Swiss
Francs on a number of occasions in connection with environmental issues. These cases
involved corporate borrowers being required to comply with environmental laws. As a
result the banks had suffered loss of repayment for all or part of a loan, and in some
cases had incurred clean up cost attached to security before resale was possible. The
Swiss banks had not been the subject of direct legal assessment for environmental
damage in their position as lenders. Representatives from Bank A and Bank B
recognised that the financial loss which their bank had experienced in connection with
environmental lending considerations was partially a response to borrowers' inability to
comply with developing environmental legislation.
Members of the banks concerned recognised that each experience had influenced their
view of the potential extent and likelihood of environmental credit risks. As a result,
environmental considerations within lending activities had been increased and the
formalisation of an environmental lending policy had been encouraged. It is noteworthy
that representatives from Bank C were unaware of such an incident occurring in relation
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to their lending activity or that of their peers. The bank remained in the planning stages
of introducing formal environmental credit procedures, influenced primarily by the
forthcoming introduction of an environmental contaminated land register for
Switzerland.
Corporate environmental performance measurement
In Bank A corporate loan appraisals were based on written summaries and were not
subject to a risk rating procedure. In Bank B and Bank C final lending decisions were
based on systems of credit risk rating. However, it was recognised by representatives of
both banks that the incorporation of environment lending considerations within this
system were at the time of research future objectives. In Bank C the development of
such a system would be part of the final stage of the environmental lending policy
regulation.
Irish bank community
Background
Bank regulation
Bank activities are regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. When research was carried
out the governing Central Bank of Ireland Act 1989 placed no requirement on banks to
consider environmental issues.
Legislation
There was no explicit legal requirement on banks to consider environmental issues as
part of their lending process. The most significant piece of environmental legislation of
potential influence on bank 'housekeeping' activities was the Waste Bill which at the
time the research study was undertaken was in the process of development.
When the primary research was carried out Ireland's Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Act 1992 was being introduced by the Irish Environment Agency through a
system of licensing corporate activity on a sector by sector basis. Environmental
licensing requirements were a potential issue of compliance for a range of corporate
borrowers.
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Ireland operates under a common law system. In a case of corporate bankruptcy or
foreclosure a lender may become 'mortgagee in possession of a property' and liable for
associated environmental damage.
Industrial profile
Historically, industrial activity in Ireland has centred on agriculture and there has been
an absence of heavy industry and limited presence of large 'international' groups. At
the time research was undertaken the Irish Environment Agency was in the process of
outlining licensing requirements for agricultural activities.
Bank community profile
The Irish bank market is dominated by four commercial lending banks. Research
participation was achieved with two of these four banks. It was felt that this level of
participation was sufficient to achieve a basis for comparison within the community.
The banks examined were members of international groups with their head offices
located in Dublin Ireland.
Bank trade associations
Liaison between Irish banks is formally organised by the Irish Bank Federation (IBF).
The IBF has an Environmental Working Group, which includes representatives from
the banks examined. No formal guidelines are provided by the IBF on procedural issues
for banks. The work of the Group has centred on an identification of environmental
issues faced by local banks in particular lender liability issues.
Community views
The bank community liaise primarily through the IBF. Policy makers and legal advisers
from banks examined highlighted the role of a special IBF environmental working
party, as providing a valuable forum for discussion of environmental issues within
banking at both a local and a European level. In addition, the working party was viewed
as providing a mechanism for establishing a community response for negotiations with
regulators and external bank advisers. For example, Federation initiatives had included
efforts to establish standards for property valuations and an industry delegation to
address government plans for waste regulation. In addition, legal advisers from each
bank had been delegated by the 'BF working party members to represent the Irish bank
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community at meetings of the European Bankers Association to discuss developments
in European legislation.
Reflecting upon the focus of attention of the bank community, bank representatives
revealed that the development of environmental legislation was the main topic of
consideration. The EPA Act 1992 was viewed by bank representatives as a move
towards European environmental standards. The banks' stated their support for the
development of environmental legislation, but expressed concern regarding the ability
of the Environment Agency to deal with the administration of licensing requirements to
'appropriate standards'.
Community Overview
Banks D to E
Group structure
Within both Groups, trading activities varied geographically. The nature of corporate
lending in Ireland was perceived as particularly unique in comparison to foreign
operations. Within both banks lending facilities were was divided into three categories:
large corporate termed "commercial" loans; small and medium sized enterprise loans
termed "retail"; and "agricultural" loans. Due to the nature of the financial services
market in Ireland corporate lending activities were centred on retail and agricultural
lending. Outside Ireland the Groups offer only commercial loan facilities.
Within each bank a central credit committee retained responsibility for lending
decisions associated with facilities over an established limit, primarily commercial
loans. The limit was the same in each bank. Responsibilities for lending decisions for
facilities below these established limits were delegated to regional/area and local
lending officers.
In designing local lending procedures bank policy makers referred to discussions with
members of foreign subsidiaries. The requirements of environmental legislation were
noted by bank representatives as the foundation for international consultation. The
greatest degree of contrast made by bank representatives was with their UK subsidiaries
whom they proposed shared a number of common market issues. However, they
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reflected on cases of financial lending loss within US operations to note the potential
significance of environmental lender liability.
Environmental considerations
Environmental considerations within both banks examined were centred on Group risk
management approaches. Environmental risk was viewed primarily in terms of the
banks' potential environmental lender liability centring risk management on
commercial lending activities. Bank members and documentation referred to
'environmental risk in lending' as opposed to environmental credit risk.
In Bank D members of Group risk management were responsible for credit strategy,
policy and review in addition to the development of credit risk assessment procedures.
To monitor environmental management activities a working party had been established
drawing on members of the central credit committee, policy makers and legal
representatives.
In Bank E Group risk management activities were co-ordinated by a steering group
drawn from representatives of each bank function. Members of a Group credit control
function were delegated responsibility for risk management within credit strategy and
developing guidelines for environmental management built on Group risk management
policy. In both banks policy makers with responsibility for environmental credit
considerations referred to the extensive involvement of the banks' legal representatives
in policy and procedural development.
Motives for environmental management
Environmental considerations within bank lending processes were viewed by
representatives from both banks as a reaction to the development and subsequent
implementation of the EPA Act 1992. Environmental management requirements were
established in each bank in 1993 by the banks' environmental working party/ steering
committee. As a result policy documentation outlining responsibilities for
environmental credit risk assessment were issued by policy makers within each bank in
1994.
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Bank E's policy maker recognised that the development of bank procedures had also
been influenced by the public demonstrations of environmental pressure groups calling
for environmental improvements by large industrial companies in the area. It was noted
that public recognition of a bank's association with a corporate polluter represented a
risk to bank reputation.
Policy makers' primary concerns were the impact of a compliance requirement on a
borrower's performance and the associated implications for environmental lender
liability. Environmental credit risk management for both banks was viewed as a
weighting of the costs and benefits of a borrower's approach to corporate
environmental management. Bank members' viewed the risk of lender liability for the
environment as an integral part of credit risk. However, while both bank policy makers
acknowledged the same motivation for environmental credit risk assessment, the nature
of the management response varied considerably between the banks.
In particular, Bank E's policy maker recognised the potential benefits of encouraging a
market for special rate 'environment loans' for small businesses with a good
environmental record. Bank D placed much greater emphasis on avoiding the negative
consequence of poor environmental management by a borrower. However, it was noted
that documentary reference to environmental credit risk within each bank remained
centred on avoidance of liability.
Lending considerations
Policy
Working party and steering committee members interviewed referred to standard bank
guidance documentation and procedures as bank "lending policy". In each bank the
primary document issued to launch the "policy" was a circular. The circulars outlined:
potential environmental credit risks resulting from the EPA Act 1992; potential
environmental lender liability; environmental responsibilities; and associated
procedures for environmental credit risk assessment. In addition, in Bank D a one page
summary was provided at the end of the circular termed a policy statement. Policy
makers in both banks acknowledged that lending officers had been consulted during the
preparation of guidance material.
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As a follow up to policy communication, lending officers within each bank were
provided with standard environmental credit assessment working papers. In each bank
working papers were provided as the basis for recording environmental assessment
procedures undertaken within borrower case files.
Adherence to standard environmental credit assessment procedures 
Under the banks' lending policies, responsibilities for corporate environmental
performance considerations within lending processes differed considerably.
In Bank E all loans were subject to a basic environmental review and then loans
exceeding a specified limit, or initially identified as an environmental risk, were subject
to further review. Accordingly, members of the central credit committee and regional
lending officers had delegated responsibility for environmental decision making. To
support policy introduction a special environmental training course was provided to all
lending officers. Members of the central credit committee were also members of the
bank's environmental steering committee responsible for policy developments,
therefore they were already familiar with the standard environmental credit risk
assessment procedures.
Research access in Bank E was restricted to interviews with the bank's policy maker
and legal adviser, and documentary review. The policy maker, as a member of the
bank's central credit committee, provided examples of corporate environmental
performance considerations within the lending process and adherence to standard bank
procedures. The legal adviser provided reference to formal and informal consultation on
environmental lending cases by regional and local lending officers, and members of the
central credit committee. The legal adviser was involved in the bank's environmental
training course and attributed informal case referrals to this responsibility and lack of
familiarity with environmental issues. In addition, the adviser noted the use of standard
environmental assessment documentation as a guide to defining environmental credit
risk by lending officers and central credit committee members.
Within Bank D only loans greater than a specified limit were subject to environmental
review. This limit was considerably higher than that established within Bank E. As a
result final lending decisions in relation to environmental issues remained centralised.
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Recognition and referral of environmental issues were however made by regional
lending officers. To highlight the importance of environmental considerations within
the loan process each officer had been provided with a desk top template referring to
standard environmental assessment procedures. However, the policy maker proposed
that formal environmental training was not necessary. It was recognised that training
would be required to support the future delegation of responsibility for environmental
decision making to lending officers. The bank policy maker noted that training would
be part of the next stage of formal policy development.
In Bank D members of the central credit committee were interviewed regarding their
adherence to environmental considerations. Members interviewed provided anonymous
case examples of corporate environmental performance considerations within lending
decisions, and extensive reference to the use of standard environment credit risk
assessment procedures. Reference was additionally made to the involvement of lending
officers in identifying environmental credit risk for assessment while processing
lending applications. Credit committee members noted that they commonly engaged in
informal consultation with lending officers regarding risk definitions and policy issues
during the initial stages of policy familiarisation. A regional lending officers from Bank
D recognised the use of a desk top template as a basis for environmental considerations
within case referral. However, the lending officers noted that where an environmental
risk was identified, a process of informal referral took place with a member of the
senior credit committee, or the bank's legal adviser. Bank D's legal adviser recounted a
number of examples of such case referral.
Corporate environmental performance measurement
In both banks lending officers based their final lending decisions on a risk rating
process. However, in Bank D corporate environmental performance was represented
within standard working papers by a written summary. Alternately, in Bank E final
lending decisions were based on a system of credit risk rating. However, it was
recognised by the bank's policy maker that environmental lending considerations had
not been fully integrated into the credit rating system. In both banks policy makers
recognised the need to integrate environmental considerations into their 'traditional'
lending process. In Bank E the policy maker noted a desire to develop a quantitative
mechanism for corporate environmental performance consideration.
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Lending experience
Irish banks examined had not experienced environment related financial loss and bank
members noted that no such loss had occurred within the wider bank community to
their knowledge. The policy maker of Bank D described the case of a potential site
purchase by a commercial builder where a site valuation had revealed the presence of
considerable pollution. As a result the site was cleaned by the vendor before purchase.
In reaction to this case, members of central credit committee recognised an increased
awareness of potential environmental credit risks and greater emphasis on adherence to
'standard' environmental credit assessment procedures.
Members of Bank E's central credit committee recognised that they had lost potential
custom by requesting a potential borrower to conduct an environmental impact
assessment to examine potential land contamination. As a consequence the borrower
had successfully approached and raised finance with another bank who had not
requested such an assessment. Bank E's policy maker stressed the importance of
reaching a common approach to environmental issues within the bank community to
minimise such loss of business. The mechanism for promoting such standardisation was
seen as discussion within the IBF working party. Bank E's policy maker acknowledged
providing details regarding the bank's internal environmental lending procedures to
other IBF members with the specific intention of "encouraging others to act".
Members from both banks stressed the potential for banks to suffer direct financial loss
in relation to environmental credit risks and noted that such a loss would lead to a
review of lending procedures and an increase in their level of environmental
consideration. Representatives from both banks noted the potential extent of corporate
environmental liability by reference to a local incident involving a fire at a plant which
had led to pollution of a local water course, and action by the Environment Agency.
Representatives for Bank D and Bank E proposed that a lack of large scale
manufacturing industry in the area minimised environmental risk to lenders. However,
they recognised that a degree of risk existed from Ireland's dominant agricultural sector
which, at the time research was undertaken, was soon to come under legislation. Bank
representatives additionally recognised that Ireland had inherited a legacy of nuclear
waste dumps in unknown locations which could contaminate land offered as security.
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The policy maker from Bank E and members of the central credit committee from Bank
D reflected upon the experience of their US operations when considering the potential
consequences of environmental liability. Environmental guidance documentation issued
by both banks referred to loss incurred by US lenders. Documentation issued within
Bank D specifically quoted case details and quantified bank loss.
In-house management
Environmental housekeeping issues were found to be a consideration of Bank D and
Bank E in terms of efficient resource use and legal compliance. Representatives from
both banks recognised that the forthcoming introduction of a Waste Bill for Ireland was
causing the banks to re-evaluate their resource management procedures. The
development of environmental management procedures to meet the requirements of the
Waste Bill were being considered by the banks' respective environmental steering
group and working party.
UK bank community
Background
Bank regulation
Bank activities are regulated by the Bank of England. When research was carried out,
the governing Banking Act 1987 placed no requirement on banks to consider
environmental issues.
Legislation
There was no explicit legal requirement on banks to consider environmental issues as
part of their lending process but bank 'housekeeping' activities were subject to minimal
environmental regulation.
The most significant pieces of environmental legislation of potential influence on
borrower activities were the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) 1990 and the
Environment Act 1995.
The UK operates under a common law system. In a case of corporate bankruptcy or
foreclosure a lender operating in the UK may become mortgagee in possession of a
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property. As noted in Chapter two, the wording of the Environment Act 1995 could be
interpreted as extending environmental liability to lenders as 'mortgagee in possession
of property'5.
Industrial profile
The UK has a varied history of 'heavy' industrial activity. At the time research was
carried out, pockets of 'heavy' industrial operations were present in the UK along with
contamination from past activities.
Bank profile
The research case centred on an examination of five of the eight primary high street
banks operating in the UK. Three of the banks examined were operating as part of an
international group with their head offices based in the UK. The other two banks were
part of groups operating purely in the UK.
Bank trade associations
Liaison between banks was primarily facilitated by the British Bankers' Association
(BBA). The BBA conducts research on behalf of the UK bank community and
organises special issue discussion groups with bank representatives. The BBA has
established an Environmental Issues Advisory Group under their Risk Management
Committee. The Group was drawn from BBA members including bank members
represented within the research programme.
Community views
As noted in Chapter two, the BBA has issued a number of documents addressing
environmental issues on behalf of the UK bank community. These documents primarily
address issues of potential lender liability for the environment resulting from
developing environmental legislation in the UK and Europe, and outline a unified
community response to regulators and the markets. The community view provides that
if lenders are to be held liable for the environmental impact of their borrowers they will
refuse to lend in cases of uncertainty. These documents are aimed at raising
environmental awareness among commercial lending banks and call for regulators to
clarify the position of lenders regarding environmental liability for the environment.
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At the time the research study was carried out, the key point of debate within the
community noted by research participants was the introduction of the Environment Act
1995. BBA members made a special request to government ministers during the writing
of the Environment Bill to clarify the wording of the Bill and hence their position
regarding environmental lender liability. However, adjustments proposed by the BBA
were not made.
Community Overview
Banks F to J and C (UK operations)
Group structure
Banks C, F, H and I operated as part of international Groups and recognised that Group
policy was adapted to local markets and legislative requirements. In designing local
lending procedures bank policy makers referred to discussions with members of foreign
subsidiaries. However, the lending experience and best practice techniques adopted by
Group foreign subsidiaries were noted to be of little relevance to UK operations due to
difference in market profiles and legislation. In Bank G and Bank J Group policy was
incorporated directly into functional policies.
In Banks F, H and I, responsibility for decisions making was delegated to individual
lending officers as a function of the lending situation. In Bank G and Bank J central
credit committees and branch credit committees were responsible for decision making
according to loan value. In Bank C the policy maker had sole responsibility for making
lending decisions.
Environmental considerations
With the exception of Bank G, environmental consideration within UK banks examined
were centred on commercial lending activities and credit risk management. Policy
makers in Banks C, F, H, I and J viewed environmental lending considerations
primarily as a risk management requirement of the Group/bank. Environmental
housekeeping issues were found to be secondary considerations, reflecting minimal
legal requirements and efficient resource use.
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In Bank G the policy maker noted that environmental management considerations were
part of the Group's fundamental "ethical position". As such environmental management
was encouraged as an integral part of all bank in-house activities and service
considerations.
Environmental responsibilities
Bank G and Bank I were found to have established "Environmental Management
Units" with sole responsibility for co-ordinating environmental activities and providing
specialist support within the banks. The degree of in-house environmental management
activities within these banks was noted as considerably greater than other UK banks
examined. In Bank G corporate environmental lending policy consideration was
delegated to the manager of corporate credit strategy. Within Bank I's environmental
management unit a risk management specialist was responsible for environmental
lending issues. Similarly, in Banks F, H and J responsibilities for environmental
lending issues were delegated to group risk management members. In Bank C the
policy maker was responsible for the bank's environmental policy considerations in the
UK.
All of the UK banks represented were found to have dedicated resources to cross
functional environmental committees or working parties to support the development of
environmental management activities.
Environmental policy
In 1990 Bank J issued an environmental policy statement to all employees formalising
their environmental management approach. In 1992, Banks F, H and I issued similar
environmental policy/mission statements. However, the statements by Banks F, H and I
were made available to the public. Representatives from all of the UK banks
represented noted that policy statements were provided as a basis for raising employee
awareness of environmental issues and initiating the development of procedural
guidelines and environmental management practices. The primary emphasis of
environmental policy statements were in-house management and commercial lending
issues.
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In Bank C the principles of environmental management adopted were those contained
within the Group's environmental mission statement issued in 1990. In 1992, Bank G
launched an ethical mission statement. The statement was designed as a representation
of the bank's ethical position which was developed in the 1980's in response to
"customer demand". The purpose of the statement was to raise public awareness of the
bank's ethical position. Environmental consideration was represented as an integral part
of the bank's ethical position.
Bank G's mission statement was edited in 1995 to include a specific clause offering
financial support to borrowers' promoting environmental best practice. At the same
time Bank J also added a clause to their environmental policy as a representation of
environmental lending considerations.
Motives for environmental management
Members from Bank C, F, H, I, and J recognised, to varying degrees, that policy
developments were responses to the Environmental Protection Act 1990, in particular
addressing recommendations for a contaminated land register which was later
abandoned in 1993.
For Banks C, F and H environment policy development was a direct response to
developing environmental legislation. In Bank J the policy response was also attributed
to an environmental audit recommendation by consultants that the bank's position on
the environment be made explicit to members. Bank I developed an environmental
policy in reaction to an incident where a foreign branch of the bank had been seen to
promote the degradation of the natural environment as a result of lending activities. As
a result the bank's board of directors clarified their position on environmental issues to
bank members and provided an explicit basis for developing additional environmental
assessment procedures and raising public awareness of the bank's view.
As noted previously Bank G developed and published a formal ethical mission
incorporating environmental principles to clarify their existing ethical position to
borrowers. However, a documentary review of lending policy guidance material
revealed that considerable emphasis was placed on the bank's liability risk.
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It was noted that additions to the policy/mission statements of Bank G and Bank J
addressing environmental lending issues coincided with the development of the
Environmental Act 1995. Bank G attributed the addition to a desire to encourage a
proactive stance on the environment by 'business'. The policy maker of Bank J
recognised that a lending clause was added only when the bank's standard
environmental procedural guidelines were in place.
A number of banks recognised that pressure group activities were raising the public
profile of environmental lending consideration and leading to clarification of the banks'
positions both publicly and privately.
Lending considerations
Policy
In contrast to the existence of Group environmental policy statements, bank lending
policies were more commonly represented by guidance documentation outlining
procedural environmental responsibilities of lending officers. In addition,
environmental workbooks, reference manuals and standard working papers were
frequently referred to by bank members as representations of "lending policy". The
nature of such documents varied significantly between banks.
As noted by policy makers in each bank, following the issue of environmental policy
documentation, lending officers had taken part in a formal environmental training event
to familiarise themselves with standard environmental assessment procedures and
potential environmental credit risks.
Basis of assessment
In all banks lending officers were responsible for undertaking basic environmental
credit risk assessments when processing loan applicants and loan reviews. The purpose
of this initial review was to identify the potential environmental credit risk and the need
to undertake a second, more comprehensive, environmental assessment. In Banks H, I
and J lending officers were responsible for undertaking secondary assessments based on
one of two environmental credit risk indicators: borrowers operating within specified
industrial sectors; or loans exceeding a specified credit limit. In Banks F and G
secondary assessments were initiated based on environmental credit risk indicators
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founded on industrial sectors and credit limits. In Bank C, while influenced by
industrial risk categorisation and the level of credit facilities, secondary assessment was
determined according to a greater number of variables, in particular, loan purpose.
The most common variable identified within industrial sector analysis was "prescribed
processes" under the Environmental Protection Act 1990. However, the method of
assessment and specific nature of indicators applied by each bank varied significantly.
For example, in Bank J a borrower's environmental credit risk was graded according to
a complex risk matrix based on UK standard industry classifications and geographical
maps of potentially contaminated sites. Alternatively, in Bank F an environmental
credit risk was identified if borrower activities were noted on a general "industry risk
list".
Corporate environmental performance measurement
In Banks F, H and I, final lending decisions were made by individual lending officers
based on a system of credit risk rating. However, it was recognised by representatives
of each bank that at the time research was undertaken environmental lending
considerations had not been fully integrated into credit rating systems. In Banks G and J
fmal lending decisions were made by credit committees based on the consideration of
borrower case summaries. In Bank C lending decisions were based on a summary
report of case issues as determined by lending officers and subject to evaluation by the
policy maker.
Adherence to standard environmental credit assessment procedures 
In all banks examined policy makers were also responsible for loan approval and, as
such, provided extensive reference to cases of corporate environmental performance
considerations within bank lending processes. Unsurprisingly, they noted the use of the
bank's standard environmental credit assessment procedures and working papers as an
important basis for referrals given the potential complexity of environmental issues. A
number of policy makers also noted that on a number of occasions they had been
informally consulted by lending officers regarding environmental risk assessment on
"specialist issues". It was recognised that such consultation and, in some cases, referrals
were a more frequent occurrence in Banks G and J which were the smaller banks
examined.
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In Banks F, G and H lending officers interviewed provided anonymous case examples
of corporate environmental performance considerations within lending decisions, and
extensive reference to the use of standard environment credit risk assessment
procedures.
In Banks F and I members of commercial property management with responsibility for
environmental considerations in connection with loan security were interviewed.
Property managers provided considerable reference to cases of loan referral by lending
officers where an environmental review of security was required. In such cases
emphasis was placed on the use of standard bank working papers to outline
environmental credit risk assessment. In addition, property managers noted that their
security valuation reports took a standard format documenting potential environmental
risk according to bank policy definitions. Similar evidence of corporate environmental
performance considerations within bank lending decisions, and the use of standard
working papers for referrals, was noted during interviews with Bank I's legal adviser.
In Bank J research access was restricted to the policy maker and two environmental
managers within the EMU. The environmental managers were responsible for
undertaking detailed environmental credit risk assessments on request from lending
officers. In such a capacity environmental managers provided evidence of their own
corporate environmental performance considerations and that of lending officers.
In Bank C research access was restricted to the policy maker and internal bank
documents were provided for review. However, it was recognised that the policy maker
had sole responsibility for lending decisions and therefore was able to provide an
account of the nature and level of corporate environmental performance considerations
within lending decisions. The policy maker noted that particular importance was placed
on the application of standard bank terminology to define the fundamental determinants
of environmental credit risks and a core set of standard working papers to establish
environmental credit assessment as the basis for referral. The use of such standards was
viewed as particularly important given the size of loan facilities and potential variety of
environmental credit risks unique to each case.
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Lending experience
Members of UK banks noted instances of financial loss relating to environmental
issues. The policy maker in Bank I provided reference to one case of environment
related financial loss exceeding five million pounds. The case details were contained
within policy guidance documentation to highlight the nature and potential extent of
environmental credit risks to lending officers. Alternately, lending officers in Bank F
and environmental managers in Bank J referred to several case of financial loss in
excess of two hundred thousand pounds in which environmental issues had been a
significant factor leading to loss. Members from both banks noted that the cases had
reinforced their view of adopting their bank's environmental lending procedures.
In Bank C the policy maker noted that environmental considerations had been part of
financial lending loss on numerous occasions but the amount was not quantified. In
such instances, responsibility for loss had been attributed to the lending officers
responsible for processing the loan application if it could be shown that standard bank
policy and procedures had not been applied. However, the policy maker noted that it
was particularly difficult to influence the adoption of environmental practices by large
corporate clients. On this basis, the standard policy of the bank was to include detailed
environmental representations within warranties, covenants, and conditions on events
of default documented with loan contracts.
The policy maker and members of Bank F noted that they had not suffered fmancial
loss in relations to environmental lending issues. However, the policy maker of Bank F
provided reference to minor cases of financial loss experienced by other members of the
BBA's Environmental Issues Advisory Group as an indication of loss potential.
In Bank G no cases of financial loss were noted by bank members. The policy maker
attributed this to the successful implementation of the bank's environmental lending
policy. However, in addition the policy maker noted that the bank's extensive
promotion of their ethical policy may deter polluting companies from seeking finance
with the bank, and noted that the bank's typical client basis was unlikely to pose any
significant environmental credit risk. On this basis it is proposed that the adoption of an
environmental policy by the bank was a very low risk development, and one likely to
have very little impact on the bank's share of the corporate loan market.
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Cross community bank study
Bank C
The cross community study incorporated an examination of corporate environmental
performance considerations within the Swiss operations and UK operations of a Swiss
Bank Group 'C'. An analysis of the Group structure, responsibilities under the
environmental "mission", and Swiss lending operations have been included in the
Swiss community case findings. An analysis of UK operations has been included within
the UK community case findings.
The nature of the Group's corporate lending activities within each location was found
to vary significantly. In Switzerland, the Group's corporate lending activities included
lending to small, medium and large scale corporate borrowers. In the UK, the Group's
lending activities were restricted to merchant banking. However, despite these
fundamental market differences the findings from the study provide a valuable insight
into the relationship between Group and functional policy.
Basis of examination
In Switzerland the policy maker interviewed was responsible for Group Environmental
Management Services and credit risk management in Switzerland. An environmental
credit risk specialist responsible for the design of policy documentation and training
was also interviewed and standard bank documentation was reviewed. At the time
research was carried out the specialist had sole responsibility for corporate
environmental performance consideration within lending decisions.
In the UK, the policy maker interviewed was responsible for the development of the
bank's UK environmentaVlending policy and liaison with Group policy makers in
Switzerland. In the UK Bank C's lending function was centralised and the policy maker
interviewed had sole responsibility for making final lending decisions. Given this
central role research undertaken with Bank C UK was based on an interview with the
policy maker and a documentary review of policy and procedural guidelines.
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Environmental mission and lending policies
In both Swiss and UK operations, bank members and policy guidance documentation
made extensive reference to the foundation of environmental management activities and
lending 'policy' on Group principles outlined in an environmental mission statement
(1990). Despite this common mission, in each operation environmental management
procedures were adapted to local conditions, in particular legal requirements. It was
noted that in the case of Group's operations in Switzerland environmental credit risk
considerations were based primarily on domestic regulation. This was opposed to
European requirements noted by Bank A and B. In the case of Bank C UK
environmental credit risk assessment incorporated within merchant banking activities in
the UK were based on UK legislative requirements. Policy makers attributed this
difference to a Group definition of environmental credit risk based on an interpretation
of 'relevant' environmental legislation. In both bank locations trends recognised within
the development of European environmental legislation were noted as an influence on
policy development but were not explicitly addressed in policy documents.
In-house environmental management
The degree of in-house environmental management acknowledged by the UK policy
maker was considerably less than that recognised by the Swiss policy maker. In contrast
to the day to day environmental housekeeping initiatives recognised in the Swiss
operations, as with all UK banks examined, environmental housekeeping in the UK
were found to be a secondary consideration based on legal requirements and efficient
resource use. The policy maker proposed that this was partly due to the smaller scale of
UK operations and the reduced level of social responsibility recognised.
Environmental lending considerations
The UK policy maker noted that the introduction of environmental credit risk
assessment was a response to the Environmental Protection Act 1990, in particular
recommendations for a contaminated land register which was later abandoned in 1993.
This influence was also reflected to varying degrees by UK Banks F, H, I, and J.
Responsibilities for environmental credit risk assessment were outlined in two internal
policy documents issued to all members of UK operations in 1993. As in the case of the
Swiss operations the 'policy' was developed by an environmental committee comprised
of specialists from a number of functions.
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The UK policy maker and Swiss Group members noted that at the time research was
undertaken lending officers in Switzerland were in the process of being delegated
responsibility for environmental credit risk assessment. The difference in the response
times to the Group mission publication between the UK and Switzerland was explained
due to the reaction to the timing of significant local legislative developments. For
example, in Switzerland the development of new environmental credit risk assessment
techniques were a reaction to the introduction of a contaminated land register.
In both UK and Swiss operations it was recognised that the emphasis of environmental
credit risk assessment was contaminated land. It was noted that the UK lending policy
guidelines were issued in 1993 in anticipation of UK land registry. Contaminated land
issues were given considerable emphasis in the banks' environmental guidelines.
Policy regulation and standard terms of reference
The use of standard policy documentation as a mechanism for policy deployment and
outlining environmental credit risk assessment responsibilities was common to both UK
and Swiss operations. However UK operations, in contrast to Swiss operations, did not
reflect an emphasis on lending policy as a regulation. The UK policy maker noted,
however, that as lending decisions were centralised responsibilities delegated to lending
officers were to refer details of corporate environmental performance considered to the
policy maker as the basis for decision making.
In the case of Bank C's UK operations, in contrast to the risk rating system used in the
Swiss lending procedures, lending decisions were provided as written judgements from
case materials. The difference in lending procedure was attributed to the difference in
loan size and loan characteristics considered by each operation.
Lending experience
In contrast to the experience of bank members in Switzerland, the UK policy maker
noted that environmental issued had contributed to financial lending loss. However, it
was noted that in cases of environmental loss factors were not the primary cause of
poor financial performance but could be considered along with other factors as a
consequence of bad management. Experience of loss was noted as a factor influencing
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adherence to standard bank policy and procedures, including specific environmental
provisions in loan contracts.
A common rationality for environmental management
From a review of findings drawn from Swiss and UK operations of the Group it is
recognised that both operations appear to reflect a common set of environmental
management principles. These principles are reflected in the Group's mission statement
and when applied to functional policy are translated according to location
characteristics on which functional activities are designed.
Summary
This Chapter has presented the research findings from three bank communities,
including a cross community study. Findings are represented by comparing and
contrasting trends recognised by the researcher within each community. Comparison
and contrast between communities is limited to an evaluation of findings from the cross
community study. However, it is proposed that fmdings within the Chapter implicitly
reflect additional trends within banks and between banks in different communities.
These trends shall be made explicit in Chapter seven through an analysis of fmdings
with respect to the central proposal.
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Notes
'Bank A noted that the German bank community had a greater number of primary commercial lending
banks and trying to reach agreement on a common environmental approach within a more diverse bank
community was viewed as problematic.
2 Considered with respect to the Sandoz incident in Chapter 7.
3 Economic sustainability was defmed by bank members as the ability of the bank to continue to trade.
The influence of price rises on the banks' financial situation was not mentioned by bank members but
could affect the banks ability to trade profitably.
4 The disaster occurred when water used to put out a fire in the `Schweizerhalle Warehouse' of the
Sandoz chemical company caused massive pollution of the river Rhine.
5 To date there has been no test case.
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Chapter 7
An examination of the central proposal
Introduction
The research programme was based on an examination of corporate environmental
performance considerations within eleven commercial lending banks between August
1995 and March 1996. These banks were drawn from three banking communities:
Switzerland, Ireland and the UK. The research programme incorporated representatives,
as follows: three Swiss banks; two Irish banks; and five UK banks, including an
examination of one Swiss bank's operations in Switzerland and the UK.
The research programme was designed to facilitate an examination of the central
proposal that banks can be characterised as hierarchical cultures with views of
physical nature founded upon myths of tolerance. This proposal is evaluated in a
number of cumulative stages which follow the theme set by the theoretical development
process undertaken in Chapter four.
Initial support for this proposal is provided by examining research findings to reveal
that banks are hierarchical social structures within which bank members share common
values. This is achieved by drawing comparison between the nature of social roles,
relationships and responsibilities illustrated and adhered to within each bank. Attention
is then devoted to the development of, and adherence to, environmental policy by bank
members and the communication web supporting the social construction of perception
and management rationality within a bank. Subscription to a common "way of doing
things" by bank members is the first indication of bank "culture".
The next stage is to compare and contrast environmental risk perceptions illustrated by
banks between, and across, communities to highlight the unique nature of values held
by members of each bank. This indicates that a cultural boundary may be drawn around
a bank. The role of this boundary as a filter for communication from third parties is
highlighted and an additional dimension of social construction is inferred by the
influence of communication across this boundary.
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Finally, comparison is drawn between environmental management rationalities within
each bank to reflect a common view of tolerant nature. Drawing on these findings it is
concluded that bank members examined adhere to hierarchical ways of life and tolerant
myths of nature supporting compliance with environmental legislation and management
of exceptions through bank activities. This analysis explains how, and why, corporate
environmental performance is considered within related bank lending processes
according to the social construction of perception.
Social roles, relationships and responsibilities
Bank structure
All banks examined were members of Groups operating at either an international or
national level. Each Group can be characterised as a hierarchical social structure within
which all members can be positioned according to their reporting line and delegated
role and responsibilities. For each Group a board of executive directors had ultimate
decision making power. Within Group structures, each bank subsidiary has a local
board of executive directors who report to the Group board. Group/bank 'policy' was
co-ordinated through central departments and cross functional committees or working
parties.
Each bank function was the responsibility of a board member or a senior member
reporting directly to the board. The "head" of each function was supported by a tiered
structure of functional decision makers and administrative staff. For example,
responsibility for lending decisions were delegated to lending committees and
individual officers according to the nature of the banks lending activities and the level
of facilities processed.
To varying degrees bank members were regarded as specialists within their given role.
As bank members moved up through the hierarchy their degree of specialisation was
generally seen to increase. The number of bank members at a particular tier of the
hierarchy varied largely with the scale of organisation, and the degree of specialisation
associated with each role.
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Bank policy
Bank members defined their roles according to their functional and reporting
responsibilities. Part of each bank member's responsibility was to follow Group/bank
'policies'. Bank members defined a number of bank 'policy' categorises according to
the level of application and the mediums through which policy objectives were
communicated to various parties. The roles of bank policy makers were to oversee the
development and deployment of policy communications.
Within Groups three distinct tiers of top down policy responsibility were noted at
group, bank and functional levels. Policies were communicated through documented
policy statements or clauses which addressed general Group/bank principles and were
commonly available for public scrutiny. The publication of such policies was either a
means of delegating new responsibility to bank members or highlighting existing
responsibilities. Functional policy details were communicated to bank members only in
the form of a policy statement and/or documents outlining standard procedural
guidelines. Such policies were published to deploy new functional responsibilities to
members.
Different degrees of responsibility were attached to policy objectives within each bank.
For example, the policy maker in Bank C (UK) referred to policy as a "regulation"
while the policy maker of Bank J referred to policy as a "guide".
Environmental roles and responsibilities
Bank structure
In each bank the key research informant was the policy maker ultimately responsible
for overseeing the development and deployment of the bank's environmental lending
policy and reporting achievement to the board for comment and/or approval. The policy
makers' roles primarily differed in terms of functional responsibility. Their roles can be
categorised between two functions: environmental management or risk management.
In Groups with a central "Environmental Management Unit/ Services" (EMU) members
heading the units were responsible for the development of environmental Group policy
and domestic functional policies. Under such circumstances policy makers delegated
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responsibility for foreign policies to functional heads, as illustrated in the cross
community study of Bank C. In terms of domestic functional policy responsibility for
policy design was delegated to functional specialists located either in the EMU or a
lending department. The degree of delegation varied from bank to bank according to
policy objectives and scale of operations. For example, in Bank G members of the
environment unit were responsible for the development of bank policy through the co-
ordination of functional policy objectives. The responsibility for the development and
deployment of an environmental lending policy was delegated to the manager in charge
of credit strategy.
Policy makers responsible for environmental credit risk policy were delegated
environmental responsibility as part of a Group wide risk policy. Bank members
heading risk management functions were in a similar position to those heading EMU's.
These individuals were responsible for the development of Group risk policy and
domestic functional policies. Responsibilities for foreign risk policies were delegated to
bank policy makers and/or functional heads. In these instances, the banks' primary
environmental management activities were centred on credit risk management. To
promote a common approach to cross functional environmental management
environmental committees or working parties were often established.
Depending on the nature of the bank's: environmental policy; degree of policy
deployment; and structural form, environmental credit risk management was delegated
to central, regional and/or local lending officers. For example, when research was
undertaken with Bank C's Swiss operations environmental credit risk management was
the sole responsibility of a technical specialist in the EMU, but a policy "regulating" the
adoption of standard environmental credit risk assessment procedures by regional
lending officers was in the final draft stage and was about to be launched. Alternately,
in Bank A responsibilities for environmental credit risk management had been
delegated to all bank lending officers.
Bank policy
From a review of the roles of environmental policy makers responsible for the
development of environmental lending policies it was recognised that Group wide
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environmental or risk management policy formed the basis of environmental lending
policies. The specific nature of these policies shall be addressed in the next section.
The findings from the cross community study of Bank C in Switzerland and the UK
provided further evidence of the inter-relationship between Group policy and functional
lending policy. The importance of defining policy relationships at this stage is to
provide a basis from which to examine the nature of environmental policy, and the
process of environmental policy development, as a potential influence on the social
construction of perceptions within each bank.
In most banks examine environmental lending policies were designed by a second
environmental steering committee or working party drawn from members of the
lending hierarchy, legal and other specialist bank advisers. Each member involved was
characterised as providing an "expert" view on policy implications for their given role
and the roles of their subordinates. The policy makers provided an insight on bank
community views through their involvement with the local bank association.
The working parties consulted lending officers to gain an insight into their perception
of the impact of environmental issues on past lending cases and their level of
environmental awareness. Examples of consultation processes provided by policy
makers included questionnaire surveys, regional discussion groups with senior lending
officers and follow up discussions with lending officers responsible for cases where
environmental issues had been noted. This process of consultation was considered by
some of those involved to represent the development of an informal bank policy.
In each bank an overview of the policy development process was provided during
interview with the policy maker and, in a number of cases, members of environmental
working parties and/or bank lending officers were formally consulted. From a review of
bank fmdings the formation of environmental lending policies was recognised as a
relatively recent development.
The mechanism for policy development and representation varied between banks in
terms of responsibilities delegated, and the nature and subject of communication.
However, some general trends were visible from findings. For example, environmental
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lending responsibilities were communicated to lending officers through the provision of
policy guidance documentation outlining procedural responsibilities. Alternately, or in
addition, policy deployment was supported by the formal provision of 'appropriate
training' and pro forma working papers to lending officers. As noted previously,
standard guidance documentation and procedures were often referred to by lending
officers to define bank lending policy.
The primary objective of policy communication in each bank was to delegate
responsibility to lending officers based on a standard rationality for environmental
management. Standard environmental credit risk procedures were based on the
generation of a shared perception of environmental risk.
Policy responsibility
Lending officers were expected to follow bank policy when executing their individual
responsibilities. However, in each bank the level of expectation placed on lending
officers was found to vary. For example, in Bank C's Swiss operations policy makers
referred to the deployment of policy "regulations" requiring compliance by lending
officers but no penalties for non-compliance were recognised. Alternatively, in Bank J
policy makers referred policy "guidelines" issues for voluntary adoption by lending
officers.
It was stressed by all policy makers interviewed that lending officers were credit risk
experts not environmental experts. Where a technical environmental assessment was
required lending officers were advised to contact in-house environmental experts or
external environmental consultants. In-house environmental experts included advisers
with legal and property management departments who serviced lending officers on a
wide range of technical issues and, where available, EMU's specialist. In a number of
banks, lending officers' perceived policy makers to be "the expert opinion on
environmental credit risk assessment". Policy makers and lending officers recognised
in-house referral/consultation applied and reinforced bank policy through its use as a
common reference point. Environmental working party representatives involved in
policy development were often found to advise lending officers on environmental credit
risk assessment.
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All banks employed external environmental consultants to conduct detailed
environmental impact assessments. In each bank consultants were drawn from a panel
of consultants with whom policy makers had negotiated standards terms and conditions
of employment. It was noted by lending officers that environmental experts were not
credit experts therefore their opinions were reinterpreted in terms of credit risk as
defined by bank policy. Through this negotiation process consultants' scientific
opinions were presented in a form which was translated according to a lender's
perception of a credit risk. Lending officers recognised that the influence of
consultants' views on their perception of environmental credit risks were limited to a
reflection on case experience. Thus, lending officers' founding rationalities for
environment management remained socially constructed within the bank.
Constraints imposed by the required use of standard working papers
For individual lending officers, credit committee members, and referees the use of
standard pro forma working papers acted as a control upon the lending officer and
provided a basis from which lending processes could be subject to a policy compliance
audit. For example, members of central credit committees referred to their informal
audit of the lending process applied to each case by reviewing the use of standard bank
working papers such as decision checklists. No evidence was found to suggest banks
undertook a formal audit of lending procedures.
A number of bank policy makers and lending officers noted that the use of standard
working papers provided evidence of lending procedures which could be referred to in
court should a legal case review be necessary. Given the uncertainty perceived to exist
regarding environmental legislation, emphasis was placed on the need for such a
reference point as a means of mitigating lender liability risk.
Constraints imposed by case referral
Constraints were imposed on lending officers requiring adherence to bank policy as a
function of their responsibilities and reporting obligations. For example, in Bank D and
E the requirement for lending officers to refer lending cases to a central credit
committee for decision making also required them to adopt standard procedures
prescribed by bank policy and complete standard working papers illustrating their case
work.
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Reviewing examples of pro forma working papers highlighted them as process
checklists providing evidence of lending considerations. Committee members when
questioned stressed that a lending officer would be called on to justify any deviations
from bank procedures. Such a comment implies the flexibility of policy application but
only subject to approval. This in turn indicates the adoption of a shared rationality for
management.
Independence
In a number of banks corporate environmental performance considerations within
lending decisions were the delegated responsibility of individual officers. It is proposed
that without a referral requirement, or formal audit, lending officers in such a position
may fail to employ policy principles. All bank members questioned reflected upon their
application of standard bank procedures as an illustration of policy application.
However, a number of lending officers recognised that standard environmental
assessment procedures were not a fully integrated part of credit rating exercises, thus
allowing a more flexible approach to the adoption of environmental credit risk
assessment procedures.
Attributing blame for financial loss 
As noted above, there was no evidence of a formal penalty system to constrain the
activities of lending officers. In Bank A a control mechanism was applied by
monitoring the bank's credit portfolios to ensure that performance targets were
achieved but feedback from this system was in the %tin oi generalv.lidta-nes ts)
lending officers.
In a number of banks instances of financial loss were referred to in connection with
environmental issues. Such loss was referred to as a system failure to correctly
recognise a risk or as an unaccountable event. Blame was commonly allocated to bank
policy or the "system". In most cases noted policy makers recognised that instances of
financial loss led to the initial development of environmental management policy and
procedures. There was no evidence to suggest that a lending officer had been
reprimanded as a consequence of a loss, although policy makers proposed that a
recognised error could result in career limitations.
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Other influences on policy adoption
New policy
When considering environmental issues and the implementation of new lending
procedures, policy makers and lending officers noted that reference to guidance
materials, informal discussions and referrals were more frequent earlier in the learning
process.
Policy makers and lending officers noted that their reference to guidance material was
associated with issues of familiarity. Lending officers stressed that corporate
environmental performance considerations were a relatively new addition to lending
procedures and required reference to guidance materials and training. Both policy
makers and lending officers also recognised that a considerable degree of informal
consultation took place within the bank with regard to the interpretation of "new" case
issues.
A number of central credit committee members, technical environmental credit
specialists, and lending officers noted that their involvement in formal environmental
policy design and development increased their understanding of standard environmental
policy and procedures. As a result they acknowledged a decreasing need to reference
environmental guidelines when undertaking corporate environmental performance
considerations within lending decisions. A number of policy makers referred such
adherence as an integration of a common set of environmental management principles
within the bank's 'culture'.
These findings could have two implications. Based on the recognition that
environmental policy development and formal corporate environmental performance
consideration within lending procedures were a relatively new occurrence these
findings may be viewed as a limitation of the evidence drawn from the research.
Alternatively, it is proposed that these findings should be viewed as a strength of the
research as circumstances provide an opportunity to examine the influence of guidance
material on the establishment of standard practice.
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Findings drawn from the research programme can be used to expand on accounting
research findings, discussed in Chapter one, which revealed that only new lending
officers use standard guidelines such as those provided by bank mnemonics.
Critical incidents 
Policy development and adherence was also found to be influenced by the realisation of
environmental credit risks. For example, experience of financial loss as a result of
environmental lending issues were viewed by policy makers and lending officers as the
main influence on their perception of environmental credit risks.
In a number of banks, policy makers referred to lending cases which had resulted in the
development of standard environmental assessment procedures. These included cases
where: financial loss had been incurred by the bank due to a failure to consider
environmental issue or unforeseeable circumstances; loans had been refused due to
uncertainties regarding potential environmental issues; and cases of assessment where
environmental risks were recognised and accounted for through comprehensive referral
and consultation. Policy makers in general attributed lending officers acceptance of
change to the re-enforcement of policy communication through the occurrence and
communication of what risk researchers have termed "critical incidents".
Referring to policy adherence, policy makers noted that where such instances had not
arisen there was a need to convince lending officers that environmental credit risks
existed. Such comments have two implications: firstly policy deployment should be
based on raising a lending officer's awareness of environmental risks; and secondly that
adherence to policy guidelines was problematic in some cases. The most important
implications for evaluating the central proposal concerns adherence to policy.
Adherence to policy
It has been noted previously that interviews with central credit committee members,
environmental credit risk specialists and bank lending officers involved in policy
making revealed evidence of adherence to bank policy. However, it was noted that
given the unique nature of lending situations the application of standard environmental
credit risk assessment was subject to interpretation by individual lending officer's
processing applications and/or making decisions.
183
It is recognised that findings could have been deliberately contaminated by bank
members viewing the research exercise as a compliance test of bank policy and
providing appropriate answers. The likelihood of this view being taken may have been
increased due to the establishment of interviews based on introductions by bank policy
makers. However, this method of referral was unavoidable as it was the only means of
gaining access to confidential information.
When asked to gauge policy adherence, most policy makers admitted that policy was a
guideline not necessarily adhered to. For example, in Bank F a policy maker quoted a
lending officer's response to a policy survey as "I will consider environmental credit
risk when convinced it is an issue".
It was stressed by all policy makers interviewed that lending officers were credit risk
experts not environmental experts. Policy makers stressed, on the basis that an
evaluation of financial risk versus financial return was the primary objective of credit
assessment, and an evaluation of environmental risks was potentially only part of this
process the relevance of policy application was left to the lending officer. However, an
emphasis was placed on the process of referral as a general policy control. In addition it
was recognised that environmental lending policies were in the early stages of
development and the occurrence of environment related fmancial loss would have an
effect on both future policy design and implementation.
The social construction of perception within a bank
Research findings provide evidence of banks as hierarchical social structures within
which individual roles and responsibility were socially determined. Within these
structures the term "policy" was applied to represent bank, and subsequently functional,
responsibilities of bank members. Addressing environmental issues, policy construction
and deployment was reflected within a web of communication channels supporting the
referral, discussion and interpretation of environmental responsibilities among bank
members unique to each bank hierarchy. A hermeneutic evaluation of bank
documentation and views of members revealed bank policies representing perceptions
and rationalities for management shared by bank members. Communication channels
and messages were viewed as central to the development and maintenance of social
roles and relationships constituting a 'way of life'.
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Within such a framework lending officers were frequently found to contribute to the
design of official policy messages and received messages regarding their delegated
responsibility for environmental credit risk assessment. Bank members were expected
to adhere to policy responsibilities. Policy adherence by members was found to be
controlled according to their social roles and relationships.
Policy makers and lending officers recognised that corporate environmental
performance considerations varied according to the unique nature of each lending
situation, but were based on a set of fundamental policy principles. Bank members
referred to "the way we do things around here" and "bank procedures". When
questioning why environmental considerations were incorporated into a bank's lending
process how became an interrelated question. However, research limitations were
recognised and there was evidence to suggest that policy adherence may vary
depending on policy communication and the degree of autonomy of lending officers. It
is proposed that the greater the degree of referral and consultation built into the lending
process of a bank the greater the likelihood that bank policy will be adhered to.
In the above examination initial evidence has been provided which supports the
proposal that perception is socially constructed within a bank. Examining the central
proposal that banks can be classed as cultural hierarchies, initial evidence that bank
members share a common "way of doing things" according to social roles and
relationships within a bank provides support for this proposal. To test the proposal
further it is necessary to analyse the social values held by bank members and the
influence of communication across the boundary drawn around a bank. In accordance
with the proposal that each bank represents a cultural hierarchy, each bank should
reflect unique cultural values.
The above analysis revealed that corporate environmental performance considerations
within lending decisions were the result of responsibilities delegated to bank members
according to bank policy. Evidence has been provided that environmental values held
by bank members reflect their environmental responsibilities.
Environmental responsibilities were illustrated by two types of bank policy: an
environmental policy and a risk policy. By examining the lines of delegated authority
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within each bank, environmental management rationality for corporate environmental
performance considerations within bank lending decisions was revealed as a product of
environmental risk perception. Placed within this context there is a need to examine
environmental risk perception as a product of a bank's fundamental myth of nature. In
order to examine environmental risk perception it is therefore necessary to consider the
environmental management rationality displayed within each bank.
To facilitate an examination of potential cultural values and boundaries the questions
'how' and 'why' is environment risk perceived are addressed by comparing, and
contrasting, environmental policy content and influences within, and across, three bank
communities. Community case studies have been selected to examine the alternate
proposal that culture is constructed within a given society and to facilitate an
examination of banks operating in similar social conditions. Locational factors
considered include: bank regulation; legislation; market profile; and community trade
associations. To reflect the findings that bank members share common views, during
the following analysis perceptions shall be attributed to a bank rather than bank
members.
Environmental risk perception
Considering environmental management rationality and risk perception as a social
construct the primary locational factor of consideration was environmental regulation,
or legislation, with which a bank must comply.
Environmental management requirements
Within the communities examined banks, as corporate entities, were required to comply
with environmental legislation addressing issues such as waste management, however
these were minimal. There was no bank regulations or explicit legal requirements on
banks as lenders to consider environmental issues. However, a bank as an owner of
property taken as security may be viewed as a potentially liable party for environmental
pollution associated with the property.
Under Switzerland's civil code of law, in a case of bankruptcy or foreclosure ownership
of property devolves to the courts. In such circumstances banks are more likely to lose
their security than inherit extensive environmental liability from borrowers. Alternately,
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Ireland and the UK operate under a common law system. In a case of corporate
bankruptcy or foreclosure a lender may become 'mortgagee in possession of a property'
and liable for associated environmental damage. As noted in Chapter two, the wording
of the Environment Act 1995 could be interpreted as extending environmental liability
to lenders as 'mortgagee in possession of property'.
In each community environmental legislation existed with which corporate borrowers
potentially had to comply. It was recognised in Chapter two that the cost of compliance
could affect a company's ability to repay outstanding bank loans. Banks could therefore
suffer financial loss as a consequence of environmental compliance requirements place
on a borrower.
From a review of legal and regulatory requirements potentially influencing bank
lenders to consider the environment it was recognised, as in Chapter two, that
legislation regarding the lender's position was unclear. A bank's interpretation of their
potential environmental liability as a lender was an issue of environmental risk
perception and their environmental management rationality was a reflect of this
perception.
Shared environmental management rationalities
From an analysis of findings, evidence was provided of collective bank positions on
environmental issues negotiated and publicised at an international, European and a
national level.
An international view
With the exception of Banks D, I and J, the banks examined subscribed to the United
Nations Environment Programme Statement by Banks on the Environment and
Sustainable Development. Their subscription was a public recognition of an
international standard for environmental management.
A European view
As members of the European Bankers' Association the banks examined were
attempting to reach a European view on environmental issues through an environmental
working party. The primary issue addressed by the working party was European
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legislation. The view reflected by working party members was that environmental
legislation must be clear and liability should rest with the polluter.
A community view
Bank policy makers participating in the research cases were members of a national
trade association environmental working party. Within each community examined a
communal position on environmental management issues was debated and portrayed
through the working party. Across the three bank communities examined two common
themes were reflected. First, banks as commercial organisations recognised the need to
strive for a sustainable environment and economy. This position mirrored the banks'
view reflected through the United Nations Environment Programme. Secondly, as
lenders banks supported the development of environmental legislation to achieve such
sustainability but recognised that legislation must be clear and liability should rest with
the polluter. This position reflected that of the European Bankers' Association working
party-
A common rationality
Considered together the environmental management rationality reflected by
international, European and national bank communities illustrated was two-fold: a need
for sustainable development and a need for clear environmental legislation with blame
for environmental damage placed on the polluter. This foundation for environmental
management may be viewed as a reflection of a tolerant myth of nature, according to
which sustainability is achieved by maintaining human impact with the physical
environment at tolerable levels achieved through compliance with legislation. The
position of blame on the polluter may be viewed as a reflection of preference shared by
members of a hierarchical way of life.
Considering these findings it may be proposed that a transient social boundaries can be
drawn around banks sharing a common view. However, while banks examined
subscribed to shared views on the environment, representatives from each bank
distinguished their bank's individual view on environmental management. In addition,
bank members stressed that the communication of a shared community view was
considered by banks as a basis for negotiation with regulators, borrowers and other
interested parties. A number of bank representatives proposed that banks were seeking
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to harmonise their environmental lending approaches in an attempt to avoid a market in
finance for polluters.
It is argued that a transient social boundary should be drawn around a bank as a unique
culture and shared views considered as a reflection of the cultural typology shared by
banks with similar ways of life. In communicating with third parties through their
cultural filters, individual bank interpretations of sustainability and legislation are
explained. Views communicated to third parties by bank groups are interpreted as a
further level of social construction facilitating negotiation between different ways of
life. To provide support for this interpretation a detailed examination is undertaken of
the foundations for environmental risk perceptions and management rationalities
illustrated by banks across communities.
Bank views
Individual bank views were provided as a justification for the bank's environmental
management activities. To explain each view the environmental management activities
of banks were examined through representations made by bank members and
responsibilities inherent within communication messages, in particular policy
documents. Environmental management activities among banks were twofold: in-house
management; and product/ credit assessment. Given the relationship identified between
bank policy and lending policy, the foundation for both these activities are addressed.
In-house management
All banks were found to comply with minimal environmental management
requirements imposed on their in-house activities by environmental legislation. For
Irish Banks D and E and UK Banks F and J, in-house environmental management was
restricted to compliance with legislation. It was recognised that Bank E and Bank F had
subscribed to the UNEP principles of sustainability. Bank members proposed that, by
complying with legislation, they were striving towards sustainability.
In comparison, Swiss Banks A, B and C, and UK Banks G, H and I adopted extensive
in-house environmental management practices. These banks had, or were in the process
of, adopting a formal environmental policy/mission statement for the bank. In addition,
with the exception of Bank H, the banks had establishment Environmental Management
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Units through which responsibilities were co-ordinated and policy administered. The
rationalitiesr voluntary environmental management practices are examined below.
Issues of scale, social responsibility and sustainability
While the nature of bank in-house activities were similar, the scale of operations among
banks examined varied considerably. This was found to have two implications:
1. a higher degree of environmental management and desire for resources efficiency,
to conserve financial and environmental resources;
2. a higher degree of social responsibility to manage the environment.
For example, the Swiss banks recognised that they first considered environmental
issues in terms of energy management in the 1980s. The common impetus for the
development of an energy management policy was the oil crisis. Swiss bank
representatives recognised, that given the scale of bank operations, they were among
the largest consumers of oil in Switzerland. When a resource shortage resulted the
banks recognised efficiency gains could be made through strict energy management and
conservation programmes. Given the Swiss banks' dominance within the local
economy and limited resources the banks recognised a social responsibility to conserve
resources.
In Bank H, considered one of the largest UK banks, an environmental policy was also
developed from an energy management approach adopted in response to the oil crisis.
However, in this case social responsibility for environmental management was not
recognised by the bank at that time. Alternately, in Bank I the development of an
environmental mission was attributed to issues of social responsibility given bank scale.
In Bank I the oil crisis was not found to be an influence on the banks position.
Findings provide evidence that recognition of social responsibility was not solely
attributed to bank scale. Bank G provided an exception to the above findings. Bank G
was the smallest bank examined and had developed an 'ethical' social responsibility of
which environmental management was part. In addition, social responsibility was found
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to be influenced by environmental risk perception in terms of corporate incidents and
reputation.
Corporate incidents 
The most prominent example of a corporate incident influencing bank perception of
environmental risk was illustrated in the case of the Sandoz incident on Swiss banks.
Representatives from all Swiss banks noted that the incident had changed their
perception of the potential scale of environmental damage resulting from a corporate
incident. The incident polluted water in the River Rhine killing fish and contaminating
drinking water for miles. Given the scale of Swiss bank activities, for example oil
storage for electricity generation, the potential consequence of a bank incident on the
environment and society was recognised. As a result the banks had adopted new
environmental management procedures.
Bank location
The recognition that other bank communities were not influenced by the Sandoz
incident illustrates the influence of bank location on environmental risk perception.
Reputation risk
All Swiss banks explicitly recognised, within their internal policy documentation, a
reputation risk as a consequence of an in-house 'environmental' incident occurring or
the bank being seen to be involved with a polluting corporate.
Representatives from Bank I recognised that the bank's environmental mission had
been developed in response to a public "outcry" resulting from the bank 'Groups'
involvement with a company who was associated with rainforest depletion. In this case
the scale of the bank's activities were seen as an influence on public perception of the
banks social responsibility.
The above findings illustrate how bank perceptions of environmental responsibility
have changed as a consequence of changes in legislation or 'critical' incidents.
Environmental responsibility has been considered as a social responsibility and a need
for liability and reputation risk management. In each case events within the wider
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community have been interpreted by banks according to their individual characteristics,
in particular scale of operations and location. These findings are highlighted further
when considering the environmental lending policies of banks.
Credit risk assessment
Addressing the hierarchical nature of bank policy and individual responsibility it was
noted that bank objectives, in addition to functional objectives, were integrated into
credit management approaches. Where environmental lending policies were developed
through Environmental Management Services or Group Risk Management,
environmental lending policy was a direct product of the bank's environmental/risk
policy.
The shared corporate lending objective of banks was the management of credit risk
defined, as in Chapter one, as financial risk versus financial return. Environmental
lending considerations were therefore based on perceptions of environmental credit
risks in terms of environmental influences on financial risk versus financial return. It
was recognised that, under such a definition, banks considered corporate environmental
performance seeking opportunity in companies with a "good environmental record" as
well as risk of loss.
For all banks the primary objective of environmental credit risk assessment was
management of the bank's liability risk. This was centred on a borrowers compliance
with environmental legislation and management ability to maintain compliance and
avoid an environmental incident.
Analysing the definition of credit risk inherent within bank responsibilities for
environmental management, and corporate environmental performance considerations,
each bank illustrated a unique definition of environmental credit risk. These definitions
are considered in terms of influences on the social construction of environmental risk.
When asked to comment on potential environmental credit risk, views of
representatives from each bank varied significantly between loss of financial repayment
and security value, and unlimited financial liability of the bank for a pollution incident
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or land clean up associated with corporate borrower. The basis and potential for such
loss also varied significantly.
Legislation
All banks examined considered environmental legislation to be an influence on credit
risk in terms of potential lender liability and borrowers' compliance requirements seen
to influence their financial performance. In most banks examined consideration was
limited to community legislation. For example, in the UK the Environmental Protection
Act 1990 and Environment Act 1995, and in Ireland the Environmental Protection
Agency Act 1992 were the basis of risk interpretation by community banks. In
Switzerland all of the banks recognised the development of the Swiss contaminated
land register. However, in Swiss Banks A and B European legislative standards were
considered as a basis for determining environmental credit risk in terms of a borrowers
industrial risk categorisation.
Credit risks were evaluated based on two principles: a borrower's requirement to
comply with environmental legislation; and the borrower's management ability to
achieve and maintain such compliance. Management ability was also examined in terms
of contingency plans to manage exceptional incidents. However, each bank examined
displayed a unique perception of environmental risk drawn from their interpretation of
environmental legislation.
Incidents of bank loss 
It was recognised that where banks had experienced financial loss in relation to
environmental issues, particularly relating to clean up of contaminated land, their views
on the extent of their potential liability had changed. Cases of loss were communicated
throughout the bank as a basis for redefining environmental risk. While no test case had
come to court, banks had voluntarily cleaned up land taken as security to avoid a legal
baffle.
Representatives from Bank A and B recognised that they had experienced financial loss
in excess of five million Swiss Francs on a number of occasions in connection with
environmental issues. In all cases corporate borrowers were unable to meet their
repayments due to poor financial position, in a number of cases this was the result of
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increased expenditure undertaken to comply with environmental laws. As a result the
banks had suffered loss of income as companies failed to repay all or part of a loan, and
where companies had failed and security was taken in some cases a clean up cost was
necessary before sale of security was possible.
The banks concerned recognised that each incident had influenced their view of the
potential extent and likelihood of environmental credit risks, increased environmental
considerations within lending activities, and encouraged the formalisation of an
environmental lending policy. It is interesting to note that representatives from Bank C
were unaware of such an incident occurring in relation to their lending activities or that
of their peers. The bank remained in the planning stages of introducing formal
environmental credit procedures influenced primarily by the forthcoming introduction
of an environmental contaminated land register for Switzerland.
While UK banks did not appear to have experienced lender liability to the same extent
as their Swiss colleagues, the UK bank community in a number of cases was found to
have experienced financial loss, in excess of two hundred thousand pounds due to
environmental issues. In at least one instance a lender was found to have experienced
environment related financial loss exceeding five million pounds. In each case
examples of financial loss, in relation to environmental issues, were referred to in
policy guidance documentation of the bank.
Bank perception was additionally found to be influenced by the experience of other
banks within their national community, subject to the same legal principles, and to a
lesser extent other international cases of loss. Issues of remoteness of consequences
were considered in such comparisons. Banks who had not suffered such loss were often
aware of their peers experience through their involvement in trade association
environmental working party discussions. A number of bank representatives provided
specific reference to cases of financial loss experienced by members of the BBA
working party.
Other lending experience
The identification of potential environmental credit risk was seen to have a similar
impact on perception. While Irish banks had not suffered financial loss in relation to
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environmental issues they recognised that should a loss be incurred this would change
their view of risk considerably. A similar view was expressed by UK banks who had
not suffered environment related lending loss.
In Bank D members of the central credit committee noted that the recognition of a
potential environmental credit risk of considerable size had changed their view of risk
considerably. Similar experiences of potential loss resulting in loan refusals were
recognised by UK banks as influencing the development and implementation of
environmental credit risk assessment procedures.
Corporate incidents
In the Swiss bank community the Sandoz incident had a considerable influence on bank
perceptions of the potential extent of environmental credit risk, including a risk to a
banks reputation through association with such an incident. Similarly, the Hickson
incident in Ireland, while on a different scale and with different consequences, was
noted as influencing the risk perception of local banks. The incident involved the
pollution of a river by a local corporate while extinguishing a fire at the plant. In such
cases the location of the incident with respect to bank activities appears to be the main
factor influencing consideration.
Bank location
When evaluating environmental credit risk it was recognised that Swiss Banks A and B
based their industrial sector risk assessment on European legislative standards. It was
proposed that such consideration was due to the proximity of Switzerland to its
neighbours and the possibility for pollution to transgress the border as in the case of the
Sandoz incident.
In terms of bank location the industrial profile and historical land use within the
community was found to influence bank perceptions of environmental credit risk. This
was particularly noticeable in the Irish bank community where banks attributed their
lack of environment related financial loss to local conditions.
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Reputation risk/ social responsibility
All Swiss banks examined explicitly integrated reputation risk consideration into
environmental credit risk assessments. This may be attributed to social responsibility
recognised previously. However, Irish Bank E and UK Bank F included reputation risk
as part of environmental credit risk definitions within standard environmental guidance
documentation but not an item for attention on working papers.
Banks E and F attributed considerations of reputation risk to maintaining the image of
the banks and hence market share. Bank E additionally noted that a local demonstration
calling for environmental improvements by large industrial companies in the area had
influenced the banks consideration of reputation risk.
Internal bank influences 
Within the Irish bank community it was noted that the banks examined were of a
similar scale, operated in similar markets, had similar experiences environmental
lending experiences and recognised similar corporate incident in the local community.
At a given point in time the banks reflected different perceptions of environmental risk.
The primary difference was the subject of corporate environmental performance
evaluation. The level of facility requiring environmental consideration in Bank E was
half that of Bank D. Policy representatives from Bank D recognised that the next stage
in policy development would be to lower the limit of the level of facility requiring
attention to a level equal to that quoted by Bank E. However, bank representatives at
the given point in time did not believe that the level of risk associated with such
facilities warranted significant environmental management attention. The difference in
environmental risk perception highlighted within these two banks provided evidence
that variations in bank perception were not purely a reflection of local conditions.
Similarities between banks
Addressing commonalties reflected by banks within and across communities it was
recognised that bank perceptions of environmental risk and environmental management
rationalities were influenced by their locational factors including: legislation; economic
and social role; market profile; and the occurrence of 'critical' incidents. However,
bank interpretations of these factors were found to vary significantly. By comparing
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and contrasting the banks' interpretations of local factors across communities it was
recognised that bank characteristics such as scale and financial loss were common
influences on environmental policy. In particular, by comparing the influence on banks
of environmental lending loss and corporate pollution incidents experienced within the
bank community with the experience of banks, the social construction of perceptions
within each bank are highlighted.
As noted previously, the environmental management rationality reflected by the banks
examined may be viewed as founded upon a tolerant myth of nature. The development
of environmental management practices by banks were viewed as a response to
changing social conditions rather than a change in a fundamental view of reality.
Summary
An analysis of social structure through patterns of social roles, relationships and
responsibilities inherent within each bank has provided evidence of hierarchical social
bank structures. In each bank it has been revealed that a complex communication web
exists within the hierarchy which supports the development and adherence to social
rules which bank members collectively term "bank policies and procedures".
In all banks examined, bank members were found to consider environmental issues as a
function of their given role, responsibilities and relationships. Addressing
environmental messages transmitted and embedded within webs of bank
communication, the development of a common risk perception and rationality for
environmental management shared by bank members was recognised.
By comparing and contrasting bank perceptions of risk and environmental management
rationalities within and across bank communities emphasis was placed on the unique
nature of bank views. It is concluded from the results of the research programme that
risk perception and rationalities for environmental management within the banks
examined may be classed as cultural hierarchies. Culture was interpreted according
reference by bank members to "a shared way of doing things" and, according to social
roles and relationships which in turn sustain their roles and relationships, "a shared way
of life". Considering bank perceptions of environmental risk and management
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rationality it was recognised that, while unique, each bank's perception of reality was
founded upon what may be termed a myth of tolerant nature.
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Chapter 8
Summary and Conclusions
Summary
The aim of the thesis is to examine corporate environmental performance
considerations within bank lending processes at a theoretical and empirical level. In
particular, the questions which are addressed are 'how' the environment is considered
by bank lending officers, and 'why' it is considered in such a way.
The thesis begins with a review of academic literature which addresses bank lending
processes. The review identified a considerable degree of research undertaken in this
area, predominantly within accounting. However, an analysis of this research fails to
provide a theoretical foundation for bank lending processes, and highlights the relative
absence of environmental considerations by researchers or bank lending officers
participating in research.
The failure of research to provide a theoretical foundation for bank lending processes is
explained, in part, due to the unique nature of each lending decision and consequent
range of research questions and methodologies applied. Further, the review identified
that research in this area has a number of practical limitations. Banks have placed
considerable restrictions on researchers limiting research access, publication of research
findings, and largely requesting that their anonymity be maintained in all research
related publications.
The relative absence of environmental consideration by bank lending officers within
research findings is attributed to the recent emergence of corporate environmental
performance considerations by bank lending officers. In turn, the scarcity of specific
research which addresses environmental considerations is attributed to a tendency for
theory to follow practice when environmental investment issues are discussed.
From an analysis of prior research findings evidence is provided that financial, and to a
lesser extent non-financial, information is considered within the lending process. The
apparent priority attached by lending officers to financial information is explained
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according to their emphasis on an evaluation of financial risk versus financial return.
Attempts to distinguish the functional value of categories of financial and non-financial
information were complicated by the identification of a wide variety of complementary
and supplementary sources of information. In a number of studies, a bank lending
officer's preference for, and use of, information was found to be influenced by a
combination of personal and social characteristics. However, as secondary research
considerations, the degree of influence of these variables on the lending processes and
their inter-relationship had not been fully explored. Only one key study by Gray et al.
(1993), based on a review of professional literature, provided reference to emerging
evidence of considerations of environmental lenders liability by bank lending officers.
From this initial literature review it was concluded that corporate environmental
performance considerations within bank lending processes was an area in need of
theoretical and empirical research. Two areas of theoretical questions were identified:
• How is the lending process influenced by a bank lending officer's personal and
social characteristics?
• How do variables within a lending situation influence a bank officer's lending
decision?
As the basis for the specific exploration of environmental considerations an extensive
review of professional literature which addresses bank lending processes was first
undertaken.
An extensive review of professional literature revealed support for Gray et al.'s (1993)
findings that environmental debate among lenders has emerged in response to
developing legislation and fears regarding environmental lender liability first identified
in the US in the 1980's. Evidence additionally illustrated bank lenders' expression of
support for the development of environmental legislation on the condition that
legislation placed liability on the polluter. A review of environmental insurance was
undertaken to establish its availability and suitability as a means of potential risk
mitigation by banks and their corporate borrowers. It was revealed that a limited market
in environmental insurance was unlikely to provide a means of risk mitigation for
banks.
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Considerable evidence was provided that banks were developing environmental lending
policies and undertaking corporate environmental performance evaluations of
borrowers as a means of environmental credit risk management. The distinction
between the 'risk' management and 'credit risk' management approach of banks was
however unclear. Further, evidence was provided that banks were promoting ethical
policies on the environment founded on principles of environmental and economic
sustainability. The relationship between a bank's ethical/environmental policy, lending
policy and credit risk management approach was unclear. These findings raised two
additional questions:
• How do bank lending officers' define environmental risk? and
• What is the relationship between a bank's ethical/environmental policy and
environmental credit risk management approach?
To establish a theoretical position from which to explain corporate environmental
performance considerations within bank lending processes, an exploration was
undertaken of how risk has been defined. An interdisciplinary review of literature
which addresses 'risk' definitions provided evidence that during the 1980's and 1990's,
as theories of chaos and complexity have emerged, the limits of scientific authority
have been questioned and traditional linear foundation for risk definition have been
challenged. Objective quantitative evaluation of risk has been rivalled by subjective
assessment of possibilities based on principles of non-linearity and uncertainty. As a
minimum it is upheld that the choice of a linear evaluation method is in itself a
judgmental process of risk perception. As a result it is argued that risk definition should
be viewed primarily as a function of an individual's perception of the world and how
knowledge is constructed.
Early studies of risk perception were centred on a psychological evaluation of
knowledge construction extended within engineering studies to explain how individuals
rely on cognitive heuristics and mental rules of thumb for decision making. However,
these studies were criticised by researchers in the fields of anthropology and sociology
for their inability to account for motivational and emotional explanations for risk taking
behaviour. Based on the recognition that the perceiver is rarely an isolated individual,
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explanations for human response to risk have been expanded to perceptions of risk
based on the social construction of knowledge.
A number of theoretical models of social construction are examined from grandiose
theories of risk, for example by Beck (1992), to more practical reference to the roles of
various risk communication mechanisms. At an organisational level considerable
support is provided for cultural modes for analysing risk perception, in particular the
work of social anthropologist Mary Douglas which has dominated risk debates.
Douglas (1966 to present) proposed four cultural typologies to explain 'ways of life',
'cultural (risk) bias' and their interrelationships.
Environmental risk has similarly been defined, according to an individual's view of
reality and as a social construction. Individual 'myths of nature' have been addressed as
common to the social roles and relationships inherent within ones way of life.
Following the work of Douglas, Thompson et al. (1990) has received considerable
support for their theoretical proposal that five ways of life and corresponding myths of
nature exist.
Drawing on theoretical proposals from the social science debate, a social constructions
perspective was applied to evaluate findings regarding corporate environmental
performance considerations within bank lending processes and address the questions
posed.
• How is the lending process influenced by a bank lending officer's personal and
social characteristics?
• How do variables within a lending situation influence a bank officer's lending
decision?
• How do bank lending officers' define environmental risk? and
• What is the relationship between a bank's ethical/environmental policy and
environmental credit risk management approach?
The result of this evaluation was the development of the central proposal that,
according to Thompson et al.'s Cultural theory (1990), banks may be characterised as
hierarchical cultures with views of physical nature founded upon myths of tolerance.
202
According to this proposal, the questions remaining once previous research has been
analysed and their subsequent answers become interrelated. It is proposed that bank
lending officers share a plural rationality for corporate environmental performance
considerations based on a unique perception of risk culturally constructed within the
bank. Thus, lending officers' interpret variables outside the banks control through
cultural filters. Banks' 'ethical' environmental positions are explained according to
their 'myth' of nature and given way of life. In adhering to a similar cultural typology
banks share fundamental cultural bias.
Bank promotion of environmental sustainability and the development of environmental
legislation, was explained according to a rationality shared by bank members for the
maintenance of human impact with the physical environment at tolerable kvels. Banks
apparent support for environmental legislation which attributes blame for
environmental damage to the polluter is a demonstration of hierarchical cultural
preferences. Unique corporate environmental performance considerations within each
bank are explained as a reflection of these cultural values, based on interpretations of
sustainability and the impact of environmental legislation.
An empirical study was undertaken to test the application of the central proposal. The
core ontological foundation of the methodology was an examination of how 'reality',
and thus risk, and the environment was perceived by bank members. The basic
epistemological stance was to analyse and seek to understand 'how' and 'why' social
reality and environmental/risk definition was constructed by evaluating specific social
processes supporting environmental risk perception and management rationality within
individual banks.
It is recognised that, as noted by Adams (1995), Cultural theory by its nature cannot be
framed as a statistically testable hypothesis. However, it is proposed that the
examination of definition consistency reflected by a way of life to a pre-defined cultural
typology is a possibility. Resulting cultural typologies can be drawn on to explain the
social construction of perception of risk according to an individual's way of life.
A number of banks were examined within and across bank communities to highlight the
unique nature of cultural values and cultural bias shared among banks according to their
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common way of life. Research was undertaken with bank members from three bank
communities: Switzerland, Ireland and the UK. Research involved a hermeneutic
evaluation of environmental risk perception demonstrated by members of three Swiss
banks, two Irish banks and five UK banks, and a cross community study based on an
examination of a Swiss bank's subsidiary UK operations. Findings were first illustrated
in terms of similarities and differences identified within each community. Later
additional similarities within and between banks across communities were drawn on to
examine the central proposal.
By drawing comparison between the nature of social roles, relationships and
responsibilities within banks evidence revealed that the banks examined were
hierarchical social structures. Within these structures, roles and responsibilities were
delegated to bank members through complex webs of communication representing bank
policies. The development of a bank's environmental lending policy was found to be a
reflection of bank policy. Through an examination of the development of, and
adherence to, environmental policy bank members, subscription to a common "way of
doing things" was recognised. This was evaluated as a foundation for identifying bank
culture.
Bank subscription to community views on the environment were recognised. The views
expressed across communities were: support for economic and environmental
sustainability; and the development of clear environmental legislation founded upon
fault based principles. However, individual banks distinguistked. betykreert the
community view on the environment and their own bank view. An environmental
policy basis shared by all banks was one of risk management through compliance with
environmental legislation both through in-house activities and loan provision. A
number of individual banks were additionally found to provide support for economic
and environmental principles of sustainability. Findings from banks examined
confirmed indications from a review of professional literature that corporate
environmental performance considerations within lending processes were based on risk
management principles drawn from bank policy.
Across banks consideration of corporate environmental performance was generally
based on a borrower's requirement to comply with environmental legislation and their
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ability to achieve compliance. The risk management rationality inherent within this
consideration was based on bank perceptions of potential environmental lender liability
as part of credit risk. Credit assessments were founded upon principles of financial risk
versus financial return. In each bank, environmental risk perception varied according to
bank members' interpretations of legislation, with respect to the bank's situation.
Within and across communities examined, bank perceptions of environmental risk and
management rationality were found to be influenced by a number of situation factors.
Evidence was provided that bank characteristics, such as scale of operation, influenced
bank perceptions of social responsibility for environmental management. A bank's
experience of financial loss in relation to environmental issues was seen to be a primary
influence on environmental credit risk perception. However, these factors should not be
considered in isolation as evidence was provided that their influences on perceptions
were interrelated.
Other factors influencing bank perception were location characteristics. In terms of
community issues these included: contribution to the economy and society;
environmental legislation; geographical proximity to neighbouring communities
concerning pollution transgression; local industrial profile and historical land use;
corporate pollution incidents; and instances of financial loss by banks in relation to
environmental issues.
Evidence of the unique nature of bank values was illustrated by comparing and
contrasting environmental risk perceptions and associated management rationalities
illustrated by banks within, and across, communities. These findings provided support
for drawing cultural boundaries around the banks examined. The role of this boundary
was as a filter for communication to and from third parties and bank members. In each
bank the influence of location factors within each community was viewed through
cultural filters. This highlighted a wider social influence on bank members'
perceptions.
It is argued that evidence of environmental risk perceptions and associated management
rationalities, at both a community and individual level, among banks examined reflects
a myth of tolerant nature held by each culture. Bank support for principles of
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sustainability and environmental legislation is viewed as a means of maintaining
support for human impact with the physical environment at tolerable limits. Emphasis
on environmental legislation as a management tool, and bank preferences for blame
placed on the polluter are viewed as further evidence of bank adherence to a
hierarchical way of life.
Conclusions
The thesis provides evidence of the recent emergence of corporate environmental
performance considerations within bank lending decisions. Reflecting upon the lack of
research which addresses this area, the thesis offers a theoretical and practical insight
into 'how' and 'why', environmental issues are considered by bank lending officers as a
basis for debate.
The thesis provides initial evidence drawn from professional banking literature to
illustrate corporate environmental performance consideration within bank lending
processes based on a lender's environmental 'risk' perception and management
rationality. By drawing on social science debate regarding environmental/risk
perception it is argued that reality is a social construction. The core ontological
foundation examined is how 'reality', and thus risk and the environment, are perceived
by bank lending officers. The basic epistemological stance adopted is to analyse and
seek to understand how and why a bank lending officers environmental/ risk perception
was constructed by assessing specific social processes supporting their environmental
risk perception and management rationality.
A social constructionist perspective is adopted to interpret findings drawn from
accounting and professional literature which addresses bank lending processes and
provide a theoretical proposal for corporate environmental performance considerations.
The result is the formation of the central proposal that, according to Thompson et al's
Cultural theory (1990), banks can be characterised as hierarchical cultures with
views of physical nature founded upon myths of tolerance.
Accordingly, it is proposed that lending offices within each bank share a plural
rationality for corporate environmental performance consideration based on a unique
cultural perception of environmental risk. Bank lending officers subscribing to myths of
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tolerant nature view environmental sustainability as achievable through the
maintenance of tolerable levels of human impact with the physical environment.
Subscribing to hierarchical ways of life bank lending officer support with development
of, and compliance to, environmental legislation founded upon fault based principles to
maintain tolerable limits. Therefore, corporate environmental performance
considerations within bank lending processes will be based on a determination of a
borrower's ability to comply with legislation and manage any potential incidents at
tolerable environmental limits.
The central proposal is empirically examined through a hermeneutic evaluation of bank
perceptions of environmental risk, with representatives drawn from three bank
community case studies. Case studies are based on three Swiss banks, two Irish banks,
five UK banks, and a Swiss bank operating in the UK. Evidence is provided to support
the central proposal that the banks examined can be characterised as adhering to
hierarchical cultural typologies with a view of physical nature founded upon a myth of
tolerance. The central proposal is established as a basis for further research
consideration. In conclusion emphasis is placed on the theoretical and practical
limitations reflected by the choice of theoretical foundation and research area. The
implications of these limitations are evaluated.
Limitations
Theoretical foundation
As noted previously, the ontological foundation of the central proposal addresses how
reality is perceived and the basic epistemological stance is to analyse and seek to
understand how, and why, social reality is constructed. From such a foundation the
examination and findings portrayed within the thesis are based on, and limited to, the
researcher perception of reality. The author's rationality for decisions taken and
conclusions reached throughout the research process are conditional on the
circumstances outlined. In addition, it is recognised that the researcher and the nature of
the research will have influenced the response of participants.
It is emphasised that the conclusions drawn from the empirical study undertaken to
examine the central proposal are limited to a depiction of the bank situations examined.
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No attempt has been made to claim that findings are representative of a wider bank
population. The fundamental methodology employed to examine the central proposal is
offered as a means of evaluating other bank situations. Further, the conclusions reached
are limited to an analysis of the social processes supporting corporate environmental
performance considerations by bank lending officers. These conclusions, viewed within
the context of bank policy, should not be extrapolated to other lending issues without
alternative investigation.
Practical restrictions
The choice of research area imposed a number of practical restrictions on research. It
was recognised from the outset that banks were bound to maintain the anonymity and
confidentiality of their borrowers. Thus, as highlighted by previous research in this
area, the examination of a 'real' lending decision was precluded. Further, gaining
research access was problematic. A number of banks refused to take part in the
research. The main reason provided for this refusal was the banks desire to maintain the
confidentiality of their policies and practices. An offer to provide a written research
agreement assuring bank confidentiality would be maintained had no influence on the
outcome. The anonymity of all banks examined was guaranteed as a basis from which
to encourage research access.
Where research access to key informants was achieved, in some cases subsequent
access to other bank members was restricted and access to internal bank documentation
was denied or subject to analysis under restricted conditions. These limitations were
recognised when analysing research findings. It was proposed that findings from each
bank examined provided an adequate basis from which to address the central proposal.
In a number of cases responsibilities for corporate environmental performance
considerations were restricted to key bank members therefore extensive research access
to bank lending officers was not necessary.
Despite guarantees of anonymity, all banks precluded the reproduction of internal bank
documentation, in part or full presentation, within all research publications. This has
restricted the presentation of research findings to a narrative account by the researcher.
No primary data is available for alternative examination by the reader.
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It may be argued, that the choice of environmental considerations as a subject of
analysis restricted research findings where environmental policy was found to be in the
early stages of development. According to the theoretical position of the central
proposal environmental credit risk assessment by a bank lender is not a prerequisite for
research. In examining corporate environmental performance consideration within bank
lending processes, a lender's rationality not to undertake an environmental credit risk
assessment of a borrower is equally as informative as their rationality for conducting a
review.
A deliberate bias was integrated into the research methodology by choosing research
participants who demonstrated an environmental position. This was adopted given that
a rationality for action is likely to be explicit within bank communications and readily
accessible for research. Alternatively, a rationality not to undertake environmental
credit risk assessment may be implicit within bank communications and not as
accessible to the researcher.
To evaluate the contribution of the thesis, the conclusions drawn are considered with
respect to the limitations reflected by the choice of theoretical foundation for the central
proposal and the research area.
Contribution
The contribution of this thesis is to highlight existing evidence, and provide new
evidence, of corporate environmental performance considerations within bank lending
processes. The central proposal is offered as a means of interpreting this evidence. It
has been argued that corporate environmental performance considerations are based on
a bank lending officer's perception of environmental risk. How, and why, bank lending
officers' perceive environmental risks has been attributed to the cultural construction of
perception, and associated management rationality within a bank.
Given the interdisciplinary nature of the thesis, and its grounding on bank practice, it
offers a potential contribution to researchers and practitioners interested in: bank
lending processes; environmental management; risk perception; culture; and social
constructionist perspectives, or a combination of these subjects. Emphasis is placed on
209
the potential contribution of the thesis to research within accounting from which point
the thesis began, and bank practitioners who provide a focus for research.
To accounting
For accounting researchers the thesis contributes to existing accounting literature and
research which addresses lending processes and environmental issues. Through
empirical investigation and review of professional literature evidence has been provided
of corporate environmental performance as a consideration of bank lending officers. In
doing so, a new area for research is opened up and the central proposal is offered as a
basis from which to begin debate. Further, it is proposed that the central proposal may
be applied and examined regarding other elements of bank lending processes, and a
social constructionist perspective may be considered as a foundation for interpreting
other accounting research areas.
To bank practitioners 
To bank practitioners involved in the research, in particular policy makers, the thesis
has provided an insight into how, and why, lending officers' perceive environmental
risk and the influence of the web of communication inherent within each bank. To other
bank practitioners evidence is provided of corporate environmental performance
considerations within some banks. In addition, a methodology is proposed through
which they may reflect on their own social situation and rationality for environmental
management and interpret the position of other banks.
To other practitioners interested in bank positions 
To other practitioners, in particular corporate borrowers and legislators, the thesis
provides evidence of corporate environmental performance considerations by bank
lending officers. As a means of evaluating this evidence, and their own experience of
practice in this area, the central proposal offers a social perspective as a basis from
which to begin their interpretation. By adopting a social constructionist perspective an
emphasis is placed on the potential value of understanding the position which
individuals and groups bring to negotiations.
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To environmental debate
As noted previously, due to the interdisciplinary nature of the chosen research area the
thesis provides a contribution to a range of researchers and practitioners. This
contribution is reflected by the author's attainment of an ESRC Global Environmental
Change (GEC) Fellowship to take the research forward. The GEC Programme was
established in 1991 and is scheduled to end in the year 2000. It was set up to bring
social science expertise to bear on global environmental research and, at the same time,
to take environmental concerns "to the heart of the social sciences". Its objectives are:
to study the social/economic causes of environmental change; to assess the impacts of
environmental change on societies and economies; and to consider the policies and
strategies which governments, businesses, and individuals can adopt to mitigate or
adapt to environmental stresses.
The fellowship research titled 'Corporate Environmental Assessment by a Bank
Lender. A Social Constructionist Perspective' will contribute to the existing
Programmes under the Business and Environment topic area. Taking the conclusion of
thesis as its starting point, the author will further explore the applicability of labelling a
bank as a typological hierarchy with a myth of tolerant nature. Lloyds TSB Group plc
have agreed to act as a detailed case study for the research.
The results of the fellowship research, and thus the doctorate, will contribute to the
ESRC's wider 'Environment and Sustainability' theme. As a consequence the research
will be offered as a contribution to establish closer links between social and natural
science research to meet the interdisciplinary challenges posed by global environmental
change.
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Appendix 1.
Legal cases with implication for environmental lender liability
US Cases 
US v Fleet Factors (1990)
• Fleet factors foreclosed on some inventory and equipment after obtaining
bankruptcy court approval. This inventory and equipment was auctioned through a
liquidation company. Fleet was deemed to have participated in the management of
the company. The court distinguished actions after foreclosure to be participation in
management including auction and removal of equipment. The district court denied
a request for a summary judgement and submitted the case to a circuit court. The
circuit court held that a secured creditor could be liable without being an operator
by participating in the financial management to a degree indicating a capacity to
influence management and treatment of waste without the ability to manage day to
day operations. (Ries and Christel, 1992; Eggert, 1994; Vaughan, 1994)
Kelly and Chemical Manufacturers Association v EPA (1994)
• US Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia vacated the EPA Rule of 29 April
1992 held that the EPA lacked the authority to act by regulation to define and limit
a party's liability under section 107 of CERCLA (Anon., 1994a; Eggert, 1994;
Robbins and Bissett, 1994).
US v Maryland Bank and Trust co.(1986)
• Maryland Bank and Trust company in the USA had a US $335k loan go into default
at the end of 1986. The bank acquired title to land of equal value in a mortgage
foreclosure sale. The Bank was later required to reimburse the EPA US $500k for
the cost of cleaning up hazardous waste on the land before it could be sold on. The
hazardous waste had been dumped prior to the bank's initiation of foreclosure
proceedings, and the bank had not participated in any way in the polluting property.
However, no environmental assessment had been carried out as part of the lending
process (Welford et al., 1993).
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• The court was asked whether a foreclosing bank which owned the site actually
operated the site within the meaning of CERCLA. The court held that an exemption
covers only those persons who, at the time of the clean up, hold indicia of
ownership to protect a then held security interest in the land. The court reasoned
that the exclusion did not apply to former mortgagees such as the Bank which held
title to collateral after purchasing it in a foreclosure sale and holding title for nearly
four years. It court held that the actions of the bank were aimed at protecting the
lender's investment rather than protecting its collateral bringing the lender within
the definition of owner or operator (Sarokin and Schulkin, 1991; Ries and Christel,
1992; Bennett, 1993; Eggert, 1994; Vaughan, 1994).
US v illirabile (1985)
• The court held that a hazardous waste site owner's secured creditor may be liable
for response costs under CERCLA if the creditor exercised control over the daily
operations of the borrower. The court however, distinguished between the day to
day operations and financial involvement. The court concluded that a creditor who
foreclosed on the collateral property after all disposal operations had ceased and
who took all prudent steps to secure the property would NOT be liable. The court
also held that a creditor which had authority to participate in the management of the
company but which did not exercise that option was NOT liable. In contrast, Mellon
Bank, the third creditor was held liable. The court decision was based upon the
nature of the Bank's involvement in the site including monitoring the cash collateral
accounts, ensuring the receivables went to the proper account, and establishing a
reporting system between the company and the Bank (Eggert, 1994; Vaughan,
1994).
US v Whizco (1985)
• The sixth circuit court of appeal held a bankrupt company liable for clean-up or
reclaiming an abandoned site despite bankruptcy charge. Liability was however,
limited to the non-pecuniary obligation to reclaim the site. (Vaughan, 1994)
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Re: Bergsoe Metals Corp. (1990)
• The court stated that 'a creditor must, as a threshold matter, exercise actual
management authority before it can be held liable for action or inaction which
results in the discharge of hazardous waste' (Eggert, 1994).
Midland National Bank v New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(1986)
• The State Supreme Court refused to allow a bankruptcy trustee to abandon a
hazardous waste site contaminated with PCB's. The court held that where clean up
costs exceeded that value of the property, neither the debtor nor the receiver has a
right to abandon property in contravention of state, or local laws, designed to
protect public health and safety (Vaughan, 1994).
Kelly v Tiscornia (1992)
• A Michigan federal district court examined an array of activities undertaken by a
lender in a work-out situation and found none to be 'participation in management'
or otherwise inconsistent with a lender's proper oversight function (Eggert, 1994).
Silresim Site Trust V State Street Bank
• The court held that a lender's actions including: a new CEO appointment;
forbearance as to loan payments; increases in credit; and direct efforts to collect
accounts receivable did not constitute 'participation in management' (Eggert, 1994).
Waterville Industries Inc. v Fame (1993)
• The courts applied the same analysis as that adopted in the EPA rule without
relying on the rule. (Eggert, 1994)
Pheonix v Garbage Service Co. (1991)
• A bank was held liable for clean up as personal representative to a will. The estate
owned shares in a landfill. During the period of settlement title had temporarily
passed to the bank but the bank had never operated, nor received, a beneficial
interest in the landfill site at any time (Ries and Christel, 1992).
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Canadian cases
Re Hyrodam (Corby) Ltd
• The case considered a bank as a shadow director of a borrowing company in
difficulty. The case gives limited reassurance that a bank may not be held liable for
a borrowers debts. The case notes a number of actions which the bank can safely
take, including exemptions as professional advisers and limited direction (Turing,
1994).
Canadian Trust v Bulara Corporation Ltd
• A court receiver had taken over the assets of the borrower and found itself in control
of a group of vacant buildings which had been abandoned on a shut down mine. The
buildings were deemed a fire risk. A professional receiver had been ordered to
demolish the buildings but recognised that the demolition cost would exceed the
market value of the lot. The court held that the receiver had been given very broad
and sweeping powers of management in the company and thus had a duty to
comply with the demolition order. The court of appeal affirmed that decision (Tay,
1992).
Lamford Forest Products Ltd (1992) (Tay, 1992; Vaughan, 1994)
• A company wanted to file for bankruptcy but failed to identify a bankruptcy trustee
as required by Canadian law. Failure to identify a trustee was directly linked to the
fact that no one would assume responsibility for the environmental hazards on the
company site (Vaughan, 1994). It was held that any official receiver or trustee who
accepted an appointment would be liable for clean up (Tay, 1992).
Panamericana Be Bienes y Servicios S.A. v Northern Badger Oil & Gas Ltd
• Canadian bankruptcy law established a priority scheme directing payment on claims
against the estate to secured creditors. The court issued a strong warning that a
secured lender will not be able to realise the assets of a company and leave the
liabilities for the public to bear. Further, the decision opens the gates for public
authorities to refuse to take action and effectively to seek recovery from the
bankrupt's estate by ordering the receiver or trustee to perform that function (Fettig,
1991; Tay, 1992).
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Northern Wood Preserves inc.
• A court suggested that environmental liability could be imposed on a party which
takes possession of a polluting business (Vaughan, 1994).
Algoma Steel Corp.
• In a receivership one of the main creditors, the Royal Bank of Canada, faced site
remediation costs in excess of $20m, deemed higher than the value of the assets
(Vaughan, 1994).
Quadion Corp. v Macke (1990)
• The court provided a purchaser of property permission to seek contribution to clean
up costs from a bank trustee as previous owner (Ries and Christel, 1992).
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Banking and the Environment
A Statement by Banks on the Environment and
Sustainable Development
Foreword
We,the undersigned,believe that human welfare,environmental protection and sustainable
development depend on the commitment of governments,businesses and individuals.We
recognize that the pursuit of economic growth and a healthy environment are inextricably
linked.We further recognize that ecological protection and sustainable development are
collective responsibilities and must rank among the highest priorities of all business
activities,including banking.We will endeavor to ensure that our policies and business
actions promote sustainable development:
meeting the needs of the present without compromising those of the future.
(1) General Principles of Sustainable Development
(1.1) We believe that all countries should work towards common environmental goals.
(1.2) We regard sustainable development as a fundamental aspect of sound business
management.
(1.3) We believe that progress towards sustainable development can best be achieved
by working within the framework of market mechanisms to promote environmental
protection.We believe that there is role for governments to provide the right signals to
individuals and business,to promote behavioral changes in favor of effective
environmental management through the conservation of energy and natural resources,
whilst promoting economic growth.
(1.4)We regard a versatile,dynamic financial services sector as an important contributor
towards sustainable development.
(1.5) We recognize that sustainable development is a corporate commitment and an
integral part of our pursuit of good corporate citizenship.We are moving towards the
integration of environmental considerations into banking operations and business
decisions in a manner which enhances sustainable development.
(2)Environmental Management and Banks
(2.1)We subscribe to the precautionary approach to environmental management,
which strives to anticipate and prevent potential environment degradation.
(2.2)We expect,as part of our normal business practices, that our customers comply with
all applicable local,national and international environmental regulations.Beyond
compliance,we regard sound environmental practices as one of the key factors
demonstrating effective corporate management.
(2.3) We recognize that environmental risks should be part of the normal checklist of risk
assessment and management.As part of our credit risk assessment,we recommend when
appropriate environmental impact assessments.
(2.4)We will,in our domestic and international operations, endeavor to apply the same
standards of environmental risk assessment.
(2.5)We look to public institutions to conduct appropriate,up-to-date and comprehensive
environmental assessments in ventures with them,and to share the results of these
assessments with participating banks.
(2.6)We intend to update our management practices,including
accounting,marketing,public affairs,employee communications and training ,to incorporate
relevant developments in environmental management.We encourage banking research in
these and related issues.
(2.7)We will seek to ensure that in our internal operations we pursue the best practices in
environmental management,including energy efficiency,recycling and waste
minimisation.We will seek to form business relations with suppliers and sub-contractors
who follow similarly high environmental standards.
(2.8)We support and will develop suitable banking products and services designed to
promote environmental protection,where there is a sound business rationale.
(2.9)We recognize the need to conduct internal environmental reviews on a periodic
basis to measure our operational activities against our environmental goals.
(3) Public Awareness and Communication
(3.1)We will share information with customers,as appropriate,so that they may strength
their own capacity to reduce environmental risk,and promote sustainable development.
(3.2)We will foster openness and dialogue relating to environmental management with all
relevant audiences,including governments,clients,employees,shareholders and the public.
(3.3)We recommend that banks develop and publish a statement of their environmental
policy and periodically report on its implementation.
(3.4)We ask the United Nations Environment Programme to assist the industry by
providing,within its capacity,relevant information relating to sustainable development.
(3.5)We will periodically review the success in implementing this Statement and will
revise it as appropriate.
(3.6) We encourage other banks to support this Statement.
Status of UNEP Statement by Banks on
The Environment and Sustainable Development
31st January 1995
1. Algemene Spaarbank voor Nederland, The Netherlands
2. - Arab Bank, PLC, Jordan
3. Balkanbank Ltd., Bulgaria
4. - Banesto, Banco Espagnol de Credito, Spain
5. Banco do Estado de Sao Paulo SA, Brazil
6. - Bank Austria, Austria
7. - Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy S.A., Poland
8. - Bank fiir Tirol und Vorarlberg Aktiengesellschaft, Austria
9. - Bank Gdanski S.A., Poland
10. - Bankhaus Carl Spangler & Co. Aktiengesellschaf, Austria
11. - Bank of Baroda, India
12. - Bank of Handlowy W. Warszawie SA, Poland
13 - Bank of Ireland Group, Ireland
14. - Bank of Montreal, Canada
15. - Bank Ochrony Srodowiska, Poland
16. - Banky Fampandrosoana ny Varotra, Madagascar
17. -	 Bank of Philippine Islands, Philippines
18. - Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A., Poland
19. - Bank Przemystowo-Handlowy S.A., Poland
20. - Bank Rozwoju Eksportu S.A., Poland
21. - Banco Nacional de Angola, Angola
22. - Banco Portuges do Atlantico SA, Portugal
23. - Bank Slakski S.A., Poland
24. - Bank Bayerische Verinsbank AG, Germany
25. - Bank Zachodni S.A., Poland
26. - Budapest Bank RT., Hungary
27. - Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Canada
28. - Central Hispano, Spain
29. - Commerzbank AG., Germany
30. - Community Capital Bank, U.S.A
31. - Cooperative Bank, Manchester, U.K.
32. - Creditanstalt-Bankverein, Austria
33. - Credit Suisse, Switzerland
34. - Den Danske Bank, A/S, Denmark
35. - Deutsche Bank Ag, Germany
36. - DG Bank, Germany
37. - Dresdner Bank Ag, Germany
38. - Export Bank of Africa Ltd., Kenya
39. - ( The ) Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation Ltd., Hong Kong
40. - Kansallis-Osake-Pankki, Finland
41. - Kenya Commercial Bank Group, Kenya
42 - Kreditna banka Maribor d.d., Slovenia
43. - Landesgirokasse Bank, Germany
.44. -	 Landsbanki Islands, Iceland
45. - Lloyds Bank PLC, U.K.
46. - National Bank of Kuwait SAK, Kuwait
47. - National Westminster Bank PLC, U.K.
48. - ästerreichische lnvestitionskredit Aktiengesellschaf, Austria
49. - Osterreichische Kommunalkredit Aktiengesellschaf, Austria
50. - Polski Bank Kredytowy S.A., Poland
51. - Pomorski Bank Kredytowy S.A., Poland
52. - Powszechny Bank Kredytowy S.A., Poland
53. - Powszechny Bank Gospodarczy S.A. w todzi, Poland
54. - Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci - Bank Panstwowy, Poland
55. - Republic National Bank, U.S.A.
56. - Romanian Commercial Bank SA, Romania
57. - Royal Bank of Canada, Canada
58. - ( The ) Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, U.K.
59. - Thai Investment and Securities Co. Ltd , Thailand.
60. - Scotia Bank ( The Bank of Nova Scotia ) , Canada
61. - Swiss Bank Corporation, Switzerland
62. - ( The )Toronto-Dominion Bank, Canada
63 - Uganda Commercial Bank, Uganda
64. - Unibank (Denmark)
65. - Union Bank of Switzerland
66. - Westpac Banking Corporation, Australia
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A list of Bank members interviewed
Swiss banks
A Policy Maker*
Senior Manager, Environmental Management Services
Manager, Environmental Management Services
Assistant, Environmental Management Services
Manager, Environment Desk, Environmental Management Services
Head of Corporate Sector, Head Office
Manager, Corporate Sector, Head Office
Manager, Branch Office
B Policy Maker*
Credit Risk Manager, Environmental Management Services
Manager, Environmental Management Services
Researcher, Environmental Management Services
C Policy Maker*
Credit Risk Manager, Environmental Management Services
C(UK) Policy Maker*
Irish banks
D Policy Maker*
Senior Manager, Risk Management
Manager, Risk Management
Manager, Branch Office
Legal Adviser
Personnel Manager
E Policy Maker*
Legal Adviser
UK banks
F Policy Maker*
Manager, Branch Office
Manager, Property Management
Senior Manager, Marketing
Personnel Manager
G Policy Maker*
Manager, Environmental Management Unit
Manager, Branch Office
Public Relations Officer
H Policy Maker*
Officer, Risk Management
Public Relations Officer
I Policy Maker*
Manager, Property Management
Legal Adviser
Public Relations Officer
J Policy Maker*
Manager, Risk Management
Manager, Risk Management
Public Relations Officer
*denotes Key Informants
NB: the titles of bank policy makers have been withheld and the titles of other bank
members have been sanitised to maintain bank anonymity.
